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Introduction
0.1 Introduction
This dissertation makes a case for Descartes’s being a nonreductionist, in at least some 
areas of his philosophy. It first gives a reading of Descartes’s biology, in which I argue 
that he is not a strict reductionist about the mechanisms of the body (because those 
mechanisms rely on non-lowest-level properties of systems), that his ‘principle of life 
and motion’ is explicable only in terms of the whole body (or its major systems), and 
that he has no reductionist account of life. I then argue that this nonreductionism is 
compatible with Descartes’s wider philosophy. I give a reading of his treatment of the 
union of  mind and body in terms of  irreducibility,  which I  then use to argue that 
Descartes’s  philosophy  allows  for  nonreductionist  knowledge  and  the  existence  of 
irreducibles (the union itself,  teleology, and, finally,  life).  Indeed, I end up claiming, 
Descartes’s philosophy could not work without this nonreductionist knowledge and 
without those irreducibles. That is because reductionism fails him. Given his system, 
he cannot reductively explain the operation of biological  bodies,  the interaction of 
thought and extension,  or  possibly  even physical  causation.  Nonreductionism saves 
him from what would otherwise be explanatory dead ends.
2 INTRODUCTION
It is admittedly somewhat odd, though, to read Descartes as a nonreductionist. He is 
explicitly, famously committed to reductionism, broadly conceived.1 Indeed, it would 
not be much of a stretch to describe him as the archetypal philosophical reductionist – 
we see this much in the throwaway remarks on Descartes that often come up in the 
introductions to papers on reductionism in philosophy of science and science studies. 
Descartes, we’re told, ‘was the first to introduce reductionism to Western thinking and 
philosophy’  (Mazzocchi  2008:  10) ;  reductionism  ‘is  identified  with  René 
Descartes’  (Trewavas  2006:  2420);  and,  even if  reductionism has  a  history  prior  to 
Descartes, it was supposedly he who ‘later re-introduced’ it to science (Beresford 2010: 
721). These are all just superficial references to Descartes, of course, which are used 
only to provide a little scene-setting for arguments that are not at all concerned with 
Descartes  or  the  seventeenth  century.  Given  that,  their  superficiality  is  perfectly 
reasonable, but it’s also revealing. It’s revealing in that it indicates the degree to which 
the association with reductionism permeates the general (non-specialist) conception of 
Descartes’s  natural  philosophy:  ‘as  an  aside’,  these  references  seem to  say,  ‘all  our 
modern  concern  with  reductionism  goes  back  to  Descartes’.  And  it  is  not  only 
nonspecialists who associate Descartes with reductionism. As Grosholz puts it, ‘[m]uch 
of  modern philosophy bears  the traces  of  Descartes’s  reductive method [.  .  .],  and 
requires prolonged and deep philosophical criticism in order to make that influence 
visible, and so subject to further reflection’ (1991: 10).
This  association  with  reductionism is  well  supported  by  Descartes’s  texts.  In  the 
Discourse on the Method, written as a methodological introduction to his essays on optics, 
meteorology, and geometry, Descartes sets out his approach in general terms:
[. . .] never to accept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its 
truth [. . .].
[. . .] to divide each of the diﬃculties I examined into as many parts [parce!es] as 
possible and as may be required in order to resolve them better.
[. . .] to direct my thoughts in an orderly manner, by beginning with the simplest 
and most easily known objects [objets] in order to ascend little by little, step by step, 
to knowledge of the most complex [plus composez]
(CSM i: 120; AT vi: 18).
1  Broadly conceived because Descartes can readily be associated with various forms of reductionism: his 
ontological parsimony lends itself to ontological reductionism, as does his epistemic parsimony to epistemic 
reductionism, and his commitment to the unity of the sciences seems, at least to an extent, to tie in with 
theory reductionism, and so on for diﬀerent subtypes of reductionism. See Grosholz (1991: 12–3).
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It is easy to read this as a kind of explanatory reductionism – as the recommendation 
to  break  higher-level  problems2  down  into  their  lowest-possible-level  parts.  Those 
lowest-level parts should be well-grounded, such that we have ‘evident knowledge’ of 
their  truth.  On that  basis,  we  should  build  up knowledge  of  complex  things  from 
knowledge of their parts; we should explain higher levels on the basis of the lowest 
level.
Descartes’s  ontology,  too,  suggests  reductionism  –  in  this  case,  an  ontological 
reductionism. As he sets it out in the textbook version of his system, the Principles of 
Philosophy,
I recognize only two ultimate classes of things: first, intellectual or thinking things, 
i.e.  those  which  pertain  to  mind  or  thinking  substance;  and  secondly,  material 
things, i.e. those which pertain to extended substance or body
(Principles 1/48; CSM i: 208; AT viiiA: 23).
He continues, to specify that
extension  in  length,  breadth  and  depth  constitutes  the  nature  of  corporeal 
substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance. Everything else 
which can be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of an extended 
thing;  and similarly,  whatever we find in the  mind is  simply one of  the  various  modes  of 
thinking
(Principles 1/53; CSM i: 210; AT viiiA: 25; my emphasis).
That is, the world consists of nothing but thinking substance and extended substance. 
Whatever there might seem to be in the world, it can ultimately be nothing other than 
a  modification  of  thought  or  extension;  whatever  there  seems  to  be,  it  must, 
exclusively, reduce down to thinking substance or extended substance. Similarly, if we 
want to explain what there is in the world, and what happens within it, these are the 
terms we need: thought, extension, and their respective modifications. In the natural, 
material world, that means that all phenomena, and all explanations thereof, ought to 
come down to nothing more than the ‘size, shape, and motion of the tiny parts that 
make it up’ (Garber 2001d: 112). This call to reductionism is emphasised by Descartes’s 
explicit promotion of his notoriously austere ontology, and its explanatory capabilities, 
over the relative ontological extravagance of what he takes to be the superfluous forms, 
qualities, powers, souls, etc. used in the then-mainstream scholastic philosophy (e.g. AT 
iii: 648–9; AT vi: 45–6; AT xi: 7; AT xi: 202).
2  In context, Descartes is concerned with the reduction of problems here, but his use of ‘objects’  might 
suggest an ontological reductionism too.
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There are, then, plenty of good reasons to take Descartes to be a reductionist through 
and through: his ontology allows only a very narrow range of things into the world, and 
his  epistemology  depends  on the  reconstitution of  complex  knowledge  from those 
basic truths of which we have evident knowledge.  That evident knowledge is  what 
Descartes comes to call ‘clear and distinct’ knowledge. It is, again, easy to interpret 
Cartesian  clarity  and  distinctness  as  the  lowest  level  for  an  epistemological 
reductionism. As McMullin sums it up,
[Descartes’s]  insistence in his  epistemology on the primacy of clear and distinct 
ideas leads him to an extreme form of reductionism in his ontology where all that 
he admits are “bodies which are extended in length, breadth, and depth, and which 
have various shapes and move in various ways.” That, he says, is all he needs “to 
deduce the truth of other things” (Principles: 1:184; AT 9B:10).
[. . .]
Reduction on this scale forces him to a new level of explanation, one which has no 
parallel in Aristotelian natural philosophy. Properties like color and weight which 
are simple givens for  Aristotle  now have to be explained (or explained away)  in 
terms of extensions (or bodies) and motion alone, a daunting task for anyone less 
committed to clear and distinct ideas than was Descartes
(McMullin 2008: 88–9).
One of the major messages of the Meditations  is  that clarity and distinctness is our 
epistemic saviour. Clarity and distinctness is our only means of metaphysical certainty 
(AT vii: 62). It’s the fulcrum with which Descartes means to shift the earth (AT vii: 24), 
and so on. Its opposite is obscurity and confusion. When something is obscure, it is 
obscured by something else; when it’s confused, it is combined with something else.3 
That  is,  we  have  obscurity  and  confusion  when we  have  unreduced  complexes.  In 
which case,  it  is  the aim of a  reductionist  epistemology to rid us of  obscurity and 
confusion – to reduce those complexes down to the clear and distinct lowest level. On 
the  reductionist  reading,  all  epistemic  value  lies  in  clarity  and  distinctness,  while 
whatever is obscure or confused is nothing but an impediment to knowledge, and is in 
need of reduction.
In that light, this dissertation is an attempt to rehabilitate obscurity and confusion. 
That’s not to say that it is an analysis of the categories: it is not. Rather, obscurity and 
confusion (confusion in particular) are the ghosts that haunt the nonreductionism that 
I  address  here;  I  am attempting to show that  they are  friendly  ghosts.  Unreduced 
3 Descartes himself makes extensive use of the terms, but does not define ‘obscurity’ and ‘confusion’ outright; 
I follow Nelson’s (1997) very convincing reading here. For more on this, see Ch. 5, §5.4.1.
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complexes, I argue throughout, are not just epistemic impediments for Descartes: they 
have epistemic value of their own; they can do things that the lowest levels cannot. 
Thus, Descartes explains the heartbeat using non-lowest-level properties of systems, 
because eﬃcient causation between corpuscles fails to be suﬃciently explanatory (Ch. 
1); he has no means of reducing various kinds of teleology to the properties of extended 
substance, and yet he relies heavily on natural teleology (Ch. 6 §6.3); and so on – I make 
similar cases for various biological mechanisms (Ch. 1), the ‘principle of life’ (Ch. 2), life 
itself (Ch. 3 and Ch. 6, §6.4), and the union of mind and body (Ch. 4 and Ch. 6, §6.2). 
In this way, clarity and distinctness does not always confer knowledge; sometimes, it 
prevents  it.4  Sometimes,  it  is  only  through  obscurity  and  confusion  –  through  the 
nonreductionist knowledge of unreduced complexes – that Descartes can adequately 
account for the world.
There is nothing new in pointing out that Descartes helps himself to things he should 
not,  given their preclusion in his system. The relatively recent work on Descartes’s 
biology and associated areas has been especially fruitful to this end. Natural teleology is 
a notable case, and has so far received the most attention.5 Des Chene (2001) points to 
more problematic  things,  including the unity  of  the animal  body and (in-principle-
reducible) systems. And Brown (2012), in attempting to account for one (function in 
Descartes’s embryology), identifies what I take to be another (interdependence – see 
Ch. 1, §1.3.1.1 and Ch. 2, §2.4.2). The first half of this dissertation serves to identify 
more  such  cases.  The  second  half  then  establishes  a  context  of  reductionism and 
nonreductionism in which to address them, and makes a case for the coherence of 
irreducibles within Descartes’s philosophy.
0.2 Outline
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. In the first part (Chs 1–3), I show that 
Descartes’s  account  of  physiology  depends  on  nonreductionism  to  explain  the 
operation of the body. The chapters that make up the first part of the dissertation were 
all written for independent publication, and are lightly modified here. Chapter One 
looks as Descartes’s  use of mechanism in his accounts of physiological  phenomena. 
4 Clarity and distinctness prevents knowledge in that the clear and distinct ideas of Descartes’s dualist system 
can tell us nothing about the union (or, I argue in Ch. 6, about natural teleology or life).
5 See, e.g., Gaukroger (2000), Des Chene (2001; 2000a), Simmons (2001), Shapiro (2003) (note that Shapiro 
explicitly attempts to provide Descartes with a reductionist account of natural  teleology in the form of 
health), Manning (2013), and Distelzweig (2015).
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Cartesian  mechanism  gets  strongly  associated  with  reductionism,  for  the  reasons 
discussed above –  it  is  supposed to be the reduction of  natural  phenomena to the 
shape, size, position, and motion of tiny, material corpuscles. Here, I refer to the latter 
position as ‘corpuscular mechanics’, and I argue that the mechanisms Descartes uses to 
account for physiology are rarely ever corpuscular-mechanical. While he does reduce 
physiological phenomena to the material, he does not reduce them to the lowest level: 
he is not a strict reductionist about biological mechanism. The chapter builds on the 
work of Des Chene (2001)  to argue that, for the most part, Descartes accounts for 
physiology through systems that are irreducible to corpuscular mechanics; any further 
reduction would rob them of their explanatory power.
In Chapter Two, I assess Descartes’s ‘principle of life’ and argue that the body, on his 
account, has no single principle underlying its operation. In the Aristotelian biologies 
that Descartes takes himself to be responding to, the principle of life is attributed to a 
soul,  or to part of a soul.  That is,  broadly speaking,  there is  one,  single thing that 
‘drives’  the  body,  and  to  which  all  its  operations  are  ultimately  reducible.  When 
Descartes  takes  on  the  ‘principle  of  life’  terminology,  it  looks  as  though  he  has 
something similar in mind. It looks as though he is swapping the psychistic principle 
for a material principle, while leaving the structure of the body’s operation in place – 
that  is,  making  its  operation  ultimately  reducible  to  a  single  thing.  He appears  to 
associate that single thing with the heat of the heart.  The trouble is,  I  argue,  that 
Descartes’s account of cardiac heat makes it inextricable from the operation of several 
interdependent bodily systems. Rather than the operations of the body bottoming out 
in a single, underlying principle, they end up in circular causality: there is no lowest 
level to which they are reducible.
Chapter Three moves on from the principle of life to Descartes’s account of life itself. 
It argues that he has,  and can have, no reductionist account of life.  It assesses the 
various attempts in the literature to provide Descartes with a reductionist concept of 
life and shows where they fail (in some cases, the attempts involved are explicit about 
their  own  failure  (Ablondi  1998;  Detlefsen  2016)).  It  then  argues  that  Descartes’s 
ontology lacks the resources to ground a principled, reductionist conception of life. I 
conclude that, for the purposes of his biology, Descartes eliminates the category of life 
entirely. The conclusions of this chapter are then taken up again in Chapter Six (§6.4), 
where I argue that this eliminativism is compatible with a metaphysical treatment of 
life as an irreducible.
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The second part of the dissertation argues that nonreductionism is both a legitimate 
possibility for and a necessity within Descartes’s philosophy. Its aim is to bridge the 
apparent  inconsistency  between  Descartes’s  explicit  endorsement  of  a  reductionist 
position  in  his  epistemology  and  ontology  with  his  use  of  nonreductionism.  My 
intention is to construct a coherent reading in which Descartes does indeed get access 
to nonreductionist knowledge and can (and must) uphold the existence of irreducibles.6
Chapter  Four  gives  a  reading  of  the  Cartesian  union  of  mind  and  body  as  an 
irreducible.  It  starts  from  Descartes’s  responses  to  the  problem  of  mind–body 
interaction, in which he claims that the union is a primitive notion that cannot be 
comprehended in the terms of his dualism but which we nevertheless know through 
‘the ordinary course of life’ (CSMK: 227; AT iii: 692). I argue that this position entails 
that there is an epistemic gap in Descartes’s dualist system when it comes to the union: 
the union is something that his dualism cannot explain. This means that Descartes has 
to abandon the epistemology that pertains to his dualism in order to account for our 
knowledge  of  the  union.  This  entails  that  he  sustain  a  separate  epistemology  that 
pertains  to  the  union.  The  chapter  reconstructs  the  epistemology  implicit  in 
Descartes’s  account  of  the  union.  It  then  argues  that  Descartes  has  to  equivocate 
between the two epistemologies to fill the epistemic gap in his dualism. This means, 
then, that there is nonreductionism at the heart of Descartes’s philosophy.
In Chapter Five, I assess the role of reductionism in Cartesian knowledge, with the aim 
of showing where it need apply and where (as addressed in Ch. 6) it need not. I argue, 
uncontroversially,  that  the  majority  of  Descartes’s  process  of  acquiring  knowledge 
involves sensation in observation and experimentation. The role of reduction in this, 
the chapter concludes, is to provide grounds for asserting the independent existence of 
external things with their particular essences. That is, while our obscure and confused 
sensations  cannot  tell  us  what  the  world  is  like  in  itself,  we  can  know  that  the 
reductions of those sensations to the elements of Descartes’s ontology tell us what does 
exist in itself:  the colour red might not exist as the colour red independent of our 
perception of it, but the rotational movement of tiny corpuscles propagating light to 
which Descartes reduces it does.
I  draw  on  this  conclusion  in  Chapter  Six  to  argue  that  all  that  Cartesian 
nonreductionist  knowledge  gives  up  is  knowledge  of  independent  existence: 
nonreductionist knowledge can tell us about the non-independent existence of external 
6  On why I’m aiming for  a  coherent  reading rather  than maintaining that  Descartes’s  project  is  simply 
inconsistent, see §0.3 below.
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things with their particular essences. We can still have knowledge of external things 
nonreductively, but we cannot say anything about what they might be in themselves, 
independent  of  us.  Cartesian  nonreductionist  epistemology  is  thus  a  subjective 
standpoint epistemology,  as  opposed to the objective epistemology he gets through 
reductionism.  I  argue  that  he  can  maintain  both.  The  chapter  gives  accounts  of 
nonreductionist knowledge first of the union, and then of natural teleology. Descartes 
treats both, it argues, as irreducibles whose existence can only be known subjectively. 
Finally, I come back to life, and argue that, despite his eliminativism about life for the 
purposes of his biology, Descartes has a weak metaphysical commitment to life itself as 
an irreducible.
0.3 Methodology
My  intention,  in  this  dissertation,  is  not  to  find  the  original  meaning  behind 
Descartes’s  texts,  or  to  get  to  some historical  truth  about  them.  In  that  way,  the 
dissertation  is  non-historicist.  Nor  is  my  approach  to  analyse  timeless  arguments, 
though. The approach here is to find some implications of what Descartes writes, with 
respect  to  reductionism and  nonreductionism.  In  other  words,  the  dissertation  is 
concerned with the interpretative possibilities for Descartes’s system. I take it that 
philosophies  have  lives  of  their  own,  and  that  the  author’s  intentions  are  fairly 
restricted guides to those lives. Descartes might or might not have meant his work to 
imply nonreductionism; nevertheless (I am arguing here), it does. With that in mind, 
I’ve  tended  to  focus  on  Descartes’s  accounts  of  various  things  (such  as  biological 
phenomena or the union of mind and body) rather than his overt statements about his 
methodology and the role of reduction within it. The point here is to be concerned 
with the philosophical consequences of the accounts Descartes gives, rather than with 
what he claims to be doing – while he might endorse reductionism explicitly, the way 
he treats biology and the union shows considerable reliance on nonreductionism (that 
is, if the analysis here works).
One way to deal with this disparity would be to interpret Descartes’s work as simply 
inconsistent. This is fine, as far as it goes: there undoubtedly are inconsistencies in 
Descartes’s  work,  some developmental,  and some possibly  more  insidious.7  But  my 
approach here instead is to look for a reading that generates some coherence from that 
inconsistency. That’s because I take it that it’s philosophically productive to see how far 
a system can be pushed. And Descartes has a system that is in particular need of being 
7 Machamer and McGuire (2009) have recently made an excellent case for the inconsistency of Descartes’s 
philosophy and, to an extent, the value of that inconsistency.
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pushed. His is  quite possibly unique in its  combination of influence,  extensiveness, 
rigidity, explicitness, and well-definedness. And the association of reductionism with 
that system is  still  particularly widespread,  to the extent that Descartes is  still  the 
default historical framing device for any number of nonspecialist works on the subject 
(as we’ve seen). My aim here is to recruit Descartes for the other side. I want to make 
him  a  nonreductionist  (because,  if  the  archetypal  reductionist  turns  out  to  be  a 
nonreductionist,  then pure reductionism ought to find itself  standing on somewhat 
shakier ground). That would be a vacuous, and arbitrary, exercise if his system did not 
support such a reading, of course: it would be pointless to claim that Descartes is a 
nonreductionist without any basis for that claim. And while it would not be vacuous to 
show that, despite himself, Descartes is sometimes inconsistently nonreductionist, that 
position would be weaker than a reading that maintains the coherence of Descartes’s 
system while interpreting it as fundamentally (if not exclusively) nonreductionist.
What I am doing in this dissertation, then, is turning Descartes into something very 
diﬀerent  from what  we  have  come  to  believe  he  is.  Whether  that  is  historically 
legitimate,  I  am not  sure  (that  might  be  a  matter  for  further  research).  But  it  is 
possible, while still staying coherent with his texts. And that is what I’m interested in 
here. I am aware that I have used variations on the phrase ‘that’s surprising’ repeatedly 
throughout this dissertation. I suspect it gets fairly tedious. But this is a dissertation 
that makes what,  at  first,  sound like very odd claims.  It  claims that Descartes is  a 
nonreductionist, that he can be a non-corpuscularian, that he has no principle of life 
(despite claiming to), that the union of mind and body have some sort of priority over 
thought and extension, that he has another domain of knowledge outside his dualism, 
and that he is both an eliminativist about life and some sort of vitalist. If that can end 
up seeming non-surprising, the dissertation will have done its job reasonably well.

Part 1
Nonreductionism in Descartes’s biology

Chapter 1
Descartes, corpuscles and reductionism: mechanism and 
systems in Descartes’s physiology1
1.1 Introduction
This chapter is a reconstruction of Descartes’s approach to physiology in which his 
explanations  of  the  principal  operations  of  the  body  are  understood  in  terms  of 
systems. A systems reading of Descartes’s physiology is at odds with the received view 
on  explanation  in  Descartes’s  natural  philosophy,  which  takes  him  to  reduce  all 
phenomena  in  the  natural  world  to  the  size,  shape,  position,  and  motion  of  tiny 
corpuscles  (see  the  introduction,  p.  3  above).  A systems  explanation  cannot  be  a 
reduction right down to this corpuscular mechanics, because it is the system itself that 
carries the explanatory weight, rather than its lowest-level components.
Elsewhere in his natural philosophy, Descartes arguably does make use of explanations 
in terms of corpuscular mechanics (but see §1.3.3 for discussion of whether even his 
physics is corpuscular-mechanical). Most notably, the propagation and colour of light 
are reduced to, respectively, tendency to longitudinal motion and rotation of the very 
smallest  pieces  of  matter.  These  explanations  of  light  have  come  to  be  seen  as 
archetypal for Descartes’s treatment of natural phenomena.2 Given his commitment to 
1 A version of this chapter was originally published in The Philosophical Quarterly 65/261 (2015): 669–689.
2 The propagation of light tends to be the key example in scholarship on Descartes’s use of analogy in natural 
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the unity of the sciences, it makes sense to presume that Descartes explains all aspects 
of the natural world, including physiology, in the same way, such that what goes for 
light  also  goes  for  the  living  body.3  Thus,  Clarke  tells  us  that  ‘Descartes’s  whole 
scientific project is one of imaginatively constructing descriptions of the motions of 
particles  which  might  explain  natural  phenomena’  (1982:  124);  in  a  recent  paper, 
Theurer asserts that Descartes’s aim is ‘to explain all of human physiology in terms of 
the principles of Cartesian physics. Ideally, all of this could be explained in terms of the 
properties  of  fundamental  particles’  (2013:  912–3).  This  position  is  echoed  in  both 
Hatfield (1992: 340) and (in a more restricted context) Hatfield (2000: 635), while Fuchs 
(2001) sees Descartes’s aim in physiology as being ‘to explain vegetative-vital processes 
exclusively in terms of [the] lowest level’ (2001: 123), which involves reducing the ‘vital 
heat’  provided  by  the  heart  to  nothing  more  than  ‘an  exothermic  reaction  of 
particles’ (2001: 115). It is symptomatic of this approach that Smith (2006b: 14; 2006a: 
88)  sees  Descartes’s  inability  to  account  for  embryogenesis  specifically  in  terms  of 
corpuscular mechanics as a ‘failure’.
By  contrast,  Des  Chene  (2001)  has  convincingly  shown  that  there  is  more  to 
Descartes’s treatment of physiology than corpuscles: there are systems too. Similarly, 
Brown (2012) has argued that Descartes’s account of embryogenesis consists of a ‘whole 
matrix of interdependent processes’ (2012: 12), which I suspect we may take to suggest 
something strongly systemic.4 As Des Chene puts it, for Descartes, ‘the body is to be 
analysed into systems of mechanisms, and each mechanism into simpler mechanisms, 
until  we arrive at  mechanisms whose capacities  can be understood in terms of  the 
modes and derived properties of extended things’ (2001: 154).
I take Des Chene’s identification of systems of mechanisms seriously. However, Des 
Chene sees Descartes as moving away from systems, proceeding through a string of 
recursive reductions until reaching the level of corpuscular mechanics (‘the modes and 
derived properties  of  extended things’).  This  is  entirely  consistent  with Descartes’s 
philosophy. See, e.g., Clarke (1982: 122ﬀ.), Galison 1984; Manning (2012). The account of colour is often used 
to exemplify Descartes’s reductive method, since it is part of the conclusion of his only extended description 
of his own use of his method, given in Discourse 8 of the Meteors (see, e.g., Buchwald 2008, Clarke (1982: 
173ﬀ.), Garber 2001b, Garber 2001a, Georgescu and Giurgea 2012).
3 Descartes’s most significant statement of commitment to the unity of sciences is of course the simile of the 
tree of knowledge in the preface to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy (AT ixb: 14–5; CSM i: 
186).
4 On interdependence and systematicity, see §1.3.1.1 below.
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ontological commitments, but it is not, I want to argue, the approach that Descartes 
takes in accounting for the ‘principal parts’ (Passions a. 6) of the body. It is the reduction 
to  the  lowest  level  that  I  argue  against  here:  instead  of  reduction  to  corpuscular 
mechanics, Descartes explains the operation of the body through whole systems. And 
the components of those systems exist at diﬀerent levels. In other words, the systems 
remain systems; they do not get reduced away to corpuscles.
If my reading is correct, then what goes for light does not in fact go for the living body. 
As Roux puts it, ‘in his biological treatises, Descartes rarely speaks of laws of motion, 
or even of corpuscles’ (2004: 34). If the explanations of light are taken to be archetypal 
of Cartesian explanation in natural philosophy, then, it means we have misunderstood 
at least some of Descartes’s  natural  philosophy: his explanations in physiology (and 
perhaps elsewhere: see §1.3.3). Where the explanations do not reduce to corpuscular 
mechanics,  this is  not a ‘failure’  on Descartes’s  part,  but a property of the kind of 
explanation in use.
The focus of this chapter is not on Descartes’s own claims (in, e.g., the Principles) about 
what he is doing in natural philosophy: my intention is not to recover what Descartes 
rea!y  meant  when he  wrote  about  explanation.  Instead,  I  am concerned with  what 
Descartes actually does when he explains physiology. My ultimate concern here lies with 
understanding  the  philosophical  implications  of  Descartes’s  account  of  physiology 
rather than with understanding his intentions (see the introduction, §0.3). Accordingly, 
in this chapter, I do not attempt to establish whether or not Descartes-the-philosopher 
would agree with my analysis  of the work of Descartes-the-physiologist5,  and I use 
anachronism where avoiding it would be ineﬃcient.
This is by no means to suggest that the analysis presented here is incompatible with 
Descartes’s philosophy, however. For instance, while Descartes himself does not use the 
term ‘system’ in the sense employed here, a passage in La Forge’s commentary on the 
1664 edition of Descartes’s  Traité  de  l’homme  suggests that something like a systems 
reading was available in the period: the body-machine is ‘composed of many organic 
parts which, united, work together to produce certain movements of which they would 
not be capable if they were separated’6 (La Forge 1664: 173). Nor is my aim to describe a 
method for Descartes’s physiology that is discontinuous with his larger project. I take 
5 See Ch. 6.
6 ‘[. . .] composé de plusieurs parties organiques qui estant unies, s’accordent à produire quelques mouvements, dont e!es ne 
seroient pas capable, si e!es etoient separées.’
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it  that  aspects  of  systems  explanations  turn  up  throughout  Descartes’s  natural 
philosophy (§1.3.3), and that the unity of the sciences is less at risk if we distinguish 
between  explanatory  and  ontic  systems,  and  rule  out  the  latter  (at  least  for  now) 
(§1.2.2 ).
In what follows, §1.2.1 provides a definition of the type of system in question here, in 
the  form  of  a  brief  outline  of  its  structure;  §1.2.2  makes  a  distinction  between 
explanatory and ontic systems, favouring the former for the purposes of this reading. 
The type of explanation outlined in §1.2 is then used in §1.3 to analyse Descartes’s 
explanations of physiology. §1.3.1 focuses on his account of the heartbeat. First, §1.3.1.1 
shows how the explanation is systemic and compositional. Next, §1.3.1.2 demonstrates 
how Descartes’s explanations are constructed in terms of the eﬀects and components 
set out in §1.2.1. The analysis of the explanation of the heartbeat concludes by showing 
that  the  components  of  the  system exist  at  diﬀerent  explanatory  levels  (§1.3.1.3). 
Systems explanations are not restricted to the heartbeat and associated systems, which 
§1.3.2  demonstrates  by  applying  the  analysis  to  explanations  of  bodily  growth  and 
muscular movement, while §1.3.3 assesses the extent which systems explanations, or 
some of their features, may be present outside the physiology.
1.2 Systems
1.2.1 Definition
I make use of systems explanations here as an analytical tool: the application of this 
analysis  in  the  rest  of  the  chapter  will  show  how  it  makes  sense  of  Descartes’s 
explanations of physiology.
An explanation is systemic insofar as it is given in terms of systems – that is, for the 
purposes of this chapter, aggregations of components7, organised in such a way as to 
determine an eﬀect.  I  refer  to the organisation of  the components  as  the system’s 
‘composition’, and it is the composition that is the ultimate determinant of the system’s 
7 Descartes uses the term ‘part’ (‘partie’ (AT xi: 225–6, 234, 253) or sometimes ‘piece’ (AT xi: 119)). I prefer 
‘component’ here because of its connection to composition and because of its generality (we tend to think of 
parts as straightforwardly physical,  whereas what constitutes a component depends on the system; here, 
components are activities).
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eﬀect.8  The components are mostly systems themselves. When components are not 
systemic,  they consist  of  nothing more than the behaviour of  individual  corpuscles 
(such  as  the  stochastic  movement  of  spirit-corpuscles  in  muscles).  Non-systemic 
components  are  non-systemic  because  lower-level  organisation  plays  no  part  in 
determining  their  behaviour.  All  components,  both  systemic  and  non-systemic, 
determine their own eﬀects (e.g., a blood-expansion component determines the eﬀect 
of  blood  expansion).  As  such,  all  components  are  activities  rather  than  static 
(anatomical) structures: they are things that happen and, in doing so, determine other 
things to happen.
These explanations involve multiple levels when the components of the system exist at 
diﬀerent levels: within the explanation, lower-level components have direct causal and 
dependency  relations  with  higher-level  components,  and  vice  versa.  The  levels 
distinction relevant here is not between visible and subvisible (as in, e.g., Galison 1984) 
but between levels of organisation (the engine of a car is at a lower level than the car 
itself, but at a higher level than the pistons). There are multiple ways to hierarchise 
such levels, but doing so with precision is not necessary for the argument here, which 
requires only a distinction between the lowest level and some higher level(s):  where 
there are causal or dependency relations between any higher and any lower level, the 
system is multilevel.
1.2.2 Explanatory versus ontic systems
On the face of it, appeals to whole systems and multiple levels within them ought to be 
a serious problem for Descartes. His metaphysics commits him to an ontology of the 
natural world that cannot involve more than the shape, size and motion of pieces of 
extended substance. If he is invoking system properties and higher levels in preference 
to the behaviour of corpuscles, he appears to be in trouble. One way of dealing with 
this inconsistency would be to surmise that (A)  Descartes’s  philosophical  project is 
simply not as coherent as he wanted it to be. On reaching the outer branches of his 
tree of knowledge, perhaps he faltered, and perhaps things became somewhat messier 
8 See Shapiro (2003: 435): ‘[w]hat makes a machine the machine it is [. . .] is its particular composition’. And 
Gaukroger (2002: 393): ‘Descartes wants to subordinate function to structure’.
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than they had been within the solid roots of metaphysics. This is possible.9 On this 
reading, if Descartes does include systems of the kind described here in his physiology, 
they are ontic systems: they exist in the real, material world. In that case, he would be 
(presumably inadvertently) giving up on his ontological parsimony and tacitly accepting 
the existence of hearts and lungs as real entities in the world (or, rather, heart-beating 
and respiration as real activities in the world).
We can,  however,  find such systems in  Descartes’s  physiology  without  breaking  so 
radically from his metaphysical commitments if (B) the systems are explanations only.10 
On this reading, they are not ontic systems. Descartes does have ontic mechanisms, but 
they  can  exist  only  at  the  lowest  level  (i.e.  the  corpuscle  level).  Heart-beating, 
respiration, and blood-expansion get to be components of an explanatory system, but 
Cartesian ontic mechanisms are composed of corpuscle-behaviour alone. This means 
that,  in a Cartesian world,  systems with components on higher levels  can never be 
isomorphic to ontic mechanisms. In addition, systems explanations cannot be direct 
descriptions of ontic mechanisms11, because systems include components that are not 
available to Cartesian ontic mechanisms. Because systems explanations cannot directly 
describe real-world mechanisms, the explanations may be hypothetical, or heuristic, or 
they may ‘overlay’ real-world mechanisms.12 My position is compatible with all three 
options. In the case of overlaying explanations, systems explanations would describe 
real-world  mechanisms,  but  only  indirectly,  just  because  the  components  of  the 
explanatory systems would bottom out at diﬀerent levels from the components of the 
real-world mechanisms.
9 Machamer and McGuire (2009) suggest that inconsistency is the appropriate way to interpret the relation 
between Descartes’s earlier and later work. They do not, however, uphold the kind of incoherence between 
Descartes’s later metaphysics and physiology that (A)  entails.  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for 
pointing out the relevance of Machamer and McGuire here.
10  The ‘how-possible’  reading of Descartes’s  physiology given by Des Chene (2005)  might lie somewhere 
between the incoherence and explanatory-systems readings. In the context of that interpretation, Descartes’s 
how-possible explanations would be systemic rather than strictly reductionist.
11 Recent work on mechanism sees (modern) biological mechanistic explanation precisely as description of 
real-world mechanisms (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000: 3). It is a diﬀerence in ontology that allows for 
the diﬀerence in possibility of describing real-world mechanisms.
12 On hypothetical explanation in Descartes’s natural philosophy, see in particular Clarke (1982: 133ﬀ.) and 
Manning 2012.
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There is an argument to be made for (A), and the analysis in this chapter would be 
broadly compatible with that position. Nevertheless, I have assumed (B) here, partly 
because it is the less revisionist path, and partly because it avoids problems that may be 
generated by conflating explanation with ontology (the chapter remains agnostic about 
whether or not the explanatory systems overlay real-world mechanisms).
There might also be a case to be made for (C) an ontic reading of Cartesian systems 
that  maintains  the coherence of  Descartes’s  project.  While  an ontic  reading might 
seem entirely at odds with Descartes’s ontology, perhaps allowing an ontological status 
to systems is not significantly more problematic than allowing it to corpuscles in a 
world of extended substance.13 This is potentially interesting, but making the case for it 
would be an undertaking lengthy enough to hijack the thesis of the present chapter. 
Consequently, I leave (C) to be addressed elsewhere. If my analysis in the chapter is 
correct,  however,  and  if  (C)  does  indeed  hold,  then  we  will  be  able  to  say  that 
Descartes’s ontology contains real multilevel systems.
1.3 Systems in Descartes’s physiology
1.3.1 The heartbeat
The following section analyses Descartes’s most extensive account of the heartbeat in 
terms of systems. The account comes from Descartes’s Description of the Human Body 
(hereafter, Description), a late manuscript that integrates and expands on his prior work 
on  physiology.  The  analysis  shows  that  the  explanation  of  the  heartbeat  involves 
considerably more than corpuscular mechanics (as defined in §1.1), first in terms of its 
systematicity and composition, then its eﬀects and components, and finally its reliance 
on appeal to multiple explanatory levels.
1.3.1.1 Systematicity and composition
For the purposes of this chapter, a system is an aggregation of components, organised 
in  such  a  way  as  to  determine  an  eﬀect  (§1.2.1).  Consequently,  if  Descartes’s 
explanations  are  given  in  terms  of  components  whose  organisation  determines  a 
13 My position in the published version of this chapter was that there might be some support for an ontic 
account to be found in Descartes’s remarks on the real distinction in the Principles (1/60) (Cf. Sowaal 2004). 
Within the framework established in the second part of this dissertation, I would say that the unity of any 
physical body might be another irreducible. See Ch. 6, §6.3.3, p. 152 below. Cf. Lennon 1994 and 2007, and the 
discussion of the latter in Ch. 6, p. 140 below.
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particular eﬀect, we can say that they are systemic. The second part of the Description is 
concerned with explaining the eﬀect of the heartbeat (along with the eﬀect of heat 
generation). While it begins with the movement of the heart itself, the complexity of 
the account escalates rapidly. It soon reaches the point where it is no longer limited to 
the activity of the heart alone. It extends inexorably first to the haematic circulatory 
system,  then  to  the  respiratory  system,  and  then  (in  part  three)  to  nutrition  and 
assimilation (AT xi: 231f). The explanation of the heartbeat continues throughout: it is 
not that Descartes explains the heartbeat and then moves on to another physiological 
eﬀect; rather, he explains the heartbeat by moving on. The explanation of the heartbeat 
requires the explanation of circulation, respiration, and so on. We see this in a nutshell 
when the explanation moves from the heart itself to circulation:
by these means [the blood in the arteries] swells and rises at the same time as the 
heart; and it is this movement, as much of the heart as of the arteries, that is called the 
pulse
(DHB: 5; AT xi: 232; my emphasis).
Clearly, Descartes does not see the heart and the circulatory system as independent 
entities. The movement of the pulse pertains as much to the heart as to the arteries. 
This implies that a change to the arteries, or to their relations with the heart, would 
mean a change in the movement that constitutes the heartbeat-eﬀect. In other words, 
organisation (the composition of the system) must be playing a part in determining the 
eﬀect here.
The  case  for  the  role  of  organisation  grows  stronger  as  the  account  continues. 
Descartes  goes  on  to  show how,  just  as  the  pulse  depends  on  the  heartbeat,  the 
heartbeat depends on the pulse, via the circulation. This is because the reentry of the 
blood into the heart is a partial cause of the next heartbeat (see §1.3.1.2).  Thus, the 
heartbeat is dependent on circulation, and circulation is dependent on the heartbeat. 
Following the movement of blood through the circulation, the account naturally takes 
in the pulmonary blood vessels (AT xi: 235f.). And then it turns to the lungs, concluding 
that,
the main use of the lung consists in one thing alone: by means of the respiratory air, 
it thickens and tempers the blood that comes from the right ventricle of the heart 
before it enters the left ventricle; without this it would be too rare and too fine to serve to 
fuel the fire that it encounters there
(DHB: 177; AT xi: 236; my emphasis).
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The Description’s account of the heartbeat does not – and seemingly cannot – keep these 
bodily systems isolated. As soon as the heartbeat is brought up, the circulation of the 
blood follows necessarily.  And then respiration follows too. And it does not merely 
fo!ow, because without the thickening of blood during respiration, there would be no 
heartbeat: respiration is indispensable for the process that explains the beating of the 
heart  (and its  warmth).  It  turns  out  that  Descartes  cannot  give  an account  of  the 
heartbeat without also referring to and relying on everything involved in respiration 
and circulation. Each plays a necessary role in explaining how the heartbeat works: in 
the absence of circulation or respiration, there would be no heartbeat. And each plays 
its role within a specific organisation: if respiration did not precede the entry of blood 
into the left ventricle, the blood would be ‘too rare and too fine’ for the process to 
continue; if circulation did not follow the active phase of the heartbeat, there would be 
no blood to re-enter the heart. Each must occur in a particular order for the heartbeat-
eﬀect to be produced.
The heartbeat, circulation, and respiration do not constitute, however, the extent of 
Descartes’s explanation. The next section of the Description deals with the nutrition of 
the body’s organs, which is a consequence of the circulation of the blood (AT xi: 245f.). 
But nutrition results in the loss of corpuscles from the blood (AT xi: 246). Thus, the 
explanation has  to  include assimilation as  well.  Otherwise,  the  supply  of  blood on 
which the heartbeat, circulation and nutrition depend would dry up. At the same time, 
assimilation  depends  on  both  the  flow  of  blood  provided  by  the  heartbeat  and 
circulation, and on the organ-integrity provided by nutrition. From the heartbeat, the 
circulation  of  the  blood  follows.  And  the  nutrition  of  the  organs  follows  the 
circulation. And assimilation follows nutrition. Simultaneously, each is dependent on 
the others. What started as an account of the heartbeat now encompasses the whole of 
the body. Each of the major parts of the body depends immediately on at least some of 
the  others,  which  in  turn  depend on others,  and  on  the  original  part  in  question. 
Ultimately, each part ends up depending on the whole system. At the same time, the 
system must depend on its component subsystems:
in considering only the exterior of the human body, we never imagined that it had 
enough organs or springs in it to move itself in all the diﬀerent ways in which we see 
it move
(DHB: 170; AT xi: 224).
Descartes’s point is that, although they are not visible, the body does indeed (and must) 
contain all the organs and ‘springs’ it needs to operate. And when ‘one of the principal 
parts of the body decays’ (Passions a. 6; CSM i: 329; AT xi: 330), the whole body dies, 
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and its systems cease to function.14 That is, the system of the body as a whole depends 
on its component subsystems, and their organisation, to such an extent that the failure 
of any one of them results in the failure of the whole.
The  system  of  the  principal  parts  of  the  body  is  thus  not  simply  a  chain  of 
dependencies:  it  is  not  just  the  case  that  the  heartbeat  must  follow  respiration; 
respiration must also follow the heartbeat. Without the one, there would not be the 
other,  and,  crucially,  vice  versa.  Most  of  all,  it  is  the  circularity  that  makes  the 
dependencies here more than a simple chain. The movement of a billiard ball can be 
dependent on the movement of the ball that struck it, whose movement can in turn be 
dependent on the ball that struck it, and so on: that would constitute a chain. But a 
self-perpetuating system in  which each component  is  simultaneously  dependent  on 
each of  the others  and on the system as  a  whole is  a  diﬀerent matter.  Descartes’s 
explanation of the heartbeat looks like the latter rather than the former. As such, the 
dependencies  are  circular,  and  the  system  is  intradependent:  its  subsystems  are 
reciprocally dependent on each other. A failure in any one of them also results in the 
failure of each of the others (if the respiratory system stops working, the heart stops 
beating, and vice versa). And there is good reason to think that Descartes is quite aware 
of this, given that, after having established the dependencies between various functions 
involved, he describes the circulation and heartbeat as forming a ‘perpetual circular 
motion’ (DHB: 179; AT xi: 239): without the dependencies between functions, there 
would be no motion of the blood, and without the circularity of those dependencies, 
the motion would not be circular (blood would end up spraying out somewhere, and 
the body would die).
Brown  (2012)  recognises  a  similar  interdependence  of  subsystems  in  Descartes’s 
embryology,  in  which organs develop through accretion of  particles  deposited by a 
stream of fluid that flows along a circular path, such that ‘the formation of the brain is 
necessary for the persistence of the heart and the formation of the heart a necessary 
precondition for the formation of the brain’ (2012: 12). Brown points out that what is 
special about the interdependence in Descartes’s account of embryogenesis is that – 
unlike the metaphysical  dependence of every piece of extended substance on every 
other  piece  –   embryogenesis  is  not  ‘indiﬀerent  to  the  way  in  which  matter  is 
arranged’  (2012:  13).  In other words,  the organisation is  integral  in determining the 
eﬀect:  the interdependence of physiological  subsystems makes for a strong form of 
14 Descartes does not list what he takes the principal parts to be, but, as the analysis here shows, they must 
include at least the heart and the circulatory, respiratory, and digestive systems – when any of those fails, the 
others cannot continue to work, and the body ceases to operate.
DESCARTES, CORPUSCLES AND REDUCTIONISM 23
systematicity.  What  we  see  when we  look  at  the  account  of  the  heartbeat  is  that 
interdependence goes beyond development. For Descartes, the parts of the living body 
are  in  a  continuous  and perpetual  state  of  interdependence,  and the  body itself  is 
therefore strongly systematic for as long as it is alive.
The  interdependence  here  is  a  strong  case;  it  is  not  the  sole  determiner  of 
systematicity. For some of the body’s subsystems, the dependency is clearly one-way: 
muscular movement or hearing both depend on the whole body, but not vice versa. 
Aside  from the  possibility  of  internal  interdependence  in  muscular  movement  and 
hearing systems, these cases still fulfil the minimum condition for systematicity given 
in §1.2.1  (a particular organisation of components (of some kind)  that determines a 
particular eﬀect).
So  far,  everything  in  the  explanation  has  taken  place  at  a  high  level  (heartbeat, 
circulation, respiration, etc.); the following section moves the analysis to a lower level 
of organisation: what, on Descartes’s account, happens inside the heart. It finds the 
components involved in the explanation, and shows how, through their organisation, 
they determine the eﬀects of the system.
1.3.1.2 Effects, components and activities
Systems, like bodies, are made up of parts, which I refer to here as ‘components’. The 
obvious place to look for the components of Descartes’s physiological systems is in the 
anatomical  structures  of  the  body:  hearts  and  lungs  and  so  on.  However,  in  what 
follows, I argue that we can make better sense of Descartes’s systemic explanations if 
we do not take the components to be anatomical. On the reading presented here, the 
components are activities instead: heart-beating and respiration, rather than hearts and 
lungs. We saw an instance of this in the last section, in Descartes’s recognition that the 
pulse is  a  movement continuous throughout various anatomical  structures,  and not 
localisable  to  any  particular  one.  The  activities  that  Descartes  invokes  are  often 
motions  (colliding,  falling,  etc.),  but  they  need  not  be:  they  could  also  be,  e.g., 
resistance, or tendency to motion.
The main section of the Description, titled ‘on the motion of the heart and blood’, does 
begin with anatomy.  Here,  though,  anatomy is  only  background knowledge for  the 
explanation  of  the  heartbeat  and  circulation.  As  such,  it  is  necessary  both  for 
constructing  and  for  understanding  the  explanation,  but  it  is  not  part  of  the 
explanation itself. The introduction to the Description claims that the text requires only 
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minimal  knowledge  of  anatomy,  and  that  anything  beyond  the  very  basics  will  be 
introduced  when necessary  (AT xi:  226).  Echoing  the  earlier  Discourse  (AT vi:  47), 
Descartes  asks  the  reader  to  obtain  and  dissect  ‘the  heart  of  some  land  animal, 
something reasonably large (for they are more or less similar to those of men)’. We are 
then expected to follow along with the dissection while he briefly describes the heart’s 
gross anatomy (DHB: 172–4; AT xi: 228–31). That this is background knowledge is made 
explicit when Descartes segues into the explanation proper:
When the anatomy of the heart is seen in this way, if one considers that it always 
has more heat in it when the animal is alive than any other part of the body, and 
that the blood is of such a nature that when it is a little hotter than usual it expands 
very quickly, one cannot doubt that the movement of the heart, and fo!owing it the pulse, or 
the beating of the arteries, occurs in the way that I sha! describe
(DHB: 174; AT xi: 231; my emphasis).
Descartes lists three items of knowledge necessary for his explanation but not part of 
it: cardiac anatomy, the heart’s greater warmth relative to the rest of the body, and the 
propensity of blood to expand at low temperatures. (We should presumably add the 
principles of his physics as a tacit fourth.) His point here is that, in light of these three 
items, the heartbeat and circulation must work in just the way he is about to describe. 
This implies two things: that the explanation is yet to begin, and that anatomy is not a 
component of the explanation – i.e. that it is background knowledge.
At first sight, it seems surprising that the anatomy of the heart should not play a role in 
an explanation of the heartbeat. But (per §1.2.1), components are activities. And seeing 
components as activities makes sense of Descartes’s treatment of anatomy: a dissected 
heart is inactive – or ‘deflated (as it always is when animals are dead)’ (DHB: 173; AT xi: 
229) – and the features of an inactive heart do not themselves explain the active beating 
of the heart.15 Consequently, the anatomical features of the heart are not components 
in  Descartes’s  explanatory  system.  It  is  only  when  Descartes  begins  to  describe  a 
system of active components (making use of the background knowledge of anatomy) 
that he begins to explain the heartbeat (and the circulation). This much is consistent 
with his explanations of physical phenomena outside of physiology: it is the tendency 
to  motion  of  particles  that  carries  the  weight  in  explaining  light  propagation,  for 
instance, rather than the particles themselves. In the terms we are using here, tendency 
15 A dissected heart is not necessarily inactive for Descartes. In his correspondence with Plempius, he cites two 
experiments on fish hearts ‘which, after they have been cut out, go on beating [. . .]’ (CSMK: 80; AT i: 523). 
In this case, although dissected, they are still  active hearts. It is still  the activity that is relevant. See to 
Plempius, 15 February 1638 (AT i: 523) and 23 March 1638 (AT ii: 66f.).
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to motion would constitute an activity.
The explanation proceeds as follows:
[w]hen the heart is elongated and deflated, there is no blood in its ventricles, except 
for a small amount which remains from that which has previously been rarefied. This 
is why two large drops enter them there, one fa!ing from the vena cava into its right 
ventricle, and the other fa!ing from the pulmonary vein into the left one, and the 
small amount of rarefied blood that remains in these ventricles, mixing straightaway 
with the fresh blood  coming in,  is like a kind of yeast, which causes  it to heat  and 
expand immediately, and by these means the heart swe!s, hardens, and becomes a little 
squatter in shape [. . .]
(DHB: 174; AT xi: 231; my emphases).
This short passage alone makes use of activities of elongation, deflation, remaining, 
rarefaction, entering, falling, mixing, causing, heating, expanding, swelling, hardening 
and becoming ‘a little squatter in shape’. These are the components in the account. 
They are what Descartes uses to construct the explanation. Drops of blood enter and 
fall into the ventricles. There, they mix with previously rarefied blood, which acts ‘like 
a kind of yeast [levain]’. This causes the new blood to heat up and expand. As a result, 
the heart ‘swells, hardens, and becomes a little squatter in shape’. At the same time, the 
membranes between the vena cava and the right ventricle, and between the pulmonary 
vein and the left ventricle are forced closed (like valves). This prevents the blood from 
exiting the ventricle the way it  entered.  Instead,  it  escapes through the pulmonary 
artery and the aorta, from the right and left ventricles respectively (AT xi: 232).
Anatomy in itself is not directly explanatory within the account, but it is not entirely 
absent either. Where it is invoked, it is subordinated to the activity. The vena cava 
comes into the explanation only as the place from which blood enters. Similarly, the 
ventricles are the place where new blood falls and mixes with the rarefied blood, and 
where that rarefied blood has remained after the active phase of the heartbeat. The 
ventricles are also present in the account via the constraining activity that conspires 
with the rarefaction of the blood to determine its exit through the arteries (AT xi: 232). 
In  the  same way,  the  blood is  not  portrayed here  as  simply  a  fluid  being  pumped 
through the heart. It is active throughout the account. The falling of fresh blood into 
the  heart  and  its  mixing  with  the  remaining  rarefied  blood  (partly)  determines  its 
expansion.  And the  expansion itself  is,  for  Descartes,  the  activity  that  inflates  the 
heart.  Even  the  rarefied  blood  that  remains  in  the  ventricles  does  not  sit  there 
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passively: Descartes explicitly describes it in active terms: as causing the fresh blood to 
expand when they mix.
So, the components in the explanation are activities. And it is their activity that gives 
them their explanatory power: the heart’s deflating does something, and what it does 
contributes to what the whole system does. But, that is not to say that the activity of 
the system reduces down to what its components do. Any component isolated from the 
system’s composition would contribute nothing to the activity of the system. It is the 
composition, and not the constituent components, that determines the system’s eﬀect. 
Thus, rarefying blood would simply expand uselessly if it were not within a ventricle 
too small to keep it contained, with valves that open to let it flow out, etc. But, when 
rarefying blood is taken along with heart deflation and the other components of the 
system, in the right composition, we get the heartbeat.
So far, the components involved in the explanation have all been at a fairly high level. 
Even  an  activity  as  simple  as  the  falling  of  blood  is  at  a  clearly  higher  level  than 
corpuscles (since talk about blood behaviour is not talk about corpuscle behaviour). As 
it stands, the explanation is clearly not a reduction all the way down to corpuscular 
mechanics:  corpuscles have not even entered into it  at this point.  We still  need to 
establish whether the explanation ever reaches down to corpuscles. The next section 
looks at a corpuscle-level account of blood expansion in the heart, and then shows how 
Descartes has to integrate it with plainly higher-level components in order to construct 
an explanation of the heartbeat.
1.3.1.3 Multilevel explanation
The section  of  the  Description  that  deals  with  the  motion  of  the  heart  and  blood 
provides no explanation of the initial cause of the blood’s expansion. What it does oﬀer 
is an analogy in which the blood acts like yeast (AT xi: 231). But it does not explain the 
mechanism that causes the yeast-like activity. For that explanation, we need to look at 
an account later in the Description, in the section on embryogenesis:
when  most  of  the  blood  leaves  the  heart  at  the  time  of  diastole,  those  of  its 
particles which remain there enter into the flesh, where they find pores disposed in 
such a way, and fibres agitated in such a way, that there is only matter of the first 
element surrounding them; and at systole these pores change shape because the 
heart lengthens, which makes the particles of blood, which remained there as if 
they were to serve as yeast, leave there with a great speed, and in this way entering 
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easily into the new blood coming into the heart, they make its particles separate 
from one another, and in separating thus they acquire the form of fire
(DHB: 203; AT xi: 281f.; translation adjusted).
The yeast allusion reappears in this passage, but this time gets accounted for down to 
the  corpuscle  (particle)  level.  In  this  case,  the  ‘yeast’  activity  is  explained  by  the 
ejection of corpuscles of blood from pores in the heart wall. These corpuscles hit the 
new blood concurrently entering the heart. The yeast-acting blood corpuscles move at 
such speed that collision with the corpuscles of the new blood makes the latter move 
significantly further and faster. The result of this is that the blood both heats up and 
expands. As in the account covered in §1.3.1.2, once the blood has expanded and most 
of it has forced its way into the arteries under its own pressure, a small amount remains 
in the ventricles. Descartes now specifies that what remains sinks into pores in the 
heart  wall.  The rarefied blood stays there until  the heart  enters  systole (its  passive 
phase for Descartes) and relaxes. In relaxing, the heart lengthens, compressing its walls 
relative  to  their  state  when  the  heart  was  ‘a  little  squatter’  during  diastole.  This 
compression of the walls is also a compression of the pores within them. The result of 
this is to force the yeast-acting blood out into the new blood that is in the process of 
entering. At this point, the active phase begins again, and the whole process of the 
heartbeat repeats.
A fairly  obvious  objection arises  at  this  point.  Since the passage above shows that 
Descartes has an explanation of blood expansion in terms of corpuscles, perhaps the 
account  of  the  heartbeat  might  simply  be  straightforward  Cartesian  reduction  to 
corpuscular mechanics, and not a multilevel system after all. However, this relies on 
mistaking a (partial) appeal to the behaviour of corpuscles for a full reduction of the 
phenomenon to the corpuscular level. In the account above, corpuscles are invoked for 
only part of the explanation. There are three components at the corpuscular level: (1) 
blood corpuscles moving at high speed, (2) blood corpuscle collisions and (3) increased 
mean blood corpuscle movement as a result of (2). (There are also the corpuscles of the 
first element (the smallest of Descartes’s three elements), although their role is fairly 
obscure in this particular account.16) At most, this can count as a reduction of blood 
heating  (and,  indirectly,  blood  expansion,  because  increased  mean  blood  corpuscle 
movement leads to expansion as well as heat) to the corpuscular level. But the eﬀect in 
16  There  are  strong parallels  between this  account  and the explanation of  fermentation in  damp hay in 
Principles 4:92. There, corpuscles of the first element accelerate corpuscles of grass sap, ultimately causing 
heat, under certain conditions. Similarly, a little earlier in the Description, Descartes discusses the origin of 
heat in the developing foetus in terms of matter of the second element agitated by matter of the first (AT xi: 
281)
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question  is  the  heartbeat,  and  the  corpuscle  level  here  certainly  does  not  provide 
enough to explain how the heart beats.17
Given that the blood-corpuscle behaviour alone is not enough to explain the heartbeat-
eﬀect, we need to consider the other components Descartes invokes in the account 
above.  If  we look at what he actually  appeals  to,  rather than concentrating on the 
corpuscles,  we  see  a  rather  diﬀerent  picture  of  explanation  from the  corpuscular-
mechanics  approach.  The  corpuscle-talk  is  integrated  with  appeals  to  higher  levels 
throughout. The remaining blood corpuscles enter into the ‘flesh’ of the heart, which is 
(at  least  partially)  described in  terms of  pores  and fibres.  Pores  and fibres  are  not 
corpuscle-level  descriptions.  They  presumably  could  be  reduced  to  corpuscles,  in 
principle. But that is not the level to which Descartes appeals here: the interaction of 
blood  corpuscles  with  the  heart  wall  is  not  explained  in  terms  of  corpuscular 
mechanics. Most notably, the movement of the yeast-acting blood corpuscles in the 
account  is  caused  by  the  relaxation/lengthening  of  the  heart  (via  the  resultant 
contraction of the pores). If the heartbeat-eﬀect is the highest level in this explanation, 
and the blood corpuscles the lowest, then heart-lengthening is surely somewhere in 
between (and presumably closer to the top). So, it is the speed of the movement of the 
yeast-acting blood corpuscles that allows them to impart movement to the corpuscles 
of  new  blood  and  thus  cause  heating  and  expansion.  But,  it  is  the  higher-level 
lengthening of the heart that causes the movement of the yeast-acting corpuscles. As 
such, the explanation is incomplete if it is left at the corpuscle level: the corpuscle-level 
activity is explained by means of a higher-level activity.
In  fact,  the  explanation  is  still  not  complete  even  with  the  integration  of  blood 
corpuscle behaviour and heart-lengthening. It is incomplete because it does not yet 
explain the heartbeat eﬀect. An explanation of the heartbeat that goes down to the 
corpuscle level will need to integrate (1) the account discussed in this section of this 
chapter with (2) the higher-level explanation discussed in the previous two sections. (1) 
explicitly explains only the production of heat in the heart. Implicitly, it also explains 
blood expansion. But it does not explain the heartbeat. Explaining the eﬀect requires 
appealing  to  (at  least)  the  following  features  of  (2):  the  swelling  of  the  heart,  the 
restriction of space for the expanding blood in the ventricles, the valve operation at the 
entrance and exit blood vessels, circulation and respiration (and probably also nutrition 
and assimilation). Thus, the account does not explain the heartbeat without appealing 
17 In the Rules, Descartes characterises reduction as comprising both an analytic and a synthetic step (AT x: 
379–87).  What can be synthesised from the terms in use here (the corpuscle behaviour) is blood heating/
expansion rather than the heartbeat.
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to  multiple  levels.  The  corpuscle  level  is  required  to  explain  the  expansion  of  the 
blood – but the explanation requires appealing to the higher-level interactions with the 
pores and fibres of the heart wall and (especially) to the higher-level lengthening of the 
heart.  At  the  same  time,  higher  levels  explain  the  swelling  of  the  heart,  and  the 
restriction that causes it and forces the blood out. But they do so only alongside the 
explanation  of  blood  expansion.  All  these  levels  are  necessary  for  the  account  to 
explain the heartbeat.
The natural objection now is to point out that, in principle, the whole account could be 
translated into the corpuscular level, even if Descartes chose not to. The problem with 
this is that it conflates explanatory reduction with ontological reduction. In principle, 
Descartes ought to be able to reduce the relaxation and lengthening of the heart to 
corpuscular mechanics, given his metaphysics (i.e. the physical world is nothing but 
extended substance diﬀerentiated by movement). That is, ontological reduction should 
always be a possibility in the Cartesian world. But, when the goal is an explanation of 
the heartbeat, a description of heart-lengthening in terms of corpuscles would just miss 
the point. The question here is one of relevance to the explanation. In other words, it 
is  a  question of  what  plays  an explanatory  role.  Heart-lengthening is  necessary  for 
explaining the movement of  the yeast-acting blood corpuscles.  As such,  it  plays  an 
explanatory role.  Now, heart-lengthening could indeed be reduced to the corpuscle 
level. Doing so would require an account of the structure, behaviour and interactions 
of the corpuscles that make up the heart wall. It would also require a similar account of 
the corpuscles that make up any other parts of the heart’s anatomy that move when the 
heart lengthens, since they would all be involved in corpuscle-to-corpuscle interactions 
in  the  process  of  heart-lengthening.  Because  this  would  be  a  corpuscle-level 
explanation (and thus non-systemic),  we would not need to account for every single 
corpuscle.  But  we  would  need  to  account  for  every  corpuscle  behaviour  that,  in 
aggregate, composes heart-lengthening.
If Descartes’s aim were to explain heart-lengthening itself, or some other higher-level 
elastic eﬀect, the corpuscle-talk might fulfil an explanatory role. But given that the aim 
is  to  explain  the  heartbeat,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  anything  would  be  gained by 
invoking low-level corpuscle behaviour in preference to high-level heart-lengthening. 
Worse,  doing so risks obscuring the relevant component of the explanatory system 
(heart-lengthening) beneath the profusion of corpuscle talk. The situation is analogous 
to  attempting  to  explain  the  operation  of  a  mechanical  clock  by  appealing  to  the 
interactions  of  the  molecules,  atoms,  or  subatomic  particles  (or,  for  that  matter, 
corpuscles) that make up the material of the cogs: if you were to ask me how a clock 
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works, and I were to respond by talking about quantum probability clouds, you would 
rightly accuse me of answering a diﬀerent question. My response would have been, 
intuitively, below a relevance threshold for an explanation of the operation of a clock. 
In the same way, for Descartes to reduce heart-lengthening to the corpuscle level would 
be to answer a diﬀerent question from that of how the heartbeat works. It is in this 
sense  that  higher-level  heart-lengthening  is  relevant  to  the  explanation  while  the 
corpuscle behaviour is not.18 Even if Descartes may claim elsewhere that explanation 
should be in terms of corpuscular mechanics, when he explains the heartbeat, he pays 
attention  to  a  relevance  threshold.  As  such,  he  selects  components  from diﬀerent 
levels, on the basis of their relevance to the explanation.
Another version of this objection might be to point out that the heart (along with 
everything else in the material world for Descartes) originally developed from nothing 
more than the activity of individual corpuscles. That is, that whatever complex systems 
might exist in living bodies were ultimately formed by corpuscles knocking into each 
other. But, similarly, an account of the development of the heart would be an answer to 
a diﬀerent question: ‘where did the heart come from?’, rather than ‘how does the heart 
work?’. If Descartes started to explain how the heart works by appealing to corpuscle 
collisions in his cosmological vortices, we would justifiably accuse him of missing the 
point of the question.
There is good evidence, then, for concluding that Descartes does  appeal to multiple 
levels in his explanation of the heartbeat. He appeals to the higher-level activity of 
heart-lengthening,  for  example,  when  he  discusses  the  production  of  heat  and  the 
expansion of blood in terms of (low-level) corpuscular mechanics. But there are also 
good reasons to go further and claim that multilevelness in systems provides Descartes 
with better explanations (in at least some circumstances in physiology) than the strict 
reduction he is supposed to employ. That is, strict adherence to single-level reduction 
would obscure the higher-level components that play central roles in the explanation. 
Thus, Descartes’s strategy is not to pursue reduction down to lowest-level explanation. 
Instead,  he  picks  and  chooses  the  more  relevant  components  for  his  explanatory 
system from amongst multiple explanatory levels.
18 My point here is similar to the discussion of bottoming-out in §5.1 of 2000: ‘[b]ottoming out is relative 
[.  .  .]  The  explanation  comes  to  an  end,  and  description  of  lower-level  mechanisms  would  be 
irrelevant’ (Machamer et al. 2000: 13).
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1.3.2 More systems: muscular movement and nutrition
The Description’s explanation of the heartbeat and circulation is not the only system in 
Descartes’s physiology. We can see the same structure of explanation in the account of 
muscular movement in The Passions. The account appeals to the corpuscles that make 
up  the  animal  spirits.  But  the  spirit  corpuscles  are  only  components  in  a  larger 
explanatory  system.  On this  account,  a  muscle  contracts  and  lengthens  because  it 
contains a large quantity of very small corpuscles which move ‘very quickly, sometimes 
merely eddying in the place where they are located [. . .], and sometimes flowing into 
the opposed muscle’ (a. 11; CSM i: 332; AT xi: 366). The spirit corpuscles move in much 
the same way as  the corpuscles  of  rarefied blood in  the account  of  the  heartbeat. 
Through this movement, the muscle containing the spirit corpuscles becomes swollen. 
As a result of the swelling, it contracts, and thus pulls, giving us muscular movement. 
But the behaviour of individual particles alone does not determine the movement of 
the muscle. In addition, the explanation of muscular movement requires appeal to the 
following higher-level components:  the space restriction of the muscle itself (in the 
same  way  as  the  heartbeat  requires  the  space  restriction  of  the  ventricles),  the 
opposition of a pair of muscles, and some means to control which muscle contains the 
majority  of  the  spirits  (Passions  a.  11).  It  is  this  entire  system,  with  its  particular 
composition, that forms the explanation of muscular movement.
We can find similar use of systems explanation in the much earlier Treatise  on  Man 
(written 1632–3). Its explanation of nutrition is one such case. It appeals to the collision 
of blood corpuscles with the ‘roots’ of organs, which originate from ‘the extremities of 
the little branches’ of the arteries. As the blood flows through the arteries, the pressure 
of the pulse following the active phase of the heartbeat forces some blood corpuscles 
into contact with the organ roots. The blood corpuscles push the organ root corpuscles 
‘in front of them a little, and in this way gradually replace them’. But this alone is not 
what causes nutrition for Descartes. You get nutrition when new blood corpuscles are 
left  attached  to  organ  roots.  And  this  is  explained  by  appeal  to  a  higher-level 
component: ‘at the moment when the arteries deflate, each of these parts is stopped in 
its place, and this alone means it is joined to those it touches’ (TM: 103; AT xi: 126). 
Higher-level artery deflation is what causes blood corpuscles to remain attached to the 
organ roots with which they had collided, and thus to provide them with nutrition. In 
this case, the activity of the corpuscles is necessary to explain nutrition. But it is not 
suﬃcient  for  the  explanation,  because  the  system  also  requires  appeal  to  artery 
deflation,  on  a  higher  explanatory  level,  within  the  context  of  a  composition  that 
determines  the  eﬀect  of  nutrition.  As  such,  this  explanation  too  consists  not  of 
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corpuscle  behaviour  alone  but  of  a  composed  system comprising  components  on 
separate levels, with explanatory appeals made between levels.
Of course, Descartes also gives some accounts that straightforwardly seem to keep to a 
single explanatory level – Man’s treatment of digestion, for instance (AT xi: 121). This is 
to  be  expected:  sometimes  the  relevancy  criterion  bottoms  and  tops  out  at  the 
corpuscle level, and some eﬀects may be explicable in terms of corpuscle behaviour 
alone, without the latter’s being placed within the context of a system. However, as the 
previous sections have shown, corpuscular mechanics is far from being the only means 
of  explanation  in  Descartes’s  physiology:  it  is  in  terms  of  systems  that  Descartes 
explains (amongst other things) what he takes to be the most central function of the 
body – the heartbeat – where most is at stake (AT xi: 245).
1.3.3 Systems beyond physiology19
So far, I have maintained a simplified distinction between Descartes’s explanations in 
physiology  and  his  explanations  elsewhere:  physiology  involves  systems,  while 
corpuscular mechanics suﬃces for physics. In truth, that distinction is not quite so 
straightforward. Descartes’s cosmological vortices certainly look like complex systems. 
In his optics, he appeals to higher levels alongside corpuscles: reflection and refraction 
are  explained  through  the  motion  of  balls  (analogous  to  corpuscles,  i.e.  low-level) 
thrown, respectively, against the ground and into water (both higher-level) (AT vi: 93–
101).  I  have focused on physiology here because physiology seems to be where the 
disparity between corpuscular mechanics and the explanations Descartes actually uses 
is the most noticeable.
But  that  is  not  to  say  that  systems  explanations,  or  some  features  of  systems 
explanation, are not present elsewhere in Descartes’s natural philosophy. At the very 
least,  I  suspect  Descartes  frequently  finds that  appealing to higher  levels  produces 
better  (i.e.  more explanatorily  relevant)  explanations throughout natural  philosophy 
than could be provided by pure corpuscular mechanics. He may well find the same for 
systematicity  in  some  cases,  although  perhaps  to  a  more  limited  degree  than  in 
physiology. The account of vortices,  for example, would probably be closer to what 
Haugeland (1978:  216)  calls  a ‘morphological  explanation’,  in which the eﬀect is  the 
product of the aggregate activity of many parts but is indiﬀerent to their organisation: 
if you completely rearrange the parts of a vortex, you still have a functioning vortex; 
19 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer both for raising the concerns addressed in the following section 
and for suggesting relevant examples.
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the same cannot be said of a living body. Regardless, to whatever extent Descartes’s 
explanations elsewhere look like the systems discussed here, the conclusions of this 
chapter will be (partially) applicable throughout his natural philosophy.
1.4 Conclusion
Descartes is generally taken to be a strict explanatory reductionist about the natural 
world.  His  metaphysical  commitments  seem to tie  him to  explanation in  terms of 
corpuscular  mechanics:  his  aim appears  to be the reduction of  complex observable 
phenomena  to  nothing  more  than  the  particular  behaviour  of  individual  subvisible 
corpuscles taken in isolation. However,  at least some of Descartes’s  explanations in 
physiology  (and  perhaps  elsewhere)  look  nothing  like  explanations  in  terms  of 
corpuscular  mechanics.  Instead,  they  are  systemic,  and  they  appeal  to  multiple 
explanatory levels. In these systems, the eﬀects are not determined by the behaviour of 
individual corpuscles. They are determined by the composition of the whole system. 
And the components of that system are drawn from diﬀerent levels, with interlevel 
causation and dependency relations.
The analysis oﬀered here shows that we misunderstand Descartes’s natural philosophy 
if, as the standard view has it, we take him to pursue reduction to the lowest level in 
order to provide explanations. It is not only that he does not in fact reduce what he 
takes  to  be  the  principal  physiological  systems  to  corpuscular  mechanics.  Systems 
explanations are better explanations in some cases, where it is the entire composition 
that explains the eﬀect (rather than the behaviour of individual corpuscles), and where 
each  component  is  taken  from  the  level  that  is  explanatorily  relevant  for  that 
component. Thus, the explanatory power of Descartes’s physiology comes not from its 
reductionism as such, but from its willingness to stop the reduction where appropriate.

Chapter 2
Does Descartes have a principle of life? Hierarchy and 
interdependence in Descartes’s physiology1
2.1 Introduction
At  various  points  in  his  work  on  physiology  and  medicine,  Descartes  refers  to  a 
‘principle of life’. The exact term changes – sometimes, it is the ‘principle of movement 
and  life’  (CSM  i:  108;  AT xi:  202),  sometimes  the  ‘principle  underlying  all  [the] 
functions’ of the body (CSM i: 331; AT xi: 333) – but the message seems consistent: the 
phenomena of  living bodies  are  the product  of  a  single,  underlying principle.  That 
principle is generally taken to be cardiac heat.2  The literature has, quite reasonably, 
taken this message at face value. Thus, Shapiro: ‘Descartes insists again and again that 
the human body is properly to be described as a machine whose workings are [. . .] 
driven by the heat in the heart that is the principle of life’ (2003: 240; my emphasis). In Le 
Principe  de  vie  chez  Descartes,  Bitbol-Hespériès  writes  ‘[t]he principle  of  life  [.  .  .]  is 
conceived of as the logical initial term, or the fundamental proposition, that accounts 
1 A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Perspectives on Science.
2  See Bitbol-Hespériès (1990)  for an extended argument that Descartes’s principle of life is cardiac heat. 
There is, however, some variation in Descartes’s discussion of the principle (e.g., ‘the souls of animals are 
nothing but their blood’ (to Plempius for Fromondus, 3 October 1637; CSMK 62–3; AT i, 414)); see §2.4.3 for 
an analysis of such claims.
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for the phenomenon of life’3 (1990: 25). This reading of Descartes’s principle of life as 
some kind of initial term, or foundation, for his physiology tends to be aﬃrmed either 
tacitly or explicitly wherever the subject is brought up (e.g., Aucante 2006: 164; Des 
Chene 2001: 3, 26; Gaukroger 2010: 10–1; Fuchs 2001: 131; Shapiro 2011: 272, 273, 282; 
Smith 2007: 624).
This chapter challenges that reading of the principle of life. It argues for a distinction 
between (1) the general claims that Descartes appears to make about the principle of 
life and (2) the role this ostensible principle has in his physiology. My position is that, 
when it comes to (2), there is no single underlying principle. In spite of (1), Descartes’s 
account of physiology takes the body to be structured in such a way that it can have no 
such principle – that is, interdependently rather than hierarchically. The body itself is 
structured interdependently in that the major bodily systems are dependent on each 
other, and not on an underlying principle that ‘drives’ them. At the same time, there 
can be no single underlying principle even epistemologically: Descartes’s account of the 
living body is  structured interdependently  too,  in that  knowledge about physiology 
depends on knowledge about all the major systems and their interactions, rather than 
being  built  up  on  top  of  some primary  ‘initial  term’.  This  means  that  neither  life 
functions themselves nor our knowledge of them are reducible to a single principle.
My  position  is  that,  for  Descartes,  cardiac  heat  depends  on  (at  least)  circulation, 
respiration, and digestion (see §2.4.1), all of which themselves reciprocally depend both 
on  cardiac  heat  and  on  each  other.  Brown  (2011:  11–13)  has  previously  identified 
interdependence in Descartes’s  account of  generation (embryogenesis),  where ‘[t]he 
process by which one organ is formed and operates is not independent of the processes 
by which others form and operate and this whole matrix of interdependent processes 
continues until a relatively closed system [. . .] comes into being’ (12).4 Here, I show 
that interdependence is an ongoing state of the living body for Descartes, and that we 
can  use  this  to  make  sense  of  what  would  otherwise  look  like  his  rather  bizarre 
treatment of the ostensible principle of life (§2.5).
My intention here is not to accuse Descartes of inconsistency. Rather, my aim is to 
tease out the consequences of Descartes’s physiology in order to show that what is 
going on there is somewhat diﬀerent from, and perhaps more interesting than, what he 
3 ‘Le principe de vie [. . .] est conçu comme terme rationnellement premier, ou proposition fondamentale 
rendant compte du phénomène vital.’
4 See §2.4.2 for further discussion of Brown (2012).
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appears to claim to be doing.5  I  begin by setting out the reasons for thinking that 
cardiac heat might indeed be the ‘initial term’ of the physiology, or the engine that 
‘drives’ it (§2). I then set out Descartes’s account(s) of cardiac heat (§3), before giving a 
constructive reading of his physiology, in which the major bodily functions are shown 
to be interdependent (§4).  Finally,  I  show how the interdependence reading makes 
better sense of Descartes’s treatment of cardiac heat (§5), and how it obviates the need 
for any unitary fundamental principle (§6).
2.2 Principles
When Descartes uses the phrase ‘principle of life’, there are two obvious connotations: 
(1) ‘principle of life’ is a standard designation of the soul in the Aristotelian tradition 
(see §2.1); (2) principles are foundations in Descartes’s famously foundational system of 
knowledge  (see  §2.2).  Since  the  soul  is  the  source  of  life  for  Aristotle,  the  natural 
conclusion to draw from (1) is that Descartes’s principle is supposed to be the ontic6 
foundation of physiology on his account of the body – that is, the principle of life is 
what drives the body itself. Similarly, it seems natural to suspect that, given (2), along 
with certain passages that appear to claim as much, the principle of life is meant to be 
the epistemic foundation for Descartes’s sciences of physiology and medicine.
In the following three subsections, I set out what it would mean for Descartes to have 
a principle of life in senses (1) and (2), along with reasons for thinking that his principle 
of life might indeed be the ontic and epistemic foundation of his physiology. I take it 
that these are misleading ways to think about what Descartes calls the ‘principle of 
life’;  they  need  to  be  clarified  first,  in  order  to  show,  second,  precisely  how they 
mislead.
5  Whether or not he is fully aware of the interdependence in his physiology, and its implications for his 
principle of life, is not entirely clear. His readiness to appeal to a principle of life would suggest not, but see 
§2.4.3 for some evidence to the contrary.
6 I am not thinking, of course, of the fundamental ontology of extended and thinking substances here, but of 
‘ontic’ in the sense used in more recent philosophy of science (e.g., Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000). In 
this case, the ‘ontic’ is concerned with the body itself and what it contains, as opposed to knowledge thereof. 
We might instead want to think of the ontic principle as the motive principle of the body, but this would 
obscure the distinction between the principle of the body itself and the principle of our knowledge of the 
body; it would also exclude the ontic principle from being something more than just the source of motion in 
the body (see §2.4.2).
38 CHAPTER TWO
2.2.1 The case for an ontic foundation of physiology
When Descartes brings up his principle of life, it is almost always in express contrast to 
a position of the ‘ancients’ or of the ‘schoolmen’ – that life is attributable to the soul. 
The position he counters takes the soul to be the source of life, and the engine that 
drives the self-movement of the living body. This makes the soul the ontic foundation 
of the living body insofar as it makes all life functions ultimately dependent on the 
soul. On this account, the dependency relations for life are hierarchical and go one-way 
only:  the  operations  of  the  living  body  depend  on  the  soul,  while  the  soul  is 
independent of the operations of the living body.
As Des Chene notes, ‘[i]n Aristotelian natural philosophy [. . .], the soul [. . .] is the 
principle  of  life.  For  [pre-eminent  scholastic]  Suárez,  this  is  even  a  matter  of 
definition’ (Des Chene 2001: 30). Descartes, however, wholly rejects this function for 
the  soul.  He  repeatedly  assures  us  that  life-conferring  souls  are  an  unnecessary 
supposition, because the material body by itself is suﬃcient for life (e.g., AT xi: 202; AT 
vi:  46;  AT xi:  330;  AT i:  413–14).  Particularly  telling  is  a  letter  to  Regius,  where 
Descartes writes, ‘it goes against logic to conceive the soul as a genus whose species are 
the mind, the vegetative power and the locomotive power of animals’ (May 1641; CSMK:182; 
AT iii: 371). This is because his ontology gives him a far more restrictive definition of 
the soul than was available to Aristotelians, since it allows for only two substances: 
matter and mind. The mind is identical with the soul for Descartes (and is entirely 
distinct from matter). On this definition, it is mind that is the genus, making the soul 
nothing  but  thought.  Consequently,  the  soul  cannot  take on any  life-founding role 
precisely because life-founding is a not species of thought. Taking the task of animating 
the body away from the soul allows Descartes to attribute life to animals as much as to 
humans while still maintaining that it is only humans that get souls.7
In the context in which Descartes took himself to be, where life required a soul as the 
driving force of the body, it would make sense for a physiology that explicitly excludes 
the  psychic  to  provide  its  own substitute  for  the  life-conferring  soul.  Indeed,  this 
appears to be precisely how Descartes employs the term ‘principle of life’  –  in the 
Aristotelian  sense,  but  with  the  psychic  element  swapped  for  something  more 
Cartesian  (despite  his  protestations  about  ‘departing  from  the  paths’  of  the 
‘ancients’ (CSM i: 328; AT xi: 327–8)). As T S Hall argues, ‘the explanations [Descartes] 
developed were corpuscularized, nonpsychistic versions of psychistic explanations put 
7 For an animal to have a soul “is unlikely, because there is no reason to believe it of some animals without 
believing it of all, and many of them such as oysters and sponges are too imperfect for this to be credible” (to 
Newcastle, 23 November 1646; CSMK: 304; AT iv: 576)
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forth earlier by others’ (Hall 1970: 63).8 On this reading, the Aristotelian principle of 
life would be imported (along with the ontic connotation that there is a principle of life 
that  drives  the  body)  and  simply  reinterpreted  in  as  a  process  compatible  with 
Descartes’s ontology.
For the Aristotelians, only certain bodies could be alive: bodies with organs, in the right 
arrangement. The body consists of an organization of matter independent of the soul; 
what  the  soul  does  is  confer  life  by  actualizing  the  potential  of  that  material 
organization.9 The basic structure of this understanding of life was not restricted to the 
Aristotelian  position  that  Descartes  explicitly  opposed  either.  Contemporary 
Paracelsian medical theory attributed archei to every organ. Each archeus controls its 
own  organ  and  is  (semi-)independent,  with  some  degree  of  interaction  between 
diﬀerent organs.10 This interaction is also a form of organization within the body. But 
all these subarchei are ultimately answerable to a ‘master’ archeus, an ‘internal president, 
curator and rector’ (Van Helmont, quoted in Pagel 1982: 98).11 On Descartes’s account, 
the organization of the organs remains, while the Aristotelian soul and the Paracelsian 
master  archeus  are  both  absent.  The  question  is  whether  he  replaces  them with  a 
Cartesian principle that fulfills the same role.
If he is to replace them, and if the soul is oﬀ-limits, then there is only one other option 
for  a  principle  of  life  in  Descartes’s  dualistic  ontology:  it  must  reside  in  matter. 
Descartes is committed to a material world that operates mechanistically –  through 
nothing more than the ‘shape, size, position and motion of particles of matter’ (CSM i: 
279; AT viiia: 314). And he explicitly describes the living body as a machine (AT vi: 56; 
AT xi: 120; AT xi: 226). As such, an ontic principle of life would be the mechanism that 
drives  that  machine.  This  is  precisely  what  appears  to be at  stake when Descartes 
compares the body to a watch in his Treatise on the Passions of the Soul:
8 See also Bitbol-Hespériès (1990), Hatfield (1992: 341), Des Chene (2001: 21), Aucante (2006: 166–79) and Joly 
(2011: 123); more generally, Rozemond (1998), Ariew (1999). But cf. Lindeboom (1979: 69): “the feu sans lumière 
has nothing to do with the vegetative or the sensitive soul,” but “[i]n the chaleur of the heart which heats the 
blood, the old Aristotelian innate heat (calor innatus) is easily recognized”; if it’s not one thing, it’s another.
9 See Des Chene (2000b: 81ﬀ., 112).
10 See Clericuzio (2012: 331).
11 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relevance of the Paracelsian position here.
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the diﬀerence between the body of a living man and that of a dead man is just like 
the diﬀerence between, on the one hand, a watch or other automaton (that is, a self-
moving machine) when it is wound up and contains in itself the corporeal principle 
of the movements for which it is designed, together with everything else required 
for its operation; and, on the other hand, the same watch or machine when it is 
broken and the principle of its movement ceases to be active
(Passions 1/6; CSM i: 329–30; AT xi: 330–31).
The analogy seems clear: just as a watch has a principle of movement, a living body has 
a  principle  of  life;  the latter  is  to the body as  the mainspring is  to a  watch.12  The 
passage also makes evident that Descartes equates life with self-movement here (as he 
also does elsewhere, such as in his letter to Regius of June 1642 (AT iii: 566)), since the 
analogue of the dead body is the watch with the inactive principle of motion. Given 
that it is self-movement in which Descartes is interested, the ontic principle of life 
would be the ‘spring’ mechanism that drives the movements of the machine that is the 
living body.13
2.2.2 The case for an epistemic foundation of physiology
If there is such a thing as the Cartesian principle of life, it seems likely that it is meant 
to be the ontic motive force within the body.  But the significance of  principles  in 
Descartes’s epistemology is hard to ignore, and there is a certain amount of textual 
evidence to suggest that Descartes wanted a foundational principle for his physiology. 
After all, physiology is concerned with living things, and an epistemic principle of life 
would  ground knowledge precisely  of  living  things.14  Moreover,  it  is  both easy  and 
natural  to  take  Descartes’s  physiology  to  be  a  hierarchical  science,  with  all  the 
knowledge  it  includes  having  been  built  on  top  of  a  solid  foundation.  This  is 
12  Note,  however,  that the analogy refers to more than just the principle –  there is  also ‘everything else 
required for its operation’. In §2.4, I argue that there is good reason to privilege the “everything else” over 
the principle. See especially §2.4.3 for an alternative analysis of Descartes’s claims about the principle of life.
13 Even if the ontic principle of life were the body’s motive principle, it would be a mistake to take self-
movement to be a generalised concept of life for Descartes, since that would not exclude manmade automata 
(such as watches). The issue of Descartes’s general concept of life is discussed in Ch. 3 and Ch. 6, §6.4.
14 Detlefsen argues that if Descartes had ‘no way of isolating a class of bodies taken to be living bodies, [. . .] 
he would then not be able to identify any individuals to serve as the subject matter of the life sciences—
sciences to which he devoted considerable professional time. And this would render incoherent this aspect of 
his life as a working natural philosopher’ (2016: 142).
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presumably what Bitbol-Hespériès has in mind when she refers to the principle as the 
fundamental proposition that accounts for life (Bitbol-Hespériès 1990: 25).
As Descartes claims in the famous letter–preface to the French edition of the Principles 
of Philosophy,
the  whole  of  philosophy is  like  a  tree.  The roots  are  metaphysics,  the  trunk is 
physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which 
may be reduced to three principle ones, namely medicine, mechanics, and morals
(CSM i, 186; AT ixb, 14).
The  clear  implication  is  that  medicine  (by  which  we  should  also  understand 
physiology15)  is a hierarchically high-level outgrowth of physics. From the simile, we 
might expect knowledge of medicine and physiology to be constructed on top of a 
foundation in physics, just as a branch grows progressively out of a certain point on the 
trunk.
A few  pages  earlier  in  that  same  preface,  Descartes  tells  us  that,  in  order  to  do 
philosophy, we have to begin by looking for basic principles (AT ixb: 2). Since this is a 
preface to a  textbook intended to encompass  the whole of  the tree of  knowledge, 
‘philosophy’  here  is  unquestionably  meant  to  involve  medicine  as  much  as 
metaphysics.16 The basic principles form the foundations on which knowledge can be 
built:
the knowledge of other things must depend on [these principles], in the sense that 
the principles must be capable of being known without knowledge of these other 
matters, but not vice versa
(CSM i: 180–81; AT ixb: 2).
That is,  on the hierarchical  account,  epistemic dependency relations work one-way 
only.  As  such,  the  dependencies  reflect  the  hierarchy:  hierarchically  higher-level 
knowledge depends on foundational principles, and emphatically not vice versa.
15 See p. 46 (§2.2.3) for a little on Descartes’s conception of the relation between physiology and medicine. 
For more, see Aucante (2006).
16  See Aucante 2006 and Manning’s  (2007)  extended review for thorough and convincing analysis  of  the 
position of physiology and medicine within Descartes’s philosophy.
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Given  nothing  more  than  Descartes’s  general  statements  about  his  own  epistemic 
methodology, then, it would make a certain amount of sense to think that something 
along the following lines is what is going on in Descartes’s investigation of physiology. 
First, it seems as though Descartes should be looking for an epistemically foundational 
principle.17 This principle should be taken from his physics, and its purpose would be to 
bring living bodies within the epistemological grasp of his philosophical system. Once 
he had such a principle, he could presumably then construct his account of physiology 
hierarchically, beginning with basic, low-level bodily functions, and then intermediate 
functions,  and  then  higher  functions  (presumably,  e.g.,  sensation).  These  are  the 
presuppositions  of  an  epistemically  hierarchical  account  of  physiology,  in  which 
knowledge  of  the  living  body  always  reduces  to  an  epistemic  foundation.18  By 
Descartes’ own claimed standards, all this ought to give him good, firm knowledge of 
the animal/human body.  This  may well  be what he had in mind when he wrote to 
Mersenne, ‘[p]lease look after yourself, at least until I know whether it is possible to 
discover a system of medicine which is founded on infallible demonstrations, which is 
what I am investigating at present’ (January 1630; CSMK: 17; AT i: 105).
With  a  hierarchical  account  of  this  kind,  perhaps  it  would  even  make  sense  for 
Descartes’s explanations of some of the hierarchically higher bodily functions to be 
somewhat obscure (as indeed they are on occasion), since we could at least be sure that 
he  had  the  basics  right,  given  that  the  explanations  were  derived  from  a  solid 
foundation.  Accordingly,  we  could  expect  Descartes’s  physiology  to  comprise  firm, 
strong, clear accounts of the more fundamental bodily systems, along with somewhat 
more  flimsy,  more  obscure  descriptions  of  the  higher  functions.  Crucially,  on  this 
reading,  we  should  expect  the  firmest  account  to  be  reserved  for  the  underlying 
principle – after all, it is the underlying principle that is supposed to confer reliability 
to the knowledge of physiology (and medicine) that is supposed to be derived from it.
17 This would be a principle in the second sense discussed by Clarke: ‘[o]ne sense of “principle” refers to 
propositions which are guaranteed as certain; the other meaning of the term applies to things the knowledge 
of which is basic for understanding anything else’ (1982: 80–1).
18  Methodologically,  Descartes constructs  his  physiology through various means:  experiments,  anatomical 
observation,  incorporation  (and  modification)  of  existing  explanations,  and,  arguably,  speculation.  If  his 
physiology  were  epistemically  hierarchical,  underpinned  by  an  epistemically  foundational  principle, 
reducibility  to  that  principle  would  be  the  arbiter  of  which  explanations  obtained  by  those  means  are 
admissible into the science.
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2.2.3 Descartes’s principle of life as a foundation
We have established that, in order to be an ontic foundation, the principle of life would 
have to be the ‘engine’ that drives the body and confers life to it (so as to fulfil the ontic 
function of the Aristotelian psychic principle of life), as well as being mechanical and 
material (so as to Cartesianize the principle). In addition, in order to be an epistemic 
foundation for physiology, Descartes’s principle of life would have to be an account 
derived  from (or  reducible  to)  his  physics  that  is  suﬃciently  firm to  ground  the 
knowledge of the entire science of physiology.19 In Descartes’s case, the account would 
be suﬃciently firm only if it is fully-reducible to the ultimate foundation of his physics, 
i.e.,  extension.  This  requires  explanation  in  terms  of  corpuscular  mechanics  –  the 
shape, size, and motion of subvisible particles.
On the face of things, Descartes’s references to his principle of life would appear to 
fulfil  all  these  criteria  perfectly.  What  such  a  reading  picks  up  on,  however,  is 
Descartes’s general claims about the principle of life. It is at this point that it is helpful 
to  distinguish  between  Descartes’s  general  claims  and  his  actual  treatment  of  the 
‘principle’ within his physiology, because the former tends to obscure the latter. My 
contention here is that while Descartes’s general claims do (at least) appear to present 
cardiac heat as the epistemic and ontic foundation of physiology, his actual account of 
physiology does away with any unitary foundation. In this section, I disambiguate the 
general claims before moving on, in the next, to an analysis of the role that cardiac heat 
plays in Descartes’s account of the body.
When Descartes talks about a principle of life, it is fairly unambiguous that what he 
has in mind is cardiac heat – or, in a memorable turn of phrase, the ‘fire without light’ 
in the heart (AT vi: 46). He sometimes invokes the blood as the principle as well, and, 
once, the whole body (see §2.4.3, but the scholarship tends to see these references as 
19 There has been a significant amount of work in recent years on elements of Descartes’s physiology and 
medicine that do not seem to be derived from, or even to be compatible with, his physics. These are mostly 
issues of apparent teleology; see, e.g., Gaukroger (2000)  on extrinsic purposes, Des Chene (2001)  on the 
notions of ‘function’ and ‘oﬃce’, Des Chene (2000a) and Shapiro (2003) on health, Brown (2012) on function, 
and Distelzweig (2015) on usus and function. Given that Descartes makes no claim to task these notions with 
grounding physiology, they might perhaps come under the remit of the “acceptably obscure” as discussed in 
§2.2.1, p. 42 above. Teleology is covered in detail in Ch. 6, §6.3 below.
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ultimately reducing back to cardiac heat.20  In the Treatise on Man,  Descartes tells us 
that,
it is not necessary to conceive of this machine [the body] as having any [. . .] other 
principle  of  movement  and  life,  apart  from its  blood  and  its  spirits,  which  are 
agitated by the heat of the fire burning continuously in its heart
(CSM i: 108; AT xi: 202).
Descartes’s implicit target here is the Aristotelian conception of life.21 Vital souls are 
precisely what Descartes is referring to when he talks about additional principles of life 
over  and above the physical  mechanisms of  the body (Descartes’s  ‘spirits’  here  are 
explicitly material22); his point is that we can find everything we need to account for life 
in the material of the body, and the supposition of a life-conferring soul on top would 
be a redundant step. From the way he puts it here, it sounds as though everything 
particular to a living body – its ‘movement and life’ – has a single underlying principle: 
blood and spirits agitated by the fire in the heart. And since the agitation of the blood 
and spirits is itself dependent on the heat of the fire, it seems only natural to simplify 
the principle further, to the heat in the heart itself.23
Descartes  is  fairly  consistent  with  this  description  in  his  general  claims  about  the 
principle of life. The Treatise on the Passions of the Soul, a much later text, begins with a 
summary of his physiology. Its seventh article is titled ‘A brief account of the parts of 
the body and of some of their functions’ (1/7; CSM i: 330; AT xi: 331), which covers the 
main functions of living bodies, from digestion to circulation to sensation. The next 
article addresses ‘The principle underlying all these functions’. And that principle, it 
20 Bitbol-Hespériès (1990: ch. 3) gives a thorough overview of cardiac heat as the principle of life. See also, 
e.g., Aucante (2006: 164), Des Chene (2001: 3, 26), Gaukroger (2010: 10–1), Fuchs (2001: 131), Shapiro (2003: 
240; 2011: 272, 273, 282), and Smith (2007: 624) for evidence of the consensus that cardiac heat is the principle 
of life.
21 Descartes’s correspondence with Plempius makes the implicit target entirely explicit: ‘how, I ask, can the 
movement which occurs in the cut-up bits of the heart depend on the human soul, when it is taken as an 
article of faith that the rational soul is indivisible, and has no other sensitive or vegetative soul attached to 
it?’ (15 February 1638; CSMK: 80–81; AT i: 523). See also Des Chene (2001: 15ﬀ.).
22 In Man, he calls them ‘a certain very fine wind’, produced from the finest particles of the blood (CSM i: 
100; AT xi: 129–30). As Voss puts it neatly in a note on his translation of the Passions, ‘more spiritous than 
spiritual’ (Descartes 1989: 24).
23 See Bitbol-Hespériès (1990: 38).
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seems to claim, is cardiac heat:
[w]hile we are alive there is a continual heat in our hearts, which is a kind of fire 
that  the blood of  the veins  maintains  there.  This  fire is  the corporeal  principle 
underlying all the movements of our limbs
(Passions 1/8; CSM i: 331; AT xi: 333).
Even more explicitly  than the Treatise  on  Man,  the  Passions  indicates that there is  a 
principle that acts as the ontic foundation of the body, and that this principle is cardiac 
heat. From what Descartes claims here, cardiac heat underlies ‘all the movements of 
our limbs’. As such, it drives the body – as Des Chene nicely puts it, ‘[i]n the cycle of 
the blood, the motor is the heat of the heart’ (2001: 21). Descartes describes cardiac 
heat as ‘corporeal’ (and thereby material, and by implication mechanical), and thus non-
psychic. On the strength of such general claims about the principle of life, then, it 
appears that it does indeed serve as an ontic foundation for physiology.
The epistemic side of the ostensible principle comes out in the Description of the Human 
Body  (a  late  text  that  recapitulates  and updates  much of  the  Treatise  on  Man).  The 
preface  explicitly  puts  the  Description  into  an  epistemological  setting.  It  begins  by 
discussing the importance of medical knowledge, in terms of curing and preventing 
illness,  and for the sake of retarding the ageing process.  Descartes then asserts the 
dependence of medical knowledge on physiological knowledge. Medicine could have 
obtained better clinical results, he claims, ‘if we had studied suﬃciently to know the 
nature of our body’ (DHB: 170; AT xi, p. 223–24; translation modified24). He continues 
by explaining that the chief impediment to medical knowledge has been the erroneous 
attribution of life functions to the soul. This is immediately followed by a claim similar 
to those we have already seen in Man and the  Passions, that cardiac heat is the ontic 
principle driving the living body (AT xi: 226). After a detailed account of the heartbeat, 
circulation, respiration, and nutrition, Descartes provides an explicit statement of the 
move from the ontic to the epistemic:
it is so important to know the true cause of the heart’s movement that, without it, 
we  cannot  know anything  about  the  theory  of  medicine,  because  all  the  other 
functions in the animal depend on it
(DHB: 182; AT xi: 245).
He  seems  quite  unequivocal  that  all  knowledge  of  medicine  and  physiology  is 
dependent on knowledge of ‘the true cause of the heart’s movement’ – in other words, 
24 The original French reads, ‘si on s’estoit assez étudié à connoistre la nature de nostre corps’ (AT xi: 224).
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given the preceding account, on knowledge of cardiac heat. This certainly sounds like 
an epistemic foundation for physiology. The passage also tells us something about the 
relation  between  the  ontic  and  epistemic  sides  of  the  principle:  we  cannot  know 
anything about medicine and physiology without knowledge of cardiac heat, Descartes 
claims, because the ontic constitution of the body is such that all  its functions are 
dependent on cardiac heat as the ontic principle that drives them.
2.3 Accounts of cardiac heat
2.3.1 The source of cardiac heat
Since cardiac heat is so widely identified with Descartes’s principle of life (and for good 
reason), we need to determine exactly what is involved in Descartes’s account before 
assessing whether it can serve as a principle. Merely referencing cardiac heat is not in 
itself going to be suﬃcient to make it the Cartesian principle of life. Cardiac heat is 
already present in relation to the principle of life in the theories of the ‘ancients’ to 
whom Descartes so strenuously insists he is opposed.25 If Descartes is to distinguish his 
physiology from that of the ancients, he will have to provide an account of the source 
of cardiac heat that diﬀerentiates itself from the psychic account by being reducible to 
corpuscular mechanics, and ultimately to pure extension itself.
At this point, it might be objected that, as Des Chene (2001: 27) notes, heat is already 
mechanical  for  Descartes,  given his  account of  heat  as  corpuscle  movement in the 
World and the Principles. If heat itself is mechanical, then, by extension, cardiac heat 
should also be mechanical.26 If this is the case, does pointing to heat alone get to count 
as a mechanical explanation? No, because heat itself is not what is at stake here. While 
Descartes has provided a material explanation of heat elsewhere, his explanation of 
cardiac heat cannot bottom out in heat itself. There is another level to the causal story 
– namely, the cardiac part. The nature of heat itself is not the relevant question here. 
What is relevant is what causes heat specifically in the heart.
25 See Bitbol-Hespériès (1990: 39) and Aucante (2006: 167–77).
26 See Hall (1970: 62).
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2.3.2 Analogies
In all of Descartes’s completed work on physiology and medicine, he accounts for the 
heat of the heart purely through various allusions and analogies. The most common of 
these is fire. Thus, respiration is o)andedly described as ‘necessary for maintaining 
the fire in [the] heart’ (TM: 102; AT xi: 124), while, according to the Passions, ‘we die 
when the fire in our heart is completely extinguished’ (2:122; CSM i:  370–71; AT xi: 
418). The same general attribution of cardiac heat to some kind of fire comes up again 
in both Man (AT xi: 202) and the Passions (1/8; 2/123), as well as in the Description (AT xi: 
236, 237, 244, 280–82) and the correspondence (AT iv: 407).
In Man  (AT xi:  123)  and the summary thereof  included in  the Discourse,  Descartes 
expands a little on the fire allusion. In the latter, he writes,
in the beginning God did not place in this body any [. . .] other thing to serve as a 
vegetative or sensitive soul, but rather [. . .] he kindled in its heart one of those fires 
without light
(CSM i: 134; AT vi: 46).
The idea of a fire without light might sound odd in itself, but it makes sense in context. 
In  the  Treatise  on  Light,  an  earlier  section  of  the  World,  intended  to  be  published 
alongside Man, Descartes accounts for fire in terms of flame burning wood (AT x: 7–
10).27 There, fire is produced by very fast-moving subvisible bodies breaking apart the 
particles that make up the wood. Descartes wants to equate the fire that produces heat 
in the heart with that which produces heat in the flame – simply without the light.
Descartes associates such fires without light with fermentation, and it is comparisons 
with fermentation that make up the rest of his analogies with the cause of cardiac heat. 
In the Discourse, he claims that the fire in the heart is ‘no diﬀerent from that of the fire 
which heats hay when it has been stored before it is dry, or which causes new wine to 
seethe when it is left to ferment from the crushed grapes’ (CSM i: 134; AT vi: 46). In 
the Description,  the comparison is to yeast (levain)  (AT xi:  228; AT xi:  282),  and the 
correspondence with Plempius mentions both yeast (AT i:  523)  and fermentation in 
general (AT i: 523, 531; AT ii: 69). Descartes’s reference to ‘the fire which heats hay 
when it has been stored before it is dry’ is particularly relevant, since his account of 
fermentation, which is given in the Principles, addresses its topic solely through the self-
heating of damp hay.
27 The account is reprised in Principles 4/80.
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Article 92 of part four of the Principles is titled ‘In things that grow hot but do not 
shine [lucent], such as stored hay’ (4/92; CSM i: 273; AT viiia: 256) – the context here is 
the nature and generation of fire, introduced in article 80. The claim is that heat can be 
caused by the movement of the sap within pieces of hay. There are channels in a blade 
of grass through which the sap usually flows; under normal circumstances, it would 
evaporate through those channels as the grass dries. But, as a blade of grass dries, its 
parts constrict, and, under certain conditions, the channels will constrict enough to 
seal themselves before the sap can evaporate. When that happens, the sap is forced 
faster and faster through smaller and smaller, ever-shrinking channels. This movement 
agitates  the  matter  around  it,  causing  heat.  This,  Descartes  tells  us,  is  a  form of 
fermentation, and all fermentations operate in the same basic fashion: relatively large 
particles of matter get forced to move faster than normal (AT viiia: 256).
Descartes has a mechanical explanation of fermentation, then – at least in the case of 
drying hay. He also claims that cardiac heat is caused by a kind of fermentation (or that 
its cause is like fermentation). Nevertheless, it is still not at all clear how the hay model 
applies to the heat of the heart. On Descartes’s account there is no hay in the heart – 
and not obviously anything like it – and there is nothing in the process of drying. The 
account  of  fermentation  in  damp  hay  seems  to  apply  to  a  fairly  narrow  set  of 
circumstances. This is a very diﬀerent set of circumstances from those in the heart. As 
such, the comparison with hay is not, by itself, going to show anything more than a 
very weak similarity between the two processes. Translating the model to the heart 
would require further specification of how the mechanical causes of fermentation in 
hay are manifested in the heart.
2.3.3 Blood-expulsion
Further specification is not provided in the discussions of cardiac heat in Man,  the 
Discourse, or the Passions; nor is it to be found in the extended treatment that makes up 
part two (‘On the motion of the heart and the blood’ (DHB: 172; AT xi: 228)) of the 
Description. It comes up instead, somewhat incongruously, in a section of the Description 
concerned with embryology. There, Descartes provides a brief but complete account of 
the cause of cardiac heat through blood expulsion:
I do not know of  any other fire or  any other heat  in the heart  other than the 
agitation  of  the  particles  of  blood,  nor  of  any  other  cause  which  can  serve  to 
maintain this fire except only that, when most of the blood leaves the heart at the 
time of diastole, those of its particles which remain there enter into the flesh, where 
they find pores arranged in such a way, and fibres agitated in such a way, that there is 
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only  matter  of  the  first  element  surrounding  them;  and  at  systole  these  pores 
change  shape  because  the  heart  lengthens,  which  makes  the  particles  of  blood, 
which remained there as if  they were to serve as yeast,  leave there with a great 
speed, and in this way entering easily into the new blood coming into the heart, 
they  make  its  particles  separate  from one  another,  and  in  separating  thus  they 
acquire the form of fire.
(DHB: 203; AT xi: 281–2).
This  has  fairly  clear  parallels  with  the  account  of  fermentation  in  hay,  although 
Descartes does not make them explicit. The blood that remains in the heart is the 
equivalent of the sap in the blade of grass. It sinks into pores in the flesh of the heart, 
which play the role of the channels in the grass. At systole (which is the passive phase 
of  the  heartbeat  for  Descartes),  the  heart  relaxes  into  an elongated shape,28  which 
causes the pores to be laterally compressed. This compression of the pores stands in for 
the constriction of the channels in the drying hay, expelling the particles of blood from 
the flesh of the heart wall, and into the new blood that enters the heart concurrently. 
The agitation of the accelerated blood particles, in turn, agitates the particles of the 
new blood, making them move and thus producing heat.29  This causes the blood to 
expand, on the macro level, and the heart goes into diastole, and the whole process 
repeats.
This passage provides a translation of the account of fermentation in hay over to the 
production  of  cardiac  heat.  It  does  what  the  analogies  Descartes  employs  in  his 
completed works,  in  his  correspondence,  and in  the Description’s  own treatment of 
cardiac motion do not: it explicitly accounts for the generation of heat specifically in 
the heart.
2.4 Interdependence and the case against an ontic foundation
2.4.1 Interdependence and the engine of the body
On the basis of Descartes’s explanation of the cause of cardiac heat,  we can assess 
whether  the  heat  of  the  heart  can  be  said  to  ‘drive’  the  body  on  his  account  of 
physiology (and thus whether it can serve as the ontic principle of the movement of 
the living body). On my reading, it will turn out that there can be no unitary principle 
28 See Description 2/10 (AT xi: 231).
29 Fuchs describes this stage of the process as a ‘ceaseless chain reaction’ (2001: 128), brought about by the 
ejection of the old blood (however, there is no indication of any chain reaction in Descartes’s account).
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driving the Cartesian body, just because the major systems of Descartes’s physiology are 
interdependent rather than being organised hierarchically: no one system can be more 
fundamental than another.
When Descartes writes that we ‘move just like automatons, and nobody thinks that the 
force of heat is insuﬃcient to cause their movements’ (to Plempius for Fromondus, 3 
October 1637; CSMK: 63; AT i: 414), he appears to be quite clear that it is heat that 
drives the body. If cardiac heat were the engine of the body, it would drive the body’s 
movements just because it causes the blood to circulate and because it produces animal 
spirits.  This  is  how he  describes  the  operation  of  the  body  in  the  preface  to  the 
Description:
the heat that [the body] has in its heart is like the great spring or the principle of all 
its movements, and [. . .] the veins are the tubes which conduct the blood from all 
the parts of the body towards the heart, where it fuels the heat there] [. . .]. And the 
arteries are yet another set of tubes, through which the blood, heated and rarefied 
in the heart,  passes from there into all  the other parts of the body, to which it 
brings heat and matter to sustain them. Finally, the most agitated and most active 
parts of this blood are carried to the brain [. . .], comprising an air or very fine wind 
which is called the “animal spirits”. These dilate the brain, enabling it to [. . .] [act] 
as the organ [. . .] of the common sense, of the imagination, and of the memory. 
Then, [. . .] these same spirits flow from the brain through the nerves into all the 
muscles, thereby making these nerves serve as organs of the external senses, and 
inflate the muscles in various ways imparting movement to all bodily parts
(DHB: 172; AT xi: 226–7).
Cardiac heat rarefies and heats the blood, which pushes it out through the arteries, 
whereby heat and nutrition is provided throughout the body. Cardiac heat also creates 
animal spirits, in the form of the smallest, most agitated particles of blood, which are 
released in the process of heating and rarefaction. The spirits, too, are pushed out of 
the heart by the rarefaction of the blood, and through the nervous system, whereby 
they power brain and sensation functions and ‘[impart] movement to all bodily parts’.
On the basis of this description, the causal dependency relations within the body do 
appear to go one way: functions such as digestion and muscular movement depend on 
the circulatory and nervous systems respectively, which both depend on cardiac heat 
(and,  ultimately,  on the blood-expulsion that  drives  cardiac heat).  On this  account, 
cardiac heat gets to be the engine of the body because it sits at the bottom of the 
hierarchy:  cardiac  heat  is  the engine if  that  is  where all  dependencies  in  the body 
ultimately bottom out.
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However, merely stating that such and such a thing is the principle behind something 
or other does not, in itself, make it that principle – at least, not for a Cartesian.30 The 
position needs to be substantiated. In the case of Descartes’s principle of life, we need 
to establish whether it really does provide the motive power behind the movements of 
the body. (We also need to establish whether knowledge of the principle of life is used 
as the epistemic foundation of the science of physiology.)
For Descartes, heat itself is nothing but movement (AT xi: 10). For him to claim that 
what drives the movements of the body is heat, while what causes heat (in the body) is 
movement (in  the body)  would be akin to claiming that  movement in  the body is 
caused by movement in  the body;  that  is,  it  would be circular.  Heat  in  itself  thus 
cannot serve as the ontic foundation of the body: we need the cause behind the heat. 
The  blood-expulsion  account  supplies  that  cause.  Consequently,  it  is  the  blood-
expulsion account that we need to look at in order to establish whether cardiac heat 
can act as the engine that drives the body. To put it another way, cardiac heat has a 
further  dependency:  blood-expulsion.  In  order  to  see  where,  or  indeed  if,  the 
dependencies in the body bottom out, we need to examine the dependencies for blood-
expulsion.
According to the blood-expulsion account, cardiac heat is caused by the expulsion of 
particles  of  blood  from  the  heart  wall  into  cooler,  non-rarefied  blood  that  is 
simultaneously  entering via  ‘the  vena cava  into [the]  right  ventricle,  and [.  .  .]  the 
pulmonary vein into the left’ (DHB: 174; AT xi: 231). This is what causes the heating 
and rarefaction of the blood that supposedly drives both circulation and animal-spirit 
production (and consequently the whole process of bodily functioning that Descartes 
describes in the preface to the Description).  But,  on Descartes’s  account above,  the 
production  of  cardiac  heat  through  blood-expulsion  depends  on  the  following 
activities: (a)  the addition of ‘fresh’ blood to the ventricles and (b)  the expulsion of 
blood particles from the heart wall.  In order to have (a),  the body needs both (a.1) 
blood and (a.2) a means of delivering it to the heart (i.e., circulation). And in order to 
have (b), the body needs both (b.1) blood in the heart wall and (b.2) a means of ejecting 
it at suﬃcient speed. Immediately, then, we see that blood-expulsion is dependent on 
something further. This means that the dependencies in the body cannot bottom out 
at blood-expulsion.
30 A non-Cartesian science might well be founded on an axiomatic principle that is not explained further. But 
any founding principle of Cartesian physiology would have to reduce all the way down to extension, the 
ultimate foundation of his natural philosophy.
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Following the dependencies for (b),  we see that (b.2)  depends on heart-lengthening. 
The pores of the heart wall ‘change shape because the heart lengthens’, and this is what 
‘makes the particles of blood [. . .] leave there with a great speed’ (DHB: 203; AT xi: 
281–2). Heart-lengthening itself is caused by the deflation of the heart following the 
active phase of the heartbeat (AT xi: 232). So, blood-expulsion is partially dependent on 
(b), which is partially dependent on (b.2), which depends on heart-lengthening, while 
heart-lengthening  is  caused  by  heart-deflation,  which  itself  is  an  eﬀect  of  heart-
inflation. And heart-inflation is dependent on blood-expulsion. Any given activity in 
the process – blood-expulsion, heart-lengthening, heart-deflation, etc. – is dependent 
on the other activities in the process. That is, the entire process is circular, and the 
activities within it are interdependent. Similarly, a small amount of blood remains in 
the heart wall (b.1) only as a result of the previous active phase of the heartbeat (AT xi: 
231), while the active phase is itself partially dependent on (b.1).
The dependency story plays out in the same way with (a). The addition of fresh blood 
to the ventricles partially requires the whole circulatory system (a.2) to bring the blood 
that was previously sent out from the heart back into it. At its simplest, we can say 
that,  for  Descartes,  circulation  depends  on  the  heartbeat,  which  depends  on  the 
expansion  of  blood,  which  depends  on  cardiac  heat,  which  depends  on  blood-
expulsion, which depends on circulation, and so on. Thus, circulation and cardiac heat 
are  interdependent  (along  with  blood-expulsion,  heart-inflation  and  deflation,  etc.). 
Descartes’s account, however, is not quite so simple. The dependencies for cardiac heat 
bring in at least two more bodily functions: digestion and respiration. The addition of 
fresh blood via the circulation requires a supply of blood (a.1), which depends on the 
production of blood within the body. On Descartes’s account, the production of blood 
depends on digestion (AT xi:  122, 227).  But digestion depends on the circulation of 
warm blood to provide it with the movement and material it requires to operate (AT 
xi:  121).  Without  circulation  and  cardiac  heat,  there  would  be  no  digestion  –  but 
without digestion, there would be no circulation or cardiac heat. As such, digestion, 
circulation, and cardiac heat are all interdependent.31
In  addition,  in  order  to  derive  the  fresh  blood  that  re-enters  the  heart  from the 
31 In the Description (AT xi: 239), Descartes mentions that the circulation would be a process of perpetual 
motion, if it were not for the loss of blood particles through nutrition. In a body without nutrition, there 
would be no need for digestion. In that case, digestion itself would not be one of the interdependent systems. 
Regardless, the body Descartes is describing is one in which there is nutrition, for which it is clear that, 
without digestion, cardiac heat, circulation, and respiration would fail, and that digestion therefore belongs 
among the interdependent  functions.  On the connection between interdependence and systematicity  in 
Descartes’s physiology, see Ch. 1.
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recirculating blood in the veins, Descartes’s physiology requires respiration:
by means of the respiratory air,  [the lung]  thickens and tempers the blood that 
comes  from the  right  ventricle  of  the  heart  before  it  enters  the  left  ventricle; 
without this it would be too rare and too fine to serve to fuel the fire that it encounters there
(DHB: 177; AT xi: 236; my emphasis).
If  there  were  no  respiration,  there  would  be  no  production  of  cardiac  heat.32 
Consequently, cardiac heat depends on respiration. At the same time, there would be 
no respiration without the flow of blood to the lungs, and without the movement with 
which the warm blood supplies them. Thus, respiration, circulation, cardiac heat, and 
digestion are all interdependent. Each depends on the others, and the absence of any 
particular one would prevent the operation of each and all the others.
Given this interdependence of bodily functions, a reading of Descartes’s physiology in 
which cardiac heat is the underlying ontic principle of the living body – the engine that 
drives it – becomes untenable. At no point in the cycle is there reason to stop and name 
that particular stage the ‘engine’.  There is  no single originator of movement in the 
body. There is no physiological first mover. There is nothing that fulfils the same role as 
the Aristotelian soul.  There could be no cardiac heat without blood-expulsion,  and 
there could be no blood-expulsion without fresh blood entering the heart and without 
the discharge of blood particles from the ventricle wall. But blood-particle discharge 
requires  heart-lengthening,  which  requires  heart-deflation,  which  requires  heart-
inflation, and so on. None of which could occur anyway without the supply of blood 
that is dependent on digestion, or without the interposition of respiration.
There is no one point at which the dependencies bottom out. Instead, they continue in 
a  perpetual  circle  throughout  all  of  these  bodily  functions.  The  circularity  in 
Descartes’s treatment of cardiac heat (movement caused by heat, but heat caused by 
movement)  is  thus  virtuous  rather  than  vicious,  but  only  as  a  result  of  the 
interdependence of the functions involved. Descartes’s physiology, therefore, cannot be 
hierarchical and ultimately driven by a single underlying principle. If there is an engine 
that drives the Cartesian body, it cannot be a single function; it must rather be the 
collection of interdependent functions as a whole that drives the body. The answer to 
the question raised in §2.2.1 – whether Descartes replaces the Aristotelian soul (or the 
Paracelsian master archeus) with a principle of life compatible with his ontology – is 
thus a ‘no’. He retains the organisation of the parts of the body, and he makes that 
organisation do all the work. He does away with the underlying principle entirely.
32 The same point is made in Discourse 5 (AT vi: 53).
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2.4.2 Interdependence and generation
A potential  objection to the argument here is that there is another sense in which 
cardiac heat might be conceived of as the underlying principle of life –  not as the 
engine that continuously drives the body, but as the body’s developmental point of 
origin. In Descartes’s account of generation in the Description,  the heart is the first 
organ in the embryo to begin to develop (AT xi: 254). Given that the heart develops via 
the heat generated by fermentation of the “mixture of seed” (DHB: 187; AT xi: 254), 
and that Descartes claims that ‘this movement of the diastole has from the beginning 
been caused by heat, or the action of fire [in this case, the “fire” of the fermenting seed 
from which the heart  develops]’  (DHB: 202;  AT xi:  280–81),  there  is  a  fairly  clear 
argument for seeing the warm heart as the first principle, or the initial term, of life in 
the body.
However, even here, in the earliest generation of the heart, the dependency relations 
do not go one way only. Brown (2012) shows how the development of the embryo, on 
Descartes’s  account,  requires  the  interdependence  of  the  processes  involved:  ‘the 
formation of the brain is necessary for the persistence of the heart and the formation 
of the heart a necessary precondition for the formation of the brain’ (2012: 12). Because 
the processes of generation form a virtuous circle of interdependence, exactly as do the 
bodily  systems  that  maintain  the  ongoing  operation  of  the  body,  the  warm heart 
developing  in  the  embryo  has  to  share  first  position  in  the  body  with  the  other 
interdependent  processes  of  generation.  Consequently,  there  can  be  no  single 
underlying principle of life in the generation of the Cartesian body either.
2.4.3 Interdependence and Descartes’s general claims
Even in  his  general  claims,  Descartes  does  not  always  refer  to  a  unitary  principle. 
When he brings up the ‘principle of movement and life’ in Man, he first equates them 
with the man–machine’s ‘blood and its spirits’, before going on to tell us that the blood 
and spirits are ‘agitated by the heat of the fire burning continuously in its heart’ (CSM 
i: 108; AT xi: 202). Similarly, in a letter to Plempius for Fromondus, he claims that ‘the 
souls of animals are nothing but their blood, the blood which is turned into spirits by 
the warmth of the heart’ (3 October 1637; CSMK: 62–3; AT i: 414).What is invoked in 
both  these  passages  is  something  more  than  just  cardiac  heat,  although  it  could 
certainly be argued that Descartes sees the principle underlying the blood and spirits 
here to be the heat of the heart.
There are other passages, however, that suggest Descartes might have been aware that 
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his  physiology  actually  operates  on  the  basis  of  interdependence.  In  a  letter  to 
Plempius, Descartes attributes the rarefaction of blood in the heart to ‘[t]he entire 
structure [fabrica] of the heart, the heat in it, and the very nature of the blood’, all of 
which ‘contribute [conspirant]  to this eﬀect’ (15 February 1638; CSMK: 83; AT i:  529; 
translation modified). As discussed in §2.3 , it is the rarefaction of the blood that causes 
its expulsion from the heart. It is also blood rarefaction that creates the spirits. And, 
here, Descartes is explicit that its dependencies do not bottom out in cardiac heat, but 
that it is the product of several conspiring factors, with none being more fundamental 
than any other.
Even more tellingly, in a letter to Regius Descartes writes,
[t]he  vegetative  power  in  human  beings  is  nothing  but  a  certain  arrangement 
[constitutio] of the parts of the body
(to Regius, May 1641; CSMK: 182; AT iii: 372).
He sees the engine of the body not as a single underlying principle, but as a collection 
of parts in a certain arrangement. The analysis in this chapter would suggest that we 
think of this arrangement of parts as the circle of interdependent functions. In a very 
similar vein, the Passions claims that
death never occurs through the absence of the soul,  but only because one  of  the 
principal parts of the body decays
(Passions 1/6; CSM i: 329; AT xi: 330; my emphasis).
When the body dies,  it  is  because of the breakdown of any one of some group of 
‘principal  parts’.  Descartes  himself  does  not  qualify  which  parts  he  takes  to  be 
principal, but, given the reading in §2.4.1, they must be those parts or functions that 
are  interdependent.  It  is  precisely  the  interdependent  functions  for  which,  if  one 
ceases to operate, the whole body ceases to operate: death occurs if any of the principal 
parts decays exactly because each part is dependent on all the others. Descartes is quite 
clearly not placing the responsibility for life and death solely in the hands of cardiac 
heat: he explicitly does not oﬀer cardiac heat alone as his alternative to the Aristotelian 
psychic principle of life. Instead, he places responsibility for the life of the body in the 
entire collection of principal parts.
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2.5 The case against an epistemic foundation
If physiology is structured interdependently rather than hierarchically, it can have no 
single  underlying  ontic  principle.  Given  that  Descartes’s  general  claims  make  any 
epistemic  principle  of  the  science  of  physiology  dependent  on  the  ontic  principle 
(§2.2.3),  there  is  suﬃcient  reason  to  conclude  that  his  physiology  has  no  single 
underlying epistemic principle either.  But there is  another case to be made against 
there  being  a  single  principle  grounding  the  Cartesian  sciences  of  physiology  and 
medicine.
If cardiac heat were the principle on top of which knowledge of physiology is built, 
Descartes’s treatment of it in his work on physiology would be remarkably strange. He 
deals with it o)andedly, devoting at least as much attention to the ‘auricles’ of the 
heart,  or  to  the  proper  designation  of  the  pulmonary  vein  and  artery,  as  to  the 
generation of heat in the heart. There is a considerable diﬀerence between the amount 
of detail allotted to, say, the mechanism of nutrition and that aﬀorded to the cause of 
cardiac heat. Recall (from §2.3.1) that, in all of his completed work, Descartes addresses 
the generation of cardiac heat solely through analogies and allusions. These analogies 
are  vague  and  incomplete,  and  they  get  changed,  mixed  together,  and  recycled 
throughout  Descartes’s  various  works  on  the  subject,  in  a  way  reminiscent  of  the 
interchangeable tropes of an elevator pitch (‘the principle of life is like yeast meets 
damp hay’).
If all that were at stake here were just some physiological phenomenon or another, the 
lack of specificity about the mechanism might well not matter epistemically. It would 
be what Des Chene calls  a  ‘proof of  concept’  (2001:  17):  these kinds of  things can 
happen in this kind of way.33  But knowing that fermenting wine eﬀervesces or that 
drying hay heats up, in entirely diﬀerent contexts, seems far too slight to serve as the 
foundational  principle  of  a  science  for  Descartes.  These  analogies  do  suggest  that 
generation of heat and ebullition can be a material, non-psychic process, but without 
further specification, they are insuﬃcient for a foundational principle. As established 
in §2.2.2, an epistemic foundation would have to comprise a well-specified account that 
reduces down to the principles of physics.  The analogies alone do not fit that bill. 
What Descartes needs is a mechanical explanation of fermentation, and of how it (or 
something like it) occurs in the heart.
33 See also Hatfield (1992: 343) and Manning (2012).
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He does have such an explanation: the blood-expulsion account. But Descartes never 
uses that account to explain cardiac heat in any of his general physiology. The blood-
expulsion account is given in the fifth part of the Description of the Human Body. The 
Description is an unfinished manuscript that Descartes worked on over the last couple 
of years of his life (it was composed between 1647 and 1648).  It is divided into five 
separate parts: the first three cover the introduction, the heartbeat and circulation, and 
nutrition  respectively,  while  the  remaining  two address  embryogenesis  and embryo 
development. In a 1648 letter to Elisabeth, Descartes describes embryology as being of 
the greatest necessity to his work, but complains that he lacks the relevant data (AT v: 
112). The draft he finally produces is famously tenuous. In the 1664 edition (its first, and 
posthumous, publication), Descartes’s editor Clerselier even sets the fourth and fifth 
parts of the Description aside, under the heading ‘Digression, in which the formation of 
the Animal is treated’ (AT xi: 252).34 And it is in this context – and only in this context – 
that Descartes employs the blood-expulsion account.
If this were meant to be the firm account that finally grounds Descartes’s science of 
physiology,  its  relegation  to  a  tentative  treatment  of  embryology  seems  a  strange 
choice. It makes no appearance in the first three parts of the Description,  which are 
concerned precisely with the functioning of the body and the epistemic value thereof 
(see §2.2.1).  When explaining the heartbeat, the Description  employs only the vaguer 
allusions and analogies covered in §2.3.2. In addition, since the blood-expulsion account 
was written in 1648 at the latest, there would have been ample time to insert it into the 
Passions’ discussion of the principle of life and cardiac motion before publication at the 
end of 1649.35 But we find no mention of it there either; all the Passions tells us is that 
cardiac heat is caused by ‘a kind of fire’ (CSM i: 331; AT xi: 333). If blood expulsion were 
the account that finally mechanised the very foundation of his physiology, we might 
well expect Descartes to be eager to include it in his newest work – a work which also 
happened to be the most thorough treatment of physiology he had yet to publish.36
If we take cardiac heat to be the grounding principle of Descartes’s physiology, it is 
diﬃcult to make sense of the remarkably laid-back approach he has to addressing the 
34 Adam and Tannery note that the heading appears to be due to Clerselier rather than to Descartes himself 
(AT xi: 252).
35  The Passions  was oﬃcially  published at the beginning of 1650,  but copies were available the preceding 
December.
36 Man remained unpublished until 1662 (in a Latin translation).
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generation  of  heat  in  the  heart.  However,  if  cardiac  heat  is  just  one  physiological 
phenomenon among many, and no more fundamental than circulation, respiration or 
nutrition, his treatment of it makes perfect sense. A proof-of-concept explanation is 
suﬃcient for one phenomenon among many. And a better specified explanation can 
reasonably  remain buried in  an obscure  manuscript  if  nothing pivotal  rests  on the 
phenomenon in question.
The introduction to the Description might claim that we ‘cannot know anything about 
the  theory  of  medicine’  without  knowing  “the  true  cause  of  the  heart’s 
movement” (DHB: 182; AT xi: 245), but it is evidently a mistake to take that cause to 
be cardiac heat. We might still need to know the true cause of the heart’s movement, 
but the cause is exactly what Descartes sets out in the sections of the Description that 
follow: the entire physiology of the interdependent “principal parts” of the body.
2.6 Conclusion
Descartes  makes  multiple  references  to  a  ‘principle  of  life’,  or  to  a  principle  that 
underlies the body’s operations. This principle appears to be cardiac heat. There are 
some good reasons  for  taking  these  references  to  point  to  an  ontic  foundation of 
Cartesian physiology – where an ontic foundation is the ‘engine’ that ‘drives’ the body, 
or the point at which all the dependencies in the body bottom out. There are also good 
reasons  to  go  further  and  interpret  Descartes’s  ‘principle  of  life’  as  an  epistemic 
foundation, on which all the knowledge of his physiology is grounded.
If, however, we look at the dependencies of cardiac heat, we see that it cannot be the 
ontic foundation of Cartesian physiology, because the Cartesian body is not driven by a 
single ‘engine’ principle. Instead, the living body operates on the basis of a collection of 
interdependent  bodily  functions.  These  are  (at  least)  cardiac  heat,  circulation, 
digestion,  and  respiration.  In  addition,  cardiac  heat  cannot  be  the  epistemic 
foundation of Cartesian physiology, since Descartes takes his epistemic foundation to 
depend on his ontic foundation. Thus,  the structure of Cartesian physiology is  not 
hierarchical, either ontically or epistemically, but interdependent. Precisely because it 
is  structured  interdependently,  Cartesian  physiology  has  no  place  for  a  single, 
underlying ‘principle of life’.
Chapter 3
Descartes and the dissolution of life1
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter,  I argue that Descartes is not a reductionist about life,  but that he 
dissolves  or  eliminates  the  category  entirely.  This  is  surprising  both  because  he 
repeatedly refers to the life of humans, animals, and plants and because he appears to 
rely on the category of life to construct his physiology and medicine. Various attempts 
have  been  made  in  the  scholarship  to  attribute  a  principled  concept  of  life  to 
Descartes. Most recently, Detlefsen (2016) has argued that Descartes ‘is a reductionist 
with respect to explanation of life phenomena but not an eliminativist with respect to 
life itself ’ (2016: 143). I show here that all these attempts either result in arbitrariness 
or  force  Descartes’s  wider  philosophical  project  into  incoherence.  I  conclude  that 
Descartes’s  ontological  commitments  make a  principled  concept  of  life  impossible, 
that he does not need such a concept, and that his project ends up more coherent 
without one.
Life ought not to be a category for Descartes. For the scholastics, to whom Descartes 
was responding on this issue, the vegetative soul could do the work of distinguishing 
ontologically between the animate and the inanimate: whatever had a vegetative soul 
was  alive;  whatever  did  not  was  not.  This  avenue was  not  open to  Descartes.  His 
ontology allows for only one kind of soul, which consists of thinking and absolutely 
nothing more – and animating a body is not, on his understanding, a kind of thinking 
(to Regius, May 1641; AT iii: 371). Consequently, in Descartes’s ontology, there should 
1 A version of this chapter is forthcoming in The Southern Journal of Philosophy.
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be no more of a ‘diﬀerence between living and lifeless things than there is between a 
clock or other automaton on the one hand,  and a key or sword or other non-self-
moving appliance on the other’  (to Regius,  June 1642; CSMK: 214; AT iii:  566).  In 
other words, life can have no special ontological distinction.
And yet Descartes persists in referring to ‘life’ and to ‘living things’. He does not ‘deny 
life  to animals’  (to More,  5  February 1649;  CSMK 366;  AT v,  278).  He admits  that 
severed  heads  that  ‘continue  to  move  about  and  bite  the  earth’  are  ‘no  longer 
alive’ (Discourse 5; CSM i, 139; AT vi, 55; my emphasis). He repeatedly brings up his own 
‘principle of life’ – a material, Cartesian alternative to the Aristotelian vegetative and 
sensitive souls.2 And in the letter to Regius quoted above, he goes on to say that,
[s]ince “self-moving” is a category with respect to all machines that move of their 
own accord, which excludes others that are not self-moving, so “life” can be taken as 
the category [vita sumi potest pro genere] which includes the forms of all living things
(to Regius, June 1642; CSMK: 214; AT iii: 566; translation adjusted).
So, although life ought not to be a category for Descartes, he appears to make it one (at 
the  very  least,  he  explicitly  does  not  rule  it  out).  The  problem  is  that,  as  both 
MacKenzie (1975: 2–3) and Detlefsen (2016: 145) point out, Descartes never provides a 
general concept of life. Given that his metaphysics does not allow him an ontological 
diﬀerentiation, it is not at all clear how the category of life can possibly be defined 
within his philosophical system. Just as it struggles with teleology, a purely material, 
mechanical ontology seems to lack the resources to separate out living creatures from 
the rest of the material world.
In what follows, I first assess the various suggestions for a Cartesian concept of life as 
found in the literature (§3.2). There has been a series of systematic attempts to unearth 
a principled concept of life for Descartes, starting with MacKenzie (1975), who builds 
on some ideas from Hall (1970). The task is taken up again by Ablondi (1998) and then 
Detlefsen (2016). All take Descartes to have a general, principled concept of life, and 
each sees him as a reductionist, in one way or another, about that concept. They take 
him to reduce life to some thing, or to some set of things, in the material world (for 
Ablondi and Detlefsen, God also has a role to play in the reduction). Each of these 
articles  shows  how  the  concept  put  forward  by  its  immediate  predecessor  is 
inadequate, arbitrary, or just plain wrong, before oﬀering an alternative concept of its 
own.
2 See Ch. 2.
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My claim here is that the reason all these purported concepts of life turn out to be so 
unsatisfying is that looking for a general, principled concept of life in Descartes is the 
wrong approach to start with (§3.3).  Since he is  entirely clear that life (whatever it 
might be) does not pertain to thinking substance (Passions 1/5; AT xi: 329), it cannot be 
reducible to pure thought. But because his material ontology lacks the resources to 
discriminate the living from the non-living, there is nothing in extended substance for 
life to be reduced to either. And, as Detlefsen points out (2016: 155, 168–169), Descartes 
commits himself to the inscrutability of God, for good reasons (AT vii: 55, 374–5), thus 
making God unavailable to support a concept of life. There is nowhere in Descartes’s 
ontology for a concept of life to reside.
The more suitable approach, then, is to think that Descartes does away with a concept 
of life (§3.3.1). He does not reduce it to something material. He does not look to God’s 
intentions. What he does is dissolve or eliminate the category. Rather than addressing 
his account of physiology to the nature of life itself, and to finding a material source for 
it,  Descartes  takes  on  the  traditional  phenomena  of  physiology  (cardiac  heat, 
respiration, nutrition, generation, etc.) one by one and provides a material explanation 
for each. These explanations do not aﬀord the reconstitution of any general, univocal 
concept of life. Consequently, in the process, the concept is dissolved away.3 If I am 
right about this, it means that Descartes recognised something that Machery has far 
more recently proposed for modern biology: that ‘the project of defining life is either 
impossible or pointless’ (2012: 145).
There  are  parallels  between  this  reading  of  Descartes  and  eliminativist  materialist 
positions  with  respect  to  the  mind.  In  eliminative  materialism,  ‘thoughts’,  ‘beliefs’, 
‘mind states’,  etc. are merely the terms of folk psychology, and they fail  to refer to 
anything  real.  That  is,  there  is  nothing  to  which  they  can  be  reduced.  As  such, 
neuroscience has no need to attempt to explain them (nor could it): mind states should 
be eliminated from the science, which should focus instead on physical brain states. In 
his  landmark paper  on the elimination of  propositional  attitudes,  Paul  Churchland 
concludes
[t]he propositional attitudes of folk psychology do not constitute an unbreachable 
barrier  to  the  advancing  tide  of  neuroscience.  On  the  contrary,  the  principled 
3 Cf. Wolfe (2011: 192), which argues that there was no early modern controversy over life because there was 
‘no polarization between Life and non-Life’.  Descartes is,  however, responding to a problem driven by a 
polarisation between life and non-life; it just turns out that this is a problem that arises with respect to a 
tradition he rejects (see §3.3.2).
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displacement of folk psychology is not only richly possible, it represents one of the 
most intriguing theoretical displacements we can currently imagine
(1981: 90).
Similarly,  doing  away  with  the  notion  of  life  itself  is,  presumably,  a  productive 
displacement that gives Descartes new possibilities (such as pervasive iatromechanism) 
for his work on physiology and medicine.
There are several advantages to the ‘dissolutionist’ reading. Most importantly, it makes 
sense of the complete absence of an attempt to work out a general concept of life 
anywhere  in  Descartes’s  work and correspondence (if  the  lack of  a  concept  of  life 
‘would render incoherent’ Descartes’s work on physiology and medicine, as Detlefsen 
claims (2016: 142), for him to ignore it as he does would be a significant oversight). It is 
also non-arbitrary, in a way that MacKenzie-style lists of necessary life-functions are 
not  (see  §3.2.3).  And  it  remains  consistent  with  both  Descartes’s  ontological  and 
theological  commitments.  On  the  other  had,  it  might  appear  diﬃcult  for  the 
dissolutionist reading to make sense of Descartes’s use of the term ‘life’. This problem 
is dealt with in §3.3.2. One answer may be that Descartes uses ‘life’  as a folk term, 
without any strict definition. I argue, though, that most instances of Descartes’ use of 
‘life’  are  responses  to  the  Aristotelian  position,  where  the  term  is  well  defined. 
Descartes’s  intention is  to show that all  the phenomena associated with life in the 
Aristotelian system are explicable under his own; this does not entail a subscription to 
the category of life itself.  Concerns about whether Descartes can allow disciplinary 
unity to biology in the absence of a concept of life are addressed in §3.3.3. There, I 
argue  that  Descartes  has  no  particular  need  for  a  principled  unification  of  the 
discipline, and that whatever unity it may have is provided not by life but by (human) 
medicine. This allows life itself to be redundant for Cartesian biology.
3.2 Potential reductions of life
3.2.1 Cardiac heat
Although  Descartes  never  provides  a  general  definition  of  life,  he  does  frequently 
associate life with heat. For instance, he writes to Mersenne,
[b]ut as to why you say that we cannot explain this phenomenon while allowing no 
principle of life other than heat to animals, it seems to me, on the contrary, that we 
could explain  it  better  in  no other  way;  given that  heat  is  a  common  principle  for 
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animals, plants, and other bodies, it is no surprise that it should serve to make humans 
and plants live
(AT iii: 122; my emphases).
So heat makes humans, plants, and animals live. But whatever Descartes might take life 
to be, it cannot come down to heat alone. This is because, as Descartes puts it, heat is a 
principle common to not just humans, animals, and plants, but also to ‘other bodies’. 
That is, heat is also a principle of inorganic bodies.4 There are plenty of things in the 
natural world that are both warm and clearly non-living. Consequently, there is nothing 
about heat in itself that distinguishes between living and non-living. So if Descartes has 
a concept of life and that concept involves heat, it must involve heat in addition to 
something else.
That something else would appear to be the heart. Descartes makes various seemingly 
straightforward statements such as ‘I do not deny life to animals, since I regard it as 
consisting simply in the heat of the heart’ (to More, 5 February 1649; CSMK: 366; AT v, 
278). Elsewhere, he appears to identify cardiac heat as the principle of life (AT vi: 46; 
AT xi: 202; AT xi: 333). When Descartes appeals to this principle of life, and when he 
claims  that  life  consists  in  cardiac  heat,  it  certainly  looks  like  a  reduction  of  the 
concept of life to a material process.5 This would suggest that his concept of life is the 
following.6
LifeCH := the possession of a warm heart
There is an obvious problem with taking LifeCH to be Descartes’s concept of life: we 
want to describe plants as living, but would not want to attribute warm hearts to them.7 
In addition, Descartes is quite clear that cardiac heat alone is not suﬃcient for life:
4 It is central to Descartes’s argument to Mersenne here that prevalence of heat as a motive force in inorganic 
phenomena is good reason to think it plays a role in organic phenomena too.
5 Cardiac heat is generated entirely mechanically and materially on Descartes’s account. See Fuchs 2001, part 
D.I for a detailed description.
6 This seems to be the concept of life presupposed in Bitbol-Hespériès 1990 (see especially 40 and 96). LifeCH 
is also endorsed (although only in passing) by Canguilhem (1980: 111).
7 In a letter to Mersenne, Descartes attributes heat to the life of plants (30 July 1640; AT iii: 122), but not 
hearts. See p. 62 above. Ablondi (1998: 183) cites a passage from the Cogitationes as more evidence for the 
same, although Descartes’s concern there is with the role of heat for the development of plants and animals 
rather than for life itself.
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the tiny heart of an eel, which I cut out before seven or eight o’clock this morning, 
revives when a little heat is applied to its surface, and begins to beat again quite 
rapidly, even though it is obviously dead
(23 March 1638; CSMK: 95; AT ii: 66; my emphasis).
In this case, the heart is warm (and even beating) but nevertheless does not qualify as 
living.8 Cardiac heat, therefore, cannot be not suﬃcient for life on Descartes’s account. 
Consequently, if Descartes has a concept of life, it cannot be LifeCH.
3.2.2 Cardiac heat plus an ensemble of life-functions
When we say that LifeCH  cannot be Descartes’s  concept of  life,  the objection that 
immediately springs to mind is that cardiac heat might not be suﬃcient by itself but 
could still be necessary when buttressed by some other condition for life. In this case, 
the reduction of life would be to cardiac heat plus one or more other material process. 
This appears to be Hall’s approach to the Cartesian concept of life:
LifeH := ‘an ensemble of functions that have their kinetic origin in heat—
specifically a certain “fire without light” that burns, in men and animals, in 
the heart’ (1970: 61).
LifeH deals nicely with the case of the dead-but-warm eel heart: the eel heart is dead 
because it is not acting as the source of movement for some ensemble of functions. If 
the eel’s warm heart were instead driving its life functions, it (or, rather, the eel) would 
be alive. Hall does not identify these functions, leaving LifeH, as it stands, somewhat 
vague. But the principle behind it is straightforward: life is not simply the heat of the 
heart, but a group of life-functions that are driven by the heat of the heart. It is the 
combination of cardiac heat with the ensemble of functions that is meant to provide 
suﬃciency to the concept. In this case, it does not matter too much exactly what the 
functions are: they are life functions precisely because they are driven by the heat of 
the heart  that is  unique to living bodies.  The life-functions are necessary here just 
because cardiac heat alone is insuﬃcient for life, but it is still cardiac heat that does the 
bulk of the work in LifeH.
The immediate problem is that LifeH, in this form, would rule out plant life (because 
plants do not have hearts) – and Descartes seems to be just as willing to ascribe life to 
8 An alternative reading of this passage might claim that the heart really does come back to life (the use of 
‘revives’ (reviviscere) would support that reading). However, from the context, it is clear that Descartes’s aim 
is to show that the phenomenon of the heartbeat can be reproduced at a point after an Aristotelian would 
say the soul has left the body.
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plants as to animals. In both the Principles (4:188; AT viiia: 315) and the Description of the 
Human Body (AT xi: 247), he glosses ‘living things’ as both plants and animals, and in 
the conversation with Burman, Descartes mentions prolonging the lives of plants as a 
model for prolonging human life (AT v: 178). If we want to find a concept of life in 
Descartes, the basic form of LifeH is evidently going to be too exclusive.
There  might  be  some  traction  in  generalising  the  definition  by  omitting  the 
specification after the dash in Hall’s formulation:
LifeH2 := an ensemble of functions that have their kinetic origin in heat.
This  obviates  the need to refer  to the heart  itself.  And since there is  at  least  one 
instance in which Descartes claims that plants too are driven by heat (AT iii:  122), 
LifeH2 is inclusive enough to account for plant life. However, without the restriction of 
specifically cardiac heat and its fire without light, the concept becomes too inclusive. 
Take, for example, the heating and water-boiling functions of a stove. They have their 
kinetic origin in heat.9 If we want an overarching concept of life, presumably we want it 
to exclude stoves while including plants.  Since heat as kinetic origin is not specific 
enough to provide that restriction, it makes sense to look to the functions themselves: 
if it is only certain functions that are life-functions, and if water-boiling and heating are 
not on the list,  the concept can eﬀectively  exclude stoves while  including humans, 
animals, and plants. In the next section, I look at how MacKenzie builds on exactly 
this basis in attempting to specify a Cartesian concept of life (1975: 4).
3.2.3 A list of life-functions
Where LifeH relied on the specificity of cardiac heat as source of motion to identify a 
given  function  as  a  life-function,  MacKenzie  explicitly  moves  the  burden  of 
specification to the functions themselves:
[t]he principle of motion in plants and animals without hearts will be that which 
(together  with  proper  structure)  enables  them to  engage  in  those  determinate 
activities which in turn enable them to perform their life functions. [. . .] Although 
all living creatures perform the same set of life functions, because of the vast set of 
diﬀerences among animate creatures, the determinate activities that enable them to 
perform the life functions diﬀer
(Mackenzie 1975: 10).
9 Heating is always kinetic for Descartes. See The World, part 1, ch. 2 (AT xi: 7–10).
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This  is  a  straightforward  reversal  of  the  hierarchy  in  LifeH.  The  life-functions  are 
constant, but the activities that produce them can diﬀer –  in some cases, it will be 
cardiac heat that drives the life-functions, and in others it will be something else. On 
MacKenzie’s reading, rather than doing the bulk of the work in defining life, cardiac 
heat gets to be involved in life only if it produces life-functions. It is the functions 
themselves  that  do  the  work.  Indeed,  activities  such  as  cardiac  heat  will  figure  in 
MacKenzie’s  definition only in the general  stipulation that they be mechanical  and 
material, so as to rule out psychistic principles of life (Mackenzie 1975: 6).
The functions MacKenzie identifies as life-functions are simply nutrition, growth and 
generation (1975: 8). Accordingly, her (explicitly stated) definition is
LifeMK  :=  ‘x  is  alive if  and only if  x  has an arrangement of  parts  which 
(together  with  motion)  enables  x  to  gain  nourishment  from  its 
environment, to grow, and to reproduce’ (1975: 8).
In this definition, cardiac heat has been generalised to an arrangement of parts plus 
motion, which is inclusive enough to allow life to humans, animals, and plants, as well 
as to any other living thing that might happen to operate in a diﬀerent manner. It rules 
out psychistic explanations via the suppressed assumption that parts are necessarily 
material. According to LifeMK, anything, heartless or not, will count as alive as long as it 
gains nourishment from its environment, grows, and reproduces. In this case, LifeMK is 
meant to reduce life to a set of processes (life-functions) that are material by virtue of 
the arrangement-of-parts prescription.
Since the three life-functions are doing the work in LifeMK, we would expect them to be 
robustly  specified  and  well  grounded.  If  we  are  to  rely  on  nutrition,  growth  and 
generation in order to determine what is alive and what is not, presumably we ought to 
be reasonably sure that nutrition, growth and generation are the right functions to use. 
Curiously,  this is not what happens. MacKenzie tells us,  ‘I can only speculate as to 
which functions Descartes would include on his list’ (1975: 8), and readily acknowledges 
that the nutrition–growth–generation list itself ‘may be incorrect’ (1975: 8, n. 16). Her 
point is that some particular list wi! do the job, and that it is not necessary to specify 
it accurately in order to show that Descartes’s conception of life will look like LifeMK 
(with a better list substituted if, in fact, appropriate): ‘a decision on precisely which 
functions  Descartes  would  list  is  not  necessary  for  a  general  understanding  of 
Descartes' conception of life’ (1975: 8, n. 16).
DESCARTES AND THE DISSOLUTION OF LIFE 67
The first problem with LifeMK is that, with the life-functions doing the work, a decision 
on  precisely  which  functions  they  are  is  entirely  necessary  for  the  concept  to  be 
meaningful. Without that decision, LifeMK becomes empty and arbitrary. With the list 
removed, LifeMK  would read, ‘x is alive if and only if x has an arrangement of parts 
which  (together  with  motion)  enables  x  to  perform  some  set  of  functions’.  This 
formulation would apply to any functioning machine; it only becomes specific to life 
when  that  set  of  functions  is  specified.  Without  the  life-functions,  LifeMK  tells  us 
nothing about life. In the absence of those functions, there is nothing for life to be 
reduced to. The second problem is that, as MacKenzie herself seems to be aware (1975: 
8), there is no evidence that Descartes saw life in this way: he does not appeal to a set 
of functions as constitutive of life,  and he does not seem to identify any particular 
function as constitutively necessary for life.  As such, there is  little to no scope for 
finding a set of functions in Descartes’s work that can flesh out LifeMK and save it from 
vacuity.
3.2.4 Heat plus theogenic complexity
Ablondi broadly accepts LifeMK, but argues that a ‘more basic’ criterion than a set of life-
functions is  available  (1998:  183;  emphasis  in  original).  That  more basic  criterion is 
complexity. The main evidence for complexity as constitutive of life comes from the 
Treatise on Man:
[w]e see clocks, artificial fountains, mills, and other such machines which, although 
only man-made, have the power to move of their own accord in many diﬀerent 
ways. But I am supposing this machine [the human body] to be made by the hands 
of God, and so I think you may reasonably think it capable of a greater variety of 
movements than I could possibly imagine in it, and of exhibiting more artistry than 
I could possibly ascribe to it
(CSM i: 99; AT xi: 120).
In this passage, Descartes emphasises a diﬀerence between, on the one hand, manmade 
machines  and,  on  the  other,  God-made  machines  capable  of  ‘a  greater  variety  of 
movements’ than is even imaginable by man (or at least by Descartes) and that display a 
greater  level  of  craftsmanship  than  Descartes  could  ever  attribute  to  them.  The 
message is that we humans know what it  is  to make machines,  but our clocks and 
fountains are monumentally crude in comparison to the machine of the human body 
made by God. It is not much of a stretch to see this as a distinction in complexity 
between living and non-living machines: living machines are significantly more complex 
than  non-living  ones.  Hence,  following  the  general  format  of  both  Hall’s  and 
MacKenzie’s versions, Ablondi formulates a concept of life for Descartes as follows:
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LifeA  :=  ‘(1)  possession  of  an  internal  source  of  heat  which  serves  as  a 
principle of motion, and (2) having the complexity which only God can give 
a thing’ (Ablondi 1998: 185).
Ablondi presumably includes (1) so as to rule out complex theogenic artefacts we would 
not want to classify as living, such as vortices. He does not spell this out explicitly, but 
he does note that (2) is not suﬃcient by itself (1998: 185). On Ablondi’s reading, given 
Descartes’s few remarks about heat as their principle of life, plants are included by (1) 
(1998: 183). (2) is necessary so as to exclude heat-driven manmade automata (1998: 183).
It is significant that the complexity stipulated by (2) is the kind of complexity that only 
God can provide. For Ablondi, the diﬀerence in complexity between living and non-
living  machines  cannot  be  a  diﬀerence  of  degree.  The  diﬀerence  is  between  what 
humans are capable of producing and what God is capable of producing, and ‘Descartes 
would be presuming clairvoyancy if he were to limit what human technology ever could 
do’ (1998: 184) – i.e. if it were only a matter of degree, Descartes could not reasonably 
suppose  that  human  technology  would  never  be  capable  of  reaching  that  degree. 
Consequently, while human bodies undoubtedly do have a higher degree of complexity 
than clocks, they must also have a diﬀerent kind of complexity: a theogenic kind of 
complexity (1998: 184–5).
Ablondi himself recognises the problem with theogenic complexity:
there  must  be  some  recognizable  feature  flowing  from  this  complexity  which 
enables  us  to  conclude  that  we  can’t  produce  things  that  complex.  To  say  this 
feature  is  ‘life’  is  to  beg  the  question;  the  complexity  of  the  thing  has  to  be 
identifiable  apart  "om  its  divine  origin  if  the  claim is  to  function  as  a  genuine 
criterion
(Ablondi 1998: 184).
The trouble  is  that  the  mechanical  complexity  of  the  human body–machine  exists 
entirely  within  the  material  world.  The  material  world  can  accommodate  diﬀerent 
degrees of complexity perfectly well, in that we can give criteria for diﬀerent degrees of 
complexity in material  terms:  more parts,  smaller  parts,  more interactions between 
parts, etc. Material terms for the type of distinction in kind that LifeA  requires are 
elusive.  Descartes’s  ontology,  which  allows  nothing  but  ‘shape,  size,  position  and 
motion of particles of matter’ (CSM i: 279; AT viiia: 314) in extended substance does 
not permit ontologically distinct kinds of complexity. Ablondi notes that this problem 
is ‘quite damaging’ (1998: 185) to LifeA. His position appears to be that, although LifeA 
is  incoherent  with respect  to  Descartes’s  system (i.e.  it  is  not  compatible  with his 
DESCARTES AND THE DISSOLUTION OF LIFE 69
commitments  elsewhere),  textual  evidence  suggests  that  it  is  nevertheless  the 
conception of life that Descartes held.
I  do  not  think,  however,  that  the  textual  evidence  bears  out  this  conclusion.  The 
evidence that Ablondi cites is sparse. Besides the passage from Man, there is a brief 
passage from the Discourse (in the context of a summary of the then-unpublished Man): 
‘they will regard this body as a machine which, having been made by the hands of God, 
is incomparably better ordered than any machine that can be devised by man’ (CSM i: 
139; AT vi: 56). There is also a letter to More in which Descartes remarks, ‘since [. . .] 
people can make various automatons which move without thought, it seems reasonable 
that nature should even produce its own automatons, which are much more splendid 
than artificial ones – namely the animals’ (5 February 1649; CSMK: 366; AT v: 277). This 
is  not especially conclusive.  In none of these passages does Descartes indicate that 
greater complexity is constitutive of life, rather than being merely a contingent feature 
of animal and human bodies.
In the letter to More, Descartes is arguing against animal intelligence and is attempting 
to  deflect  the  objection  that  animal  behaviour  is  too  close  to  intelligent  human 
behaviour to be thoughtless. His strategy is to show that animals are on a continuum 
with  manmade  automata,  rather  than  with  human  thought.  It  should  not  be  too 
surprising,  he  reminds  More,  if  natural  automata  happen  to  be  noticeably  more 
‘splendid’ (praestantiora) than their manmade equivalents. In summing up his argument, 
he  explicitly  tells  More,  ‘[p]lease  note  that  I  am speaking  of  thought,  and  not  of 
life’ (CSMK: 366; AT v: 278). Evidently, Descartes is not making the claim here that this 
splendidness is constitutive of life.
The passages from Man  and the Discourse  oﬀer a little more support to LifeA,  given 
their appeals to modality: the human body has ‘a greater variety of movements than I 
could possibly imagine in it’ and exhibits ‘more artistry than I could possibly ascribe to 
it’  (CSM i:  99;  AT xi:  120; my emphases);  the human body is ‘incomparably better 
ordered than any machine that can  be devised by man’ (CSM i:  139;  AT vi:  56;  my 
emphasis). Taken literally, these comments do suggest that there is a kind of complexity 
that humans are incapable of ever producing, or even of ever imagining. It is not at all 
clear, however, that these comments should be taken literally. Descartes positions the 
Treatise on Man as a fable about a hypothetical mechanical human body that God could 
create.10 Even if the conclusions of the treatise are ultimately meant to transfer to the 
actual world, the passage quoted above is from the opening of the extant text, where 
10 See the editors’ note in CSM i, p. 99, n. 1.
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the rhetoric of the fable is still being set up. There is more here to suggest that the 
modal  claims  are  rhetorical  appeals  to  the  greatness  of  God  (especially  given 
Descartes’s fears about the Inquisition’s possible reaction to his World, of which Man is 
a part11) than that they are principled commitments to an ontologically distinct kind of 
complexity. Indeed, in a letter to Mersenne, Descartes explicitly makes the point that, 
metaphysically,  we should be able  to build an artificial  bird,  even if,  ‘speaking as  a 
physicist’, we do not know how to make suﬃciently intricate (subtils) springs (30 August 
1640; AT iii:  163–4):  the problem is technical rather than ontological. Furthermore, 
whatever  the  diﬀerence  in  complexity  between  living  and  non-living  machines, 
Descartes  gives  us  no  reason  to  suppose  that  greater  complexity  is  a  necessary 
condition in defining life.
Lastly, the evidence that Ablondi cites is entirely concerned with human and animal 
bodies. Descartes never suggests that plants are more complex than we could possibly 
imagine. Of course, it is plausible that, if asked, Descartes would have replied that this 
applies  to  plants  as  much  as  it  does  to  animals.  But  Ablondi’s  justification  for 
attributing a concept of life to Descartes that is incoherent with his wider system is the 
textual evidence. And even on the most generous reading of the textual evidence for 
the relevance of theogenic complexity, plants are absent. On a textual basis, then, it 
would not be unfair to say that LifeA excludes plants, and as such, by Ablondi’s own 
criteria, does not even provide a viable concept of life.
LifeA attempts to conceptualise life by reducing it to two things in the material world: 
(1)  heat as an underlying source of motion plus (2)  theogenic complexity. Theogenic 
complexity, however, is not definable in terms of matter. Ablondi is aware of this but 
thinks the textual evidence warrants attributing a concept of life to Descartes that is 
incoherent  with  his  system.  The  incoherence  alone  would  be  enough  to  call  for 
suspicion, but, as we have seen, the textual evidence itself also turns out to provide 
little support for LifeA.
3.2.5 God’s intentions
The treatments of life we have looked at so far have all tried to find a concept of life 
through reduction to something in the material world. There are good reasons for this 
approach,  given  Descartes’s  repeated  insistence  that  life  pertains  to  extended 
substance, and not to thinking substance. Detlefsen, however, recognises that extended 
substance does not have the resources to sustain a concept of life; the purely material 
11 See to Mersenne, end of November 1633 (AT i: 270–2).
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conditions will have to be shored up by something extramaterial. For Detlefsen, the 
extramaterial  ingredient  lies  in  God’s  intentions.  Bringing  in  God  to  confer  life 
circumvents the lack of appropriate resources in matter.
Detlefsen  broadly  accepts  LifeMK,  but  extends  MacKenzie’s  list  of  life-functions  to 
include reactivity to the environment as well as nutrition, growth, and generation, all 
subtended  by  another  addition,  a  single  overarching  life-function:  self-preservation 
(2016: 151). The following is, I think, a fair reconstruction of the concept of life that 
Detlefsen wants to allow Descartes, given her adjustments to LifeMK:
LifeD  :=  x  is  alive  if  and  only  if  x  has  an  arrangement  of  parts  which 
(together  with  motion)  enables  x  to  perform determinate  life-functions 
(nutrition, growth, reproduction, and reactivity to the environment) for the 
sake of self-preservation.
LifeD,  as Detlefsen herself is well  aware (2016: 153,  167),  introduces teleology to the 
definition.  The  obvious  culprit  to  blame  for  this  intrusion  of  teleology  is  LifeD’s 
reliance on self-preservation (because self-preservation is  the end the life  functions 
serve).  Interestingly,  Detlefsen  does  not  see  self-preservation  as  the  source  of  the 
teleology. On the basis of the arguments from Shapiro 2003 and Brown 2012, she takes 
self-preservation  to  be  fairly  straightforwardly  non-teleological  (2016:  151–152,  154). 
Instead, she sees teleology entering the definition through the parts that perform the 
life-functions. Her example is the role of the mitral valve in Descartes’s explanation of 
the heartbeat and its reliance on final causes (2016: 154).  Consequently, even if self-
preservation does escape teleology for Descartes (and I am somewhat less confident 
than Detlefsen that it does – see Ch. 6, §6.3, pp. 152–154), teleology still creeps into 
LifeD – if not from the top down through self-preservation itself, then from the bottom 
up through the life functions.
LifeD’s reliance on teleology is a problem. As Descartes keeps reminding us, whatever 
life is,  it is entirely material (e.g. AT xi:  329–31; AT iii:  566),  and activity occurs in 
matter (extended substance) exclusively through mechanical means (AT viiia: 54, 314). 
As  such,  matter  can have  no intrinsic  ends,  and the  only  recourse  for  teleology  is 
through extrinsic ends. For manmade artefacts, extrinsic ends are easy to come by: a 
hammer is for hammering because someone designed it with that purpose. Similarly, 
for natural bodies, extrinsic ends would have to come from God: a heart is for pumping 
blood because God designed it with that purpose.
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But Descartes rules out access to God’s intentions and excludes them from any role in 
natural  philosophy12:  we  are  limited,  while  ‘the  nature  of  God  is  immense, 
incomprehensible and infinite’ and thus ‘capable of countless things whose causes are 
beyond my knowledge. And for this reason alone I consider the customary search for 
final causes to be totally useless in physics; there is considerable rashness in thinking 
myself capable of investigating the impenetrable13 purposes of God’ (CSM ii: 38–9; AT 
vii: 55).14 Even if God did provide natural bodies with extrinsic ends, we could never 
know about it, making it useless for explaining the natural world. In this case, God’s 
intentions  can  tell  us  nothing  about  what  life  is  just  because  we  have  no  way  of 
knowing what his intentions are.
Detlefsen oﬀers an ingenious potential  solution to the problem of inscrutability:  it 
does not matter if we cannot have certain knowledge of God’s intentions, because a 
well-supported hypothesis about them will be suﬃcient to buttress LifeD. The trouble, 
as Detlefsen notes, is that even hypothesising about God’s intentions is oﬀ limits for 
Cartesian natural philosophy:
from Descartes’ point of view, what I suggest above is illegitimate; we cannot use 
teleological  explanations  in  so  far  as  they  are  grounded  in  claims  about  God’s 
purposes even as merely likely true beliefs in our explanations about the natural 
world,  and  so  we  cannot  explain  the  teleological  nature  of  (at  least  some)  life 
activities by relying upon hypothetical claims to God’s purposes as embodied in (at 
least some) living bodies
(2016: 168).
Detlefsen  argues  that,  without  a  concept  of  life,  Descartes  would  have  no  way  to 
identify  living  bodies  as  the  subject  of  the  life  sciences,  which  ‘would  render 
incoherent’ his work on biology (2016: 142). She takes LifeD to be that concept, but 
notes that Descartes maintains his metaphysical commitment to the inscrutability of 
God’s intentions rather than adopting LifeD  (2016: 168–69).  Like Ablondi, Detlefsen 
upholds the need for a principled conception of life at the expense of the coherence of 
Descartes’s larger system. Ablondi preserves Descartes’s biology to the detriment of his 
12 Given Descartes’s insistence that what we think of as the life of humans and animals pertains to extended 
substance, life pertains to natural philosophy (if there is such a thing as life).
13 The use of ‘impenetrable’ here is an addition in the 1647 French translation approved by Descartes (AT xia: 
44).
14 See also AT vii: 374–5 and AT viiia: 15–16.
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metaphysics, in his claim that the textual evidence shows that Descartes holds LifeA 
despite  its  incompatibility  with  his  ontology.  Detlefsen  preserves  Descartes’s 
metaphysics  to  the  detriment  of  his  biology:  retaining  the  inscrutability  of  God’s 
intentions in the light of LifeD makes Descartes’s biology incoherent.
We do not need to force Descartes into such pessimistic outcomes. In the following 
section, I argue that the problem with Descartes’s conception of life is not just with 
the proposed conceptions themselves – it is, first and foremost, with the expectation 
that he have one.
3.3 Descartes and the dissolution of life
3.3.1 Dissolution
The readings of Descartes discussed above have all focused on the need to attribute 
him with a principled means of  distinguishing the living from the non-living.  Each 
attempt to do so results in either an unworkable concept of life or a strong concept 
with destructive consequences. LifeCH was insuﬃcient. LifeH was too exclusive to be 
viable. LifeMK was too arbitrary and resulted in vacuity. Both LifeA and LifeD ended up 
imposing incoherence on Descartes’s  philosophy.  This is  not an exhaustive list,  and 
there may well be other possible answers to the question of what life is for Descartes. 
It seems likely, however, that there is something wrong with the question.
The trouble is that there is nowhere for the category of life to comfortably reside in 
Descartes’s  ontology.  He  strenuously  rejects  its  presence  in  thinking  substance. 
Whenever  he  mentions  life,  he  attributes  it  to  extended  substance.  But  extended 
substance is homogeneous: there is no material diﬀerence between a human body and a 
grain mill.  Attempts to identify  aspects  of  matter  that  pertain specifically  to living 
things  lead to  arbitrariness  and fall  apart  swiftly  (as  with LifeCH,  LifeH  and LifeMK) 
precisely because there is nothing in matter that can make it belong to living things 
rather than non-living things. Matter is matter for Descartes, whether arranged into a 
clock or into an animal. If thought and matter are both ruled out, then seemingly the 
only  recourse  for  a  concept  of  life  is  in  God’s  intentions.  Unfortunately,  God’s 
intentions are oﬀ limits for Cartesian natural philosophy: if that is where the definition 
of life resides, then it is forever hopelessly out of reach. It seems that wherever we look 
for the category of life in Descartes’s ontology, we will reach an impasse.
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The solution to the above problems is to not look for a principled concept of life. 
Descartes provides no general, rigorous definition of life because he does not have one. 
And it is not that he has no such concept because his philosophy is incoherent. It is 
because he does not need one: a concept of life as such plays no role in his biology or in 
his wider system, and its absence is entirely without detriment. Descartes’s aim is not 
to provide a concept of life, but to explain life away. Hall makes the point that ‘the 
explanations  [Descartes]  developed  were  corpuscularized,  nonpsychistic  versions  of 
psychistic explanations put forth earlier by others’ (Hall 1970: 63; italics removed).15 
His method in biology was not to produce ‘explanations of fact’ but explanations of 
‘other  peoples'  explanations  (often  dismembered  and  reassembled  with  various 
additions  and deletions)’  (1970:  64;  italics  removed).16  The evidence  bears  this  out. 
Descartes  takes  on  the  Aristotelian  psychistic  conception  of  life,  and  he  indeed 
dismembers  and  reassembles  it  diﬀerently,  with  additions  and  deletions.  In  other 
words, he breaks the Aristotelian conception apart and demonstrates piecemeal how 
each  of  the  functions  it  performs  can  be  produced  by  nonpyschistic,  mechanical 
interactions of matter. Nutrition, for Descartes, is identical to the accretion of blood 
particles in the pores of the organs (AT xi: 245–52). The animation of the body is driven 
by the heat of the heart and the various mechanical processes (respiration, circulation, 
digestion, etc.) that feed into it (Passions 1:8; AT xi, 333). It is through the explanation of 
the various phenomena traditionally associated with life that Descartes deals with life.
In Cartesian reduction,  there  is  an analytic  step followed by a  synthetic  step.  The 
phenomenon at hand is broken down into its most basic parts, and then the original 
phenomenon  is  reconstructed  from those  basic  parts  (AT x:  379–87).  A reductive 
explanation is able to synthesise the phenomenon it explains from the parts to which 
the  phenomenon  has  been  reduced.  This  is  precisely  what  Descartes  does  with 
nutrition,  animation,  sensation,  etc.  If  nutrition  is  explained as  accretion of  blood 
particles in organ pores, you have nutrition exactly when you have accretion of blood 
particles in organ pores. This is not, however, what Descartes does with life. When it 
comes to life, as the previous sections of this chapter have shown, the category cannot 
be reconstituted from the material, mechanical explanations of the life-phenomena. As 
15 This is perhaps a good way of understanding Descartes’s defensive remark to Plempius, on having been 
accused of merely replicating Aristotle’s account of the cause of the heartbeat: ‘If two people arrive at the 
same place, the one taking the right road, the other the wrong one, we ought not to think that the former is 
following in the footsteps of the latter’ (15 February 1638; CSMK: 80; AT i: 522).
16 This is not to suggest that Descartes made no innovations. Hall’s point is that the problems Descartes 
addressed  were  taken  from the  established  treatments  of  biology,  rather  than  directly  from nature;  his 
answers to those problems were (largely) his own.
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we have seen, if we have cardiac heat, nutrition, etc., we still cannot reliably distinguish 
living things from non-living things. Descartes does perform the analytic step for life: 
as outlined above, he reduces everything that the Aristotelian conception associated 
with life to mechanical interactions of matter. But he does not perform the synthetic 
step (because he cannot). In this sense, Descartes is not a reductionist about life but a 
strict  eliminativist.  In  the  process  of  analysing  life-phenomena,  Descartes  simply 
dissolves the category of life itself.
3.3.2 Objection: Descartes talks about life
If Descartes dissolves the category of life, then why does he continue to talk about life 
in all the ways outlined in §3.1? He is certainly not averse to using the term, and his use 
of it does seem to be meaningful. There are several possible replies to this objection. 
One is to suggest that, compared to the loss of the coherence of either metaphysics or 
biology that strong reductionist positions about Descartes’s conception of life seem to 
result in, the occasional use of a term with no strict, principled definition seems like a 
minor  infraction,  especially  if  nothing  of  much  significance  rests  on  it  (see  §3.3.3 
below). This is a fairly reasonable response, but it is not particularly satisfying. A better 
variation would be to claim that ‘life’, in this context, is something like a folk term. Just 
as a strict physicalist might sometimes find it more convenient to talk about desires 
rather than the specific brain-states desires reduce down to, so Descartes finds it more 
convenient to talk about a living animal rather than a non-manmade automaton with 
whatever attributes and behaviours happen to be relevant to the particular automaton 
in question.17
A stronger variation on this latter response would point out that ‘life’ is not just a folk 
term for Descartes: it is an Aristotelian term. In almost every instance where Descartes 
refers to life, he is explicitly trying to demonstrate the distinction between his own 
biology and Aristotelian psychistic biology. When Descartes brings up life in both the 
Treatise  on  Man  and  the  Discourse,  it  is  expressly  to  point  out  the  redundancy  of 
vegetative and sensitive souls (AT xi:  202;  AT vi:45–6).  When he does the same in 
articles five and six of The Passions  of  the  Soul,  it  is  to show that taking the soul to 
animate the body (i.e. the Aristotelian position) is a ‘very serious error’ (CSM i: 329; AT 
xi: 330). Similarly, the discussion of the heartbeat in the correspondence with Plempius 
is in response to Aristotelian objections from both Plempius and (initially) Fromondus 
(AT i: 413–6; AT i: 521–34; and especially AT ii: 62–9). Descartes does not, then, use the 
17 Wolfe (2010: 204) discusses instrumental uses of the term ‘organism’ in modern biology in much the same 
way.
76 CHAPTER THREE
term ‘life’  because it  is  well-defined in the Cartesian system but because it  is  well-
defined in the Aristotelian system – and his aim when using the term is to show that all 
the phenomena an Aristotelian will associate with life are mechanistically explicable.18
3.3.3 Objection: Descartes’s biology needs a principled concept of life
One of Detlefsen’s major concerns with respect to Descartes’s concept of life is that, 
without a principled concept, Descartes could not identify life; and without life, he 
could have no life sciences, despite his deep commitment to anatomy, physiology and 
medicine  (2016:  142).  It  is  this  concern  that,  given  LifeD,  leads  Detlefsen  to  the 
pessimistic  conclusion  that  Descartes’s  life  sciences  are  bankrupt  (§3.2.5  above).  If 
Descartes does indeed require a principled concept of life to demarcate the discipline 
of  biology,  then  the  dissolutionist  reading  will  also  lead  Descartes’s  project  into 
incoherence.
However, Descartes’s concerns are not those of modern life sciences. Unlike today’s 
science, Descartes had no particular need to protect the disciplinary unity of general 
biology.  For  Descartes,  little  would be  at  risk  if  the  ‘life  sciences’  were  to  entirely 
collapse into physics. Nor did he have any need for a biology capable of dealing with all 
living  things,  given  that  he  was  always  perfectly  clear  that  his  ultimate  aim  was 
(human19) medicine (AT iv: 329; AT vi: 62–3; AT vi: 78).20 Consequently, it is not life 
i tse l f  that  g ives  unity  to  this  ‘a spect  of  his  l i fe  as  a  working  natural 
philosopher’ (Detlefsen 2016: 142); it is the potential of physiology and anatomy for the 
medical treatment of humans. And since humans are not just bodies but unions of soul 
and body, teleology is not a problem for (human) medicine: medicine can legitimately 
be an end for the Cartesian natural philosopher’s pursuit of biology. Life itself, then, is 
not necessary for constituting the discipline of biology for Descartes. Consequently, 
dissolutionism about life is not a problem for Cartesian biology.
18 Somewhat similar aims crop up throughout Descartes’s natural philosophy, of course. In the explanation of 
fire in the World, e.g., Descartes makes a point of how his mechanics can account for just as much as an 
Aristotelian ‘form of fire’ and ‘quality of heat’,  while being both more explanatory and less ontologically 
extravagant (CSM i: 83; AT xi: 7–9).
19  Descartes  is  famously  antipathetic  towards  animal  welfare.  Veterinary  medicine  would  be  a  literal 
oxymoron for him. See to More, 5 February 1649 (AT v: 278–9). But cf. Harrison 1992.
20 On the centrality of medicine in Descartes’s philosophy, see especially Aucante 2006, and Manning’s (2007) 
extended review of the same.
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3.4 Conclusion
Initially,  there appear to be good reasons for taking Descartes to be a reductionist 
about life, and for thinking that there is a well-defined, principled concept of life to be 
found  in  his  philosophy.  However,  attempts  to  find  such  a  concept  result  in 
insuﬃciency  and  inviability  (LifeCH,  LifeH)  or  arbitrariness  (LifeMK),  or  they  push 
Descartes’s system into incoherence (LifeA, LifeD). This is because there is nothing in 
Descartes’s ontology for life to be reduced to: it is not a species of thought, extended 
substance  lacks  the  resources  for  distinguishing  living  from non-living,  and  God’s 
intentions are inscrutable. The alternative is to relinquish the requirement for a well-
defined,  principled  concept  of  life.  Rather  than  being  a  reductionist  about  life, 
Descartes  dissolves  the  category.  The  dissolutionist  reading  makes  good  sense  of 
Descartes’s unwillingness to produce, or even discuss, a general definition of life, and, 
unlike the alternatives,  it  appears to have no negative repercussions for Descartes’s 
system.

Part 2
Nonreductionism in Descartes’s
epistemology and metaphysics

Chapter 4
The priority of the union in Descartes’s epistemology and 
metaphysics
4.1 Introduction
The union of mind and body is  a  perennial  problem in Descartes scholarship.  The 
curious thing is that Descartes himself never treated it as though it were much of an 
issue  at  all,  even  when  pressed  on  the  point  by  correspondents  as  capable  and 
forthright  as  Princess  Elisabeth and Gassendi.  My aim in  this  chapter  is  to  give  a 
reading of Descartes’s treatment of the union that does justice to his indiﬀerence to 
what so many have taken to be the deepest flaw in his system. In response to demands 
that he explain how two mutually incompatible substances can interact, his claim is 
that each of us already knows that our mind and body are united and that no further 
explanation is needed (or some variation thereof). My position here is that Descartes 
means exactly what he says in his treatment of the union, and that this has knock-on 
consequences  for  our  understanding  of  his  epistemology,  and  maybe  even  of  his 
metaphysics.
I argue that the union of mind and body cannot be explained within the terms of 
Descartes’s dualist system, but that this is not a problem for Descartes.  It is not a 
problem because he addresses it via other means. As Descartes claims, we understand 
the  union  through  sensation,  rather  than  through  the  metaphysics  of  substance 
interaction. This, I argue, constitutes an epistemology that pertains to the union and 
that is separate from the well-known epistemology that pertains to the dualism. The 
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epistemological side of my reading is largely in agreement with Simmons (manuscript), 
who argues that Descartes’s  treatment of the union is  part of a phenomenology of 
sensation. I push the reading a little further here, by arguing that there is a true, viable 
epistemology of the union (this is  also covered in Ch. 6),  and that it  has a certain 
priority  over  the  epistemology  of  Descartes’s  dualist  system.  And  I  diﬀer  from 
Simmons entirely in taking there to be an implicit metaphysics of the union.
The aim of the chapter is to give a reading that makes sense of Descartes’s seemingly 
dismissive treatment of the problem of the union. Its objective is not to establish what 
Descartes really thought about the union, but (first)  to reconstruct an epistemology 
that would allow Descartes to reach the conclusions he did with respect to the union. 
Second, it reconstructs the metaphysics implied by his conclusions about the union.1 
Consequently, there are two parts to the chapter. The first (§§4.2–4.3) argues that the 
union makes for an epistemic gap in Descartes’s dualism2: the reason he will not, and 
cannot, explain it in the way he explains various properties of mind and body separately 
is that the union is indefinable in the terms of his dualism. What this tells us is that 
Descartes does not expect his dualist system to account for every single feature of the 
world:  the  union  is  one  exception  (there  may  be  others).  The  second  part  of  the 
chapter (§§4.4–4.5) extends this analysis to metaphysics. The idea is that, because the 
dualist  metaphysics  does  not  cover  the  union,  Descartes’s  account  of  the  union 
contains  an  implicit  metaphysics  that  does.  The  metaphysical  claim  is  more 
contentious than the epistemological claim, and the rest of this dissertation is agnostic 
about  it  (while  some  parts  of  the  dissertation  (Chs  5  and  6)  do  depend  on  the 
epistemological claim).
What this chapter proposes is that Descartes has a separate, implicit epistemology and 
metaphysics  for  the  union,  which  he  invokes  at  various  points,  in  addition  to  the 
familiar  dualist  epistemology  and  metaphysics.  There  is  some  precedent  for  the 
epistemological side of this reading: in a recent paper, Brown suggests that whether we 
understand ourselves to be unions or mind ‘depends on which explanatory [. . .] context 
1 Simmons (manuscript: 12) argues that it is ‘wrongheaded’ to attempt to provide a metaphysical account of 
the union – and, if we understand Descartes’s metaphysics to be nothing but the metaphysics of the dualist 
system, I agree entirely. The point I make here, though, is that Cartesian metaphysics is not restricted to the 
framework of the dualist system: there is another, separate metaphysical framework implicit in his treatment 
of the union.
2 Cf. Alanen: Descartes’s treatment of the union ‘can be seen [. . .] as a recognition of the limits of rational 
knowledge and explanation’ (1996: 14).
THE PRIORITY OF THE UNION 83
we are in’ (Brown 2014: 255); here, I interpret Descartes as switching between diﬀerent 
epistemological contexts (which I refer to in §4.3 as ‘domains of conceivability’).
I am also going to argue that the epistemology of the union is the ‘natural’ human state 
for Descartes, and that his dualism is a derivation from it. The obvious objection here 
would be that, even if Descartes does have a distinct epistemology and metaphysics of 
the union, the whole point of his project is to supplant our ‘natural’ state of epistemic 
error.  In  that  case,  the  epistemology  and  metaphysics  of  the  union  would  be 
overridden,  and  whatever  there  might  be  to  say  about  them would  ultimately  be 
irrelevant. Another way to put this would be to ask why we should care about some 
separate epistemology and metaphysics of the union when Descartes already has the 
fully-worked out dualist system. The trouble with this objection – and the reason we do 
have to care about the epistemology and metaphysics of the union – is that Descartes 
requires,  and  makes  use  of,  the  union  within  his  dualist  project,  when  his  dualist 
epistemology and metaphysics cannot account for the union at all (see §4.2). He needs 
at least the separate epistemology of the union to deal with the presence of the union. 
So  the  dualist  system can  never  fully  supplant  the  epistemology  (and  possible  the 
metaphysics)  of  the  union.  The  latter  always  remain,  as  a  kind  of  import,  within 
Descartes’s dualist system.
This is why, if there is an epistemology and a metaphysics particular to the union, we 
need  to  understand  what  they  are  –  that  is,  because  they  are  indispensable  for 
Descartes. The diﬃcult part is that he says very little explicit about how things work 
for  the  union  itself.  There  is  a  good  reason  for  this:  Descartes  claims  that  we 
understand the union naturally and unproblematically, while the dualism is a harder sell 
that takes considerable work and persuasion to be accepted; understandably, then, as 
he tells us, he has written far more on the latter than on the former (AT iii: 664–5). 
This  is  one of  at  least  two reasons why it  might look as  though Descartes has no 
epistemology or metaphysics of the union3 – as if he leaves the union forever vague and 
underexamined.  The  other  reason  is  that  we  expect  Cartesian  metaphysics  and 
epistemology to be given in the terms of his dualist system. When those terms are not 
present, it might well look as though there is nothing metaphysical or epistemological 
there at all. What this chapter aims to show is that there is indeed an epistemology of 
the union, and that there is perhaps also a metaphysics of the union. But they are an 
implicit epistemology and an implicit metaphysics, and they need to be teased out of 
the scattered remarks about the union that Descartes does make.
3 See (Simmons 2011: 7).
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The argument proceeds as follows. I address the epistemology of the union first, since 
Descartes is somewhat more explicit about it, and show that the notion of the union is, 
for  humans,  the most fundamental  in Descartes’s  philosophy (§§4.2–4.3).  Second,  I 
show  that,  in  the  metaphysics  that  pertains  to  the  union,  the  union  ends  up 
ontologically more fundamental than, or ontologically prior to, the dualism of mind 
and body (§4.4). I then give two conclusions. The first (§4.5) shows how the union-
priority reading dissolves the problem of mind–body interaction (because it does away 
with  the  problem).  The  second  (§4.6)  argues  that  this  reading  makes  Descartes  a 
nonreductionist in the epistemology and metaphysics of the union (because, on this 
interpretation, the union is not reducible to mind and body).
4.2 The union is the ‘most primitive’ notion
4.2.1 Primitive notions and the union
Descartes’s  most  extensive  treatment  of  the  union  is  in  his  correspondence  with 
Elisabeth. Elisabeth’s stated motivation for writing to Descartes in the first place is to 
raise the problem of mind–body interaction (Bohemia and Descartes 2007: 91; AT iii: 
661). In his first reply, Descartes addresses the problem in terms of primitive notions, 
of which three in particular are relevant: thought, extension, and union.
First I consider that there are in us certain primitive notions which are as it were 
the patterns on the basis of which we form all our other conceptions. There are very 
few  such  notions.  First,  there  are  the  most  general  –  those  of  being,  number, 
duration, etc. – which apply to everything we can conceive. Then, as regards body in 
particular, we have only the notion of extension, which entails the notions of shape 
and motion; and as regards the soul on its own, we have only the notion of thought, 
which includes  the perceptions  of  the intellect  and the inclinations  of  the will. 
Lastly, as regards the soul and the body together, we have only the notion of their 
union, on which depends our notion of the soul’s power to move the body, and the 
body’s power to act on the soul and cause its sensations and passions
(CSMK: 218; AT iii: 665).
That  mind  and  body  should  be  primitive  notions  is  something  we  would  expect. 
Descartes’s  standard  ontology  is  dualist,  and  everything  in  the  material  world  is  a 
modification of extension, while everything in the mind is a modification of thought. 
Necessarily, then, when we conceive of something material, we conceive of it through 
extension,  and  when we  conceive  of  something  mental,  we  conceive  of  it  through 
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thought.4 So everything material comes down to matter itself, and everything mental to 
mind itself.  Since Descartes’s (standard)  ontology contains nothing but thought and 
extension, our only options for conceiving of thought and extension are thought and 
extension  themselves.  And  because  substances  can  depend  only  on  themselves5, 
extension can tell us nothing about thought, and thought nothing about extension. So 
we cannot conceive of the one through the other, and thought and extension must be 
primitive.
Treating the union as a primitive notion as well,  though, seems counterintuitive (at 
least under the aegis of standard accounts of Descartes’s ontology). After all, the union 
is meant to be a union of mind and body. On the face of things, it would seem perfectly 
natural to take the union to be, if anything, a composite notion, conceived through 
both  thought  and  extension.  Given  Descartes’s  famous  dualism,  given  his  famous 
ontological and explanatory parsimony, and given that the union is precisely a union of 
his  two  fundamental  substances,  we  would  reasonably  expect  it  to  be  conceived 
through those two substances. Elisabeth too expects an explanation of the union in 
terms of thought and extension. This is presumably why the problem gets posed as a 
problem of mind–body interaction, rather than a problem of the union itself.
So, it would be consistent with his wider commitments for Descartes to characterise 
the union as a composite notion, but he makes it a primitive notion instead. Why this 
ultimately  has  to  be  his  position  is  fairly  straightforward.  If  extension  can  tell  us 
nothing about thought, and thought can tell us nothing about extension, then neither 
thought nor extension can tell us anything about their union. This is because the union 
has properties that are present in neither the mind nor the body taken by themselves.6 
So whatever we want to know about the union is not going to be conceivable through 
the notions of either thought or extension. And it cannot be conceivable though the 
notions of both thought and extension simultaneously either, just because thought and 
extension are necessarily conceptually isolated from each other:  the notion of both 
thought  and  extension  simultaneously  is  not  covered  by  the  individual  notions  of 
4 See Nolan (1997: 130).
5 And, in the case of created substances, God (Principles 1/52–2).
6  On properties specific to the union, see (Simmons 2011: 9–10)  and (Brown 2014: 248),  who writes, ‘the 
special subject of these irreducible modes is not one that Descartes can draw from his oﬃcial ontology of 
basic substances, and hence he needs to conceive of the union as sui generis’.
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thought and extension.7  Put another way,  to appeal  to both thought and extension 
simultaneously is just to restate the problem of the union itself.
Necessarily, then, the union needs a notion of its own. Neither thought nor extension 
is  going  to  do  the  job.  And,  because  the  other  primitive  notions  (‘being,  number, 
duration, etc.’) that Descartes mentions ‘apply to everything we can conceive’, they are 
not going to pick out anything specific to the union. So the only means we have of 
conceiving  of  the  soul  and  the  body  together  (or  of  both  thought  and  extension 
simultaneously)  is  the  notion  of  their  union  itself.  And  it  is  on  this  notion  that 
Descartes  claims  our  conception  of  mind–body  interaction  depends.  Crucially,  and 
against initial intuitions, our conception of mind–body interaction does not depend at 
all on on our notions of mind and body. This is in no way a trivial result: it means that 
thought  and  extension,  which  are  supposed  to  be  the  fundamental  elements  of 
Descartes’s philosophy, can tell tell us nothing at all about the union.
This  is  a  problem  for  Descartes’s  system,  specifically  for  his  dualism  and  his 
reductionism. The world is supposed to consist of nothing but thinking substance and 
extended  substance  (and  God),  and  everything  within  in  it  is  supposed  to  be 
epistemically  and  ontologically  reducible  to  thought  or  extension.  But  there  is 
something in the world that is neither a thinking substance nor an extended substance, 
and that is not reducible to either. This is not just a matter of epistemic uncertainty. 
Descartes’s claim is explicitly not that he simply does not yet have a good explanation 
of the union in terms of thought or extension. His claim is there can be no explanation 
of the union in terms of thought or extension, for just the reasons covered above. The 
union requires a primitive notion of its own.
So, Descartes is explicit that the union exists and can only be conceived through a 
primitive notion of its own. The outcome of this is that, if Descartes’s philosophy is, 
fundamentally,  the  dualist  system we  take  it  to  be,  then  it  contains  something  it 
necessarily  cannot  explain:  if  the  dualist  system is  Descartes’s  philosophy,  then the 
union is necessarily indefinable within Descartes’s philosophy. It seems that we have to 
conclude either that Descartes’s system is traditionally dualist but fails in a highly non-
trivial way, or that it is (in one way or another) not dualist. My interest here is in the 
7 This is evidenced by the existence of properties particular to the union. As Simmons puts it, ‘Descartes 
himself insists that a real human being is nothing like an angel in a machine (or and angel in an animal). He 
takes  the presence of  sensations,  appetites,  and passions  to  be decisive  evidence that  the human being 
consists  in some kind of  a  union of  mind and body,  and not in a  mere aggregation of  them’ (Simmons 
manuscript: 10–1; see also Simmons manuscript: 18).
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second option.
4.2.2 The notion of union is prior to the notions of mind and body
If my approach is to deny dualism in some way, then the obvious, and established (if 
still controversial), route to take would be trialism. That is not the route I am going to 
take,  for  both  metaphysical  and  epistemological  reasons.  Metaphysically,  trialism 
assumes  that  the  ontological  categories  that  apply  to  the  dualist  system (namely, 
substance) can also be applied to the union. It is not obvious that they can (see (Brown 
2014: 255)).8 Epistemologically, trialism treats the union9 as a primitive notion on a par 
with the notions of thought and extension; my position is that the union has priority 
over thought and extension. I take it that the notions of thought and extension are, in 
a certain sense, secondary to the notion of union. This is a tricky route to take, for at 
least two reasons. First, the textual evidence makes it seem uncomfortably clear that, if 
Descartes  is  serious  about  his  doctrine  of  primitive  notions,  he  means  each to  be 
incompatible and incomparable with any other, thanks to their conceptual isolation. 
Hoping to establish priority between incompatibles seems quixotic. Second, giving the 
notion  of  the  union  priority  over  the  notions  of  thought  and  extension  seems,  if 
anything, more incongruous with Descartes’s system as we know it than does allowing 
an inexplicable union into a dualist system (at least initially).
I’ll leave the second problem for §§4.3–4.5 (briefly, it’s not as incongruous as it sounds, 
and it neatly solves some problems that are otherwise fairly intractable). In the current 
section,  I  am going  to  show that,  for  humans,  the  notion  of  the  union  must  be 
epistemically prior to the notions of thought and extension. Then (in §4.3, we’ll solve 
the first problem by showing that the priority comes not from relations between the 
notions themselves (of which there cannot be any), but from an equivocation between 
domains of conceivability that Descartes undergoes in his reply to Elisabeth. This is 
because, although the union is not conceivable in terms of the notions of thought and/
or extension, thought and extension are both perfectly conceivable in terms of the 
union. And it is not just that thought and extension are in principle conceivable in terms 
of the union; it is that Descartes does in practice derive thought and extension from 
8 I agree with Hoﬀman that ‘it seems implausible to read [Descartes] as suggesting [. . .] that the union of 
mind and body should be considered to be an attribute, that is, something constituting the nature or essence 
of  a  substance’  but  disagree that  Descartes’s  treatment of  the union constitutes  a  hylomorphic account 
(2008: 392) – for the reasons set out in §§4.3 and 4.4, Descartes’s account of the union requires treatment in 
terms of a separate, subjective metaphysics.
9 In Cottingham’s original paper on trialism, he refers to sensation rather than the union (Cottingham 1985). 
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the union (that derivation is notably represented in the structure of the Meditations). 
Indeed, if my reading is correct, for humans, the notions of thought and extension are 
necessarily derived from the union.10
When Descartes introduces the primitive notions in the letter to Elisabeth, he explains 
that ‘we go wrong if we try to explain one of these notions by another, for since they 
are  primitive  notions,  each  of  them  can  be  understood  [entenduë]  only  through 
itself ’ (CSMK: 218; AT iii: 666). This works, for the reasons covered above, for thought 
and extension: the notion of thought is not going to be able to tell us anything about 
extension, and vice versa. It also works for trying to understand the union through the 
notions  of  thought  and/or  extension:  neither  thought  nor  extension,  nor  any 
combination thereof, will be able to tell us anything about the union, and this is exactly 
our original problem. But does it also work for understanding thought and extension 
through the notion of the union? That seems less convincing. If mind and body are two 
sides of the union, which they are, and if we have a primitive notion of the union, 
which we do, then, in principle, what prevents our being able to understand both mind 
and body through the union? Nothing, as far as I can see. Conversely, if we had only a 
primitive notion of mind and a primitive notion of body, then we would never be able 
to understand the union through them (again, for all the reasons above). There are at 
least three ways to argue this, and those arguments follow in the next few sections. The 
first two are my major arguments; the third is somewhat supplementary (but has far-
reaching implications).
4.2.2.1 Argument from containment
In  his  cosmological  argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  Descartes  relies  on  the 
doctrine that a cause (or dependency) must contain at least as much as its eﬀect (or 
dependent):
it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much in the eﬃcient 
and total cause as in the eﬀect of that cause. For where, I ask, could the eﬀect get 
its reality from, if not from the cause? And how could the cause give it to the eﬀect 
10 The derivation involved is not a logical derivation: it is not the derivation of epistemic justification from 
well-founded grounds. It is a causal derivation of the notion itself, rather than of its justification (Cf. Demos 
(1934) on ‘biological derivation’ – although Demos still conflates the justification of a notion with the notion 
itself). This is much like the derivation of a metal from its ore: in a world where iron is only found naturally 
as iron oxide, pure iron can only be derived from its oxide; this is separate from the justification of iron as an 
element. Similarly, in the world of the union (i.e. the subjective world of any human), the notions of thought 
and extension can only be derived from the notion of union; and this is separate from their intellectual 
justification as independent substances.
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unless it possessed it? It follows from this both that something cannot arise from 
nothing, and also that what is more perfect – that is, contains in itself more reality – 
cannot arise from what is less perfect. [. . .] A stone, for example, which previously 
did  not  exist,  cannot  begin  to  exist  unless  it  is  produced  by  something  which 
contains, either formally or eminently everything to be found in the stone; similarly, 
heat  cannot  be produced in  an object  which was  not  previously  hot,  except  by 
something of at least the same order <degree or kind>11 of perfection as heat, and so 
on. 
(Meditations 2; CSM ii: 28; AT vii: 40–1).
There has to be some source for the eﬀect already contained within its cause. This is 
why,  as  Descartes  explains  it  here,  something  cannot  come  from  nothing.  In 
Descartes’s example, a stone can only be produced by something that already contains 
stone, or that contains the components of stone. This containment can be formal, in 
which case the cause literally contains what is in the eﬀect. Or it can be eminent, in 
which case the cause contains what is in the eﬀect in some higher form (which explains 
how  God  could  have  created  a  world  that  includes  divisible  matter  while  being 
indivisible himself12). So, y can be derived from x just in case y contains nothing that x 
does not. Consequently, if y contains something that x does not, then y cannot have 
been derived from x.
Applying this doctrine to the primitive notions, we see that the notion of the union 
contains more than the notion of thought does:  the union necessarily also involves 
body.  And since  the  union also  necessarily  involves  mind,  the  notion of  the  union 
contains more than the notion of extension does. So the notion of the union cannot be 
derived  from  the  notion  of  thought  and  cannot  be  derived  from  the  notion  of 
extension (this,  of course, is another version of the arguments covered above).  But, 
crucially, that does not seem to be true of the converse. The union is a union of both 
thought and extension. With that in mind, is there anything in the notion of thought 
that is not already contained in the notion of the union? And is there anything in the 
notion of extension not already in that of the union? The answer, in both cases, seems 
to be no.
If I am right here, then the notions of both thought and extension are derivable from 
the notion of the union (and not vice versa).  In itself,  this does not mean that the 
11  Insertions  in  angle  brackets  are  included  in  CSM and  are  from the  1647  French  translation  of  the 
Meditations, which Descartes had approved.
12 The extent which that is a convincing argument is questionable, of course, but that’s beside the point here.
90 CHAPTER FOUR
notions of  thought and extension are  in  fact  derived from the notion of  union,  of 
course.  The  individual  notions  could  still  be  derived  independently  of  the  union 
(presumably, from God; that is, as innate ideas bestowed on us by God). But they are 
nevertheless derivable from the union. It does not seem like a stretch to conclude that 
one-way derivability is a (weak) form of epistemic priority. And, if so, then the notion 
of the union is prior to the notions of both thought and extension.
4.2.2.2 Argument from the order of the Meditations
The  basic  structure  of  the  Meditations  is,  broadly  speaking,  analysis  followed  by 
synthesis (AT vii: 155; Williams 1978: 33). The method of doubt is what prompts the 
analysis, stripping away the familiar world to leave us with only the indubitable truths. 
Our familiar world then gets built back up on top of these truths. The standard reading 
of the Meditations privileges the indubitable truths. They are, explicitly, meant to be the 
foundations of Descartes’s entire philosophy (on the reading given here, of course, they 
are  only  the  foundations  of  a  restricted  part  of  his  philosophy):  Descartes  opens 
Meditation One by asserting the need ‘to demolish everything completely and start 
again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences 
that was stable and likely to last’ (CSM ii: 12; AT vii: 17). So, given the truths of the 
cogito  and  the  existence  of  God,  Descartes  is  supposed  to  be  able  to  derive  true 
knowledge  of  the  world.  The  cogito  itself  shows  that  there  is  thought,  while  the 
existence of God ensures that there is extension.
What concerns us here, however, are the prerequisites for the analysis that leads to the 
indubitable truths. We know that we need the cogito in order to prove the existence of 
God, because each of Descartes’s proofs relies on an idea of God that inheres in some 
thinking subject.13 So the cogito is a prerequisite for the proof of God’s existence. And 
so the cogito is (logically) prior to the proof of God’s existence. Given that, we can put 
the proof of God’s existence to one side and focus on the cogito. What we want to 
know are the conditions required for deriving the ‘I am, I exist’ that is supposed to 
hold up the whole edifice. On this face of it, this might seem like a strange thing to 
look for. The entire point of the cogito is that it has no dependencies beyond itself, 
precisely because it is its own grounds – that is what makes it indubitable. If that’s so, it 
should have no prerequisites.
13 Even the argument from existence as a perfection relies first on my conceiving of God as perfect (AT vii: 
65).
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However, in the Second Replies, Descartes makes very explicit that the order of the 
Meditations is in no way accidental:
The order consists simply in this. The items which are put forward first must be 
known entirely without the aid of what comes later; and the remaining items must 
be arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone 
before. I did try to follow this order very carefully in my Meditations
(CSM ii: 110; AT vii: 155).
What’s  more,  Descartes  is  clear  that  we  cannot  skip  stages  in  the  order  of  the 
Meditations:  he goes on to point out that ‘if [the reader]  fails to attend even to the 
smallest point, he will not see the necessity of the conclusion’ (CSM ii: 110; AT vii: 156). 
And since the cogito does not fall at the beginning (it has to wait for Meditation Two), 
it must be that a prior stage is necessary for getting to the cogito.
What is prior to the cogito is doubt: before being able to reach a stable foundation, the 
Meditator has to ‘demolish everything completely’ (CSM ii: 12; AT vii: 17). If we are to 
take Descartes’s comments in the Second Replies seriously, then this demolition stage 
is a necessary prerequisite for the cogito. We cannot get to the cogito without going 
through doubt first.  And what doubt works on, in the Meditations,  is  sensation and 
beliefs derived from sensation:
Once  the  foundations  of  a  building  are  undermined,  anything  built  on  them 
collapses of its own accord; so I will go straight for the basic principles on which all 
my former beliefs rested.
Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the 
senses [a sensibus] or through the senses [per sensus]
(CSM ii: 12; AT vii: 18).
The old foundations that the Meditator has to destroy before being able to reach the 
cogito are the foundations of the senses. And, as we know from Meditation Six, the 
correspondence with Elisabeth, and so on, the senses are the domain of the union (the 
Meditator might not know that term at this point,  but we do).14  So the union is a 
necessary prerequisite for the cogito, and hence also for the proof of God’s existence. 
And that makes the union a necessary prerequisite for the notions of both thought and 
extension, thus giving it priority over them.
14 See (Brown 2014: 245–6) and p. 92 below.
92 CHAPTER FOUR
We  might  want  to  object  at  this  point  that  to  bring  up  the  union  before  its 
introduction in Meditation Six is to ignore the order of the Meditations – even more so 
given  that  my  argument  here  relies  on  the  order  of  the  Meditations.  I  have  two 
responses to this. First, it is true that, at any given point in the Meditations, all that is 
available to the Meditator is what has been established up to that point, and not ‘what 
comes later’ (CSM ii: 110; AT vii: 155). But that can only be the case subsequent to doubt. 
At  the  very  beginning,  necessarily,  everything  is  available.  It  is  precisely  because 
everything is available that doubt is needed, in order to ‘hold back [. . .] assent from 
opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable’  (CSM ii:  12; AT vii:  18). 
Second,  my  argument  here  does  not  take  place  within  the  Meditations  project. 
Consequently, while the Meditator needs to follow the order of the Meditations (and so 
must start from the union in order to get to the cogito), this argument does not. My 
concern is with what is prior to the Meditations project (and the name Descartes gives 
us for what’s prior to it is ‘the union’).
We might also want to object that the need for doubt is only contingent on our own 
confusion. This would mean that doubt is not a necessary prerequisite to the cogito, but 
only a contingent prerequisite. The thought here is that doubt is only needed to get rid 
of old prejudices, and that if we were, somehow, naturally the right kind of thinker, free 
of ingrained prejudices, we would be able to skip doubt and start straightaway with the 
cogito. The problem with this approach is that, for Descartes, none of us could ever 
naturally be the ‘right’ kind of thinker for skipping doubt. This is Descartes’s opening 
description of the nature of the union in the Meditations:
There is nothing that my own nature teaches me more vividly [expresse] than that I 
have a body, and that when I feel pain there is something wrong with the body, and 
that when I am hungry or thirsty the body needs food and drink, and so on. [. . .]
Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I 
am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very 
closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a 
unit.  [.  .  .]  [T]hese sensations of hunger,  thirst,  pain and so on are nothing but 
confused [confusi]  modes of thinking which arise from the union and, as it were, 
intermingling of the mind with the body
(CSM ii: 56; {Descartes, 1996, 7, Œuvres de Descartes@80–1}).
Thus, confusion (in a certain sense) is the nature of every human, as a union of mind 
and body.15  As such,  our confusion is  necessary,  not contingent.16  As unions,  we are 
15 This would not be the case for disembodied minds; humans, though, are unions. See Simmons (2011: 3ﬀ.).
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incapable of naturally being the kind of thinker that can skip straight to the cogito. 
Instead, we necessarily have to go through an active process of doubt in order to leave 
our natural confusion behind and reach the cogito. This means that, for any human, 
doubt really is a necessary prerequisite for the cogito. By the same token, the union 
itself is also a necessary prerequisite for the cogito.
So, necessarily, we cannot get to the cogito, or to the proof of God’s existence, without 
starting from the union. And our notions of thought and extension depend on the 
cogito and God’s existence respectively.  This does not yet mean, however,  that our 
notions of thought and extension are derived from the union. To show that they are 
derived from the union, we need to look at where those notions come from, within the 
order of the Meditations.
In the case of thought, the notion is derived from my notion of myself. In Meditation 
Two, Descartes starts from the pre-doubt conception: ‘What then did I formerly think 
I was? A man’ (CSM ii: 17; AT vii: 25). As Descartes will later establish, a ‘man’ in the 
sense  he  formerly  took  himself  to  be  is  a  union  (AT vii:  81;  AT vii:  88).  Back  in 
Meditation Two, he then proceeds through an analysis of the union, stripping it of 
anything that can be doubted (via a version of the malicious demon argument), until he 
gets to thought (‘this alone is inseparable from me’ (CSM ii: 18; AT vii: 27)). It is from 
this that the Meditator establishes that s/he is a thinking substance, and thus derives 
the notion of thought itself (AT vii: 28). So, within the order of the Meditations, the 
notion  of  thought  is  derived  from an  analysis  of  the  union.  This  is  important:  in 
§4.2.2.1,  we established that the notion of thought is in principle  derivable from the 
union; here, we see that it is in fact derived from the union.
In  the  case  of  the  notion  of  extension,  things  are  slightly  more  complicated.  The 
notion is first brought back in for the Meditator at the end of Meditation Two, with 
the  wax  example  (although  somewhat  obliquely,  in  that  it  is  not  referred  to  as 
‘extension’,  ‘matter’,  etc.  at  that  point).  But  the  confirmation  of  the  existence  of 
extension, and hence the Meditator’s aﬃrmation of the notion, does not take place 
until Meditation Six. With the wax example, Descartes starts, again, with a pre-doubt 
conception (‘Let us consider the things which people commonly think they understand 
most distinctly of all; that is, the bodies which we touch and see’ (CSM ii: 20; AT vii: 
30)). He picks out a piece of beeswax and runs through another process of analysis on 
it, eliminating all its properties until we are left with nothing but extension: ‘I would 
not be making a correct judgement about the nature of wax unless I believed it capable 
16 On human nature and the union, see (Simmons 2011: 8).
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of being extended’ (CSM ii: 21; AT vii: 31). Thus, here, in the same way, the notion of 
extension is derived from an analysis of the union.
The approach in Meditation Six is similar. Descartes begins from sensation, with the 
stated aim of seeing ‘whether the things which are perceived by means of that mode of 
thinking which I call “sensory perception” provide me with any sure argument for the 
existence of corporeal things’ (CSM ii: 51; AT vii: 74). The analytic process that follows 
this time is longer and more involved, addressing everything that (pre-doubt) we take 
to be perceived sensorily, and the reasons for doubting it. This analysis too eventually 
reaches a clear and distinct conception of corporeal things as extension (AT vii: 79). 
And, because that conception excludes thought from corporeal things,  our ideas of 
them cannot be the products of our own minds (since there cannot be more in the 
eﬀect  than  is  in  the  cause).  This  means  that  they  need  another  source.  All  the 
Meditator has allowed back in at this point is his/her own mind and God. But we do 
experience  ideas  of  corporeal  things  as  coming  from  real  corporeal  things. 
Consequently,  ‘I  do  not  see  how God  could  be  understood  to  be  anything  but  a 
deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from a source other than corporeal things’; and 
since God cannot be a deceiver,  he cannot be the source of our ideas of corporeal 
things, and thus ‘[i]t follows that corporeal things exist’ (CSM ii: 55; AT vii: 80). It is in 
this way that extension gets to be aﬃrmed as real by the Meditator, and so gets to take 
its place in the Cartesian ontology.
But,  as  we  have  seen,  in  both  Meditation  Two and  Meditation  Six,  the  notion  of 
extension is derived from an analysis of sensation. That is, it is derived from an analysis 
of the union. The only role that God plays in the Meditator’s notion of extension is as 
the guarantor of its veracity. For the Meditator, the notion itself comes from the union. 
Consequently,  just  as  with  the  notion  of  thought,  we  can  say  that  the  notion  of 
extension is is not just in principle derivable from the union but is in fact derived from 
the union, within the order of the Meditations.
The result of this argument from the order of the Meditations is that both the notion of 
thought and the notion of extension turn out to have been derived from the union, via 
analysis. Put otherwise, for any human, the union, and the notion thereof, is necessarily 
prior to the notions of thought and extension. This is not to say, with Gassendi, that, 
despite his claims to the contrary, Descartes agrees that ‘whatever is in the intellect 
must have previously existed in the senses’ (Fifth Objections; AT ii: 186; AT vii: 267). 
Much, for Descartes, can be in the mind and not in the senses. But it is to say that, for 
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humans, the notions of thought and extension specifically must be derived from the 
union.
4.2.2.3 Argument from interaction
While discussing mind–body interaction with Elisabeth, Descartes tells he that he will 
explain the notions ‘which belong to the union of the soul with the body, as distinct 
from those which belong to the body alone or to the soul alone’ (CSMK: 218; AT iii: 
666). To begin doing so, he makes use of an analogy with heaviness17:
I think that we have hitherto confused the notion of the soul’s power to act on the 
body with the power one body has to act on another.  We have attributed both 
powers not to the soul, for we did not yet know it, but to the various qualities of 
bodies such as heaviness, heat, etc. We imagined these qualities to be real, that is to 
say  to  have an existence distinct  from that  of  bodies,  and so  to  be substances, 
although we called them qualities. In order to conceive them we sometimes used 
notions we have for the purpose of knowing bodies, and sometimes used notions we 
have  for  the  purpose  of  knowing  the  soul,  depending  on  whether  we  were 
attributing  to  them something  material  or  something  immaterial.  For  instance, 
when we suppose that heaviness is a real quality, of which all we know is that it has 
the power to move the body that possesses it towards the centre of the earth, we 
have no diﬃculty in conceiving how it moves this body or how it is joined to it. We 
never think that this motion is produced by a real contact between two surfaces, 
since we find,  from our own inner  experience,  that  we possess  a  notion that  is 
ready-made for forming the conception in question. Yet I believe that we misuse 
this notion when we apply it to heaviness, which – as I hope to show in my Physics – 
is not anything really distinct from body. For I believe that it was given us for the 
purpose of conceiving the manner in which the soul moves the body
(to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643; CSMK: 219; AT iii: 667–8).
Descartes’s point is that the scholastic conception of real qualities as causal powers is 
only intelligible through the notion of the union (which, for Descartes, even scholastics 
would naturally possess, just because our nature’s most vivid lesson is that we are each a 
union  (see  p.  92  above)).  He  claims  that  we  immediately  grasp  what  it  means  for 
heaviness to impel a body towards the centre of the earth, without questioning how 
the heaviness and the body interact, despite the body’s being one kind of thing (a body) 
and heaviness’s being another (a quality). We grasp it because we already have a notion 
17 He uses the same analogy for the same purpose in his correspondence with Arnauld (29 July 1648; AT v: 
222–3) and, more restrictedly, in the letter to Clerselier in response to Gassendi’s Disquisitio Metaphysica sive 
Dubitationes et Instantiae (AT ixA: 213) and in a letter to ‘Hyperaspites’ (August 1641; AT iii: 424). See, e.g., 
Garber (1983), which will be covered at length shortly, and Rozemond (1998: 119).
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of just that kind of interaction available – a notion that Descartes claims was ‘given us 
for  the purpose of  conceiving the manner in  which the soul  moves the body’.  For 
Descartes, of course, heaviness is a misapplication of the notion, because there is no 
separate quality of heaviness to interact with the body in question. But, in order to get 
to this misapplication, you first need the notion of the union: without it, we would 
have no way to make sense of how the heaviness quality acts on the body. So our notion 
of  the union is  a  prerequisite  for  the intelligibility  of  the scholastic  conception of 
heaviness as quality–body interaction.
Garber  (1983)  uses  the  above  passage  from Descartes’s  letter  to  extend  the  same 
argument beyond quality–body interaction to body–body interaction.18  In the letter 
that preceded the above, Elisabeth had asked for an account of mind–body interaction. 
This is how she sets out the question:
I ask you please to tell me how the soul of a human being (it being only a thinking 
substance)  can  determine  the  bodily  spirits,  in  order  to  bring  about  voluntary 
actions.  For  it  seems that  all  determination  of  movement  happens  through the 
impulsion of the thing moved, by the manner in which it is pushed by that which 
moves it, or else by the particular qualities and shape of the surface of the latter. 
Physical contact is required for the first two conditions, extension for the third. You 
entirely exclude the one [extension] from the notion you have of the soul, and the 
other [physical contact] appears to me incompatible with an immaterial thing 
(Elisabeth to Descartes, 6 May 1643; Bohemia and Descartes 2007: 62; AT iii: 661).
Elisabeth assumes that body–body interaction is straightforwardly intelligible, and that 
the problem with mind–body interaction is that it cannot make use of the means by 
which  body–body  interaction  is  supposed  to  work  (impulsion  and  shape).  Garber’s 
point is that there is no true body–body interaction in Descartes’s system; instead,
impact and the changes in bodily motion that result from impact are nothing but 
the changes that God must make in recreating the world from moment to moment 
in order to accommodate the motion of bodies to one another. Strictly speaking, 
bodies in motion are not real causes of change in impact, it would appear; motion 
18 Garber’s position amounts to an endorsement of an occasionalist reading of Descartes, and a rejection of 
secondary causation in his system. This is by no means a settled matter in the scholarship. Hatfield (1979), 
e.g.,  also  upholds  the  occasionalist  reading,  while  Gabbey  (1980),  Gueroult  (1980),  Hattab  (2000),  and 
Schmaltz  (2008)  argue  that  Descartes  does  allow  secondary  causes,  and  Des  Chene  takes  a  nuanced, 
intermediate position (1996).  In the present context, I am ultimately agnostic about the admissibility of 
secondary causes into Descartes’s system: if the occasionalist position holds, then so does the my argument 
from interaction;  if  it  doesn’t,  then  neither  does  the  argument  from interaction  (the  arguments  from 
containment and from the order of the Meditations are unaﬀected).
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transferred,  motion begun,  and motion ended in  impact  must  derive  from God 
himself, shuﬄing bodies about
(Garber 1983: 26).
If that’s the case, then all body–body interaction is really God–body interaction. God, 
of  course,  is  not  extended,  so  Elisabeth’s  argument  against  mind–body  interaction 
applies equally to God–body interaction, which means,  on Garber’s  reading,  that it 
applies  equally  to  body–body  interaction  (within  Descartes’s  system).  This,  Garber 
takes it, is ‘what Descartes should have told Elisabeth’: rather than pointing out that 
the scholastic conception of heaviness could only be intelligible through the notion of 
the union, Descartes should have argued that the body–body interaction she takes to 
be  so  readily  intelligible  is  itself  only  intelligible  through the notion of  the  union. 
Indeed,
[m]ind–body interaction must be basic and intelligible on its own terms since if it 
were not, then no other kind of causal explanation would be intelligible at all; to 
challenge  the  intelligibility  of  mind–body  interaction  is  to  challenge  the  entire 
enterprise  of  causal  explanation.  Furthermore,  we  cannot  give  a  simpler  or  more 
easily understood account of causal interaction than mind–body interaction because 
there  are  no more  basic  or  more  inherently  inte!igible  ways  of  explaining the  behavior  of 
anything open to us
(Garber 1983: 29; emphases in original).
If body–body interaction collapses to God–body interaction, Descartes has no way to 
make sense of any causation in the physical world other than the notion of the union. 
In that case, far from being an aberration, mind–body interaction is the model for all 
physical causation.19
What this shows, if we accept Garber’s reading, is that the priority of the notion of the 
union persists beyond the initial derivation of the notions of thought and extension: it 
is intrinsic to our understanding of body–body causation. This is because, for body–
body interaction to only be intelligible on the model of mind–body interaction, we 
need to have already bought into the position that  body–body interaction is  really 
God–body interaction.  So Garber’s  position applies  once we have already taken on 
19  As  Brown notes,  ‘[i]f  these  arguments  are  correct,  our  understanding  of  the  union is  anything  but  a 
peripheral concern in Descartes’ corpus’ (2006: 140).
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board  the  conclusions  of  the  developed  Cartesian  system.20  In  the  order  of  the 
Meditations, it would come in at the end, rather than the beginning. We have already 
established, in the previous two sections of this chapter, that the notions of thought 
and extension can only be derived from the union. And now it turns out that even once 
Descartes’s dualism is established, there is at least one more thing (in addition to the 
union itself) that is inconceivable within his dualism. So, if all this is the case, Cartesian 
dualism cannot account for mind–body causation without importing the notion of the 
union – and it also cannot account for intelligible physical causation without importing 
the notion of the union.
In fact,  there is an argument to be made that the point Garber makes can pushed 
considerably further, such that no physical causation at all is intelligible outside the 
model of the union. That argument would be a little too tenuous for me to rely on fully 
here, but it is  worth noting its plausibility.  Recall  that,  according to Descartes,  our 
nature’s most vivid lesson is that we are each a union, and that our minds and bodies 
interact within that union (CSM ii: 56; AT vii: 80). Above anything else – anything else 
at all – our nature teaches us mind–body interaction. Descartes repeatedly relies on this 
to show that mind–body interaction is intelligible in its own right, and is in need of no 
further explanation. He also relies on it to argue that scholastic quality–body causation 
appears intelligible only because we already have the model of mind–body causation. 
What is not clear is that Elisabeth’s faith in body–body causation is all that diﬀerent 
from the scholastic case – even without the extra step of recognising that body–body 
causation collapses into God–body causation.
We know that mind–body causation within the union is the first and most vivid notion 
we have. But Descartes does not tell us where we get the idea of body–body causation 
from. If body–body causation is really God–body causation, it seems unlikely that we 
get the idea from corporeal  things themselves:  since there is  no causation between 
corporeal things, there cannot be anything in extension to give us our idea of physical 
causation.  This  does  not  require  anyone to  first  buy  into  the  body–body/God–body 
causation collapse for intelligibility to be a problem; it just requires that the collapse is 
the case, regardless of whether we realise. And so it seems that the only model we have 
for our intuitive conception of body–body causation is,  again, mind–body causation 
within the union.
20  In a later letter to Elisabeth,  Descartes writes,  ‘I  did not worry about the fact that the analogy with 
heaviness was lame because such qualities are not real, as people imagine them to be. This was because I 
thought that Your Highness was already completely convinced that the soul is a substance distinct from the 
body’ (28 June 1643; CSMK: 228; AT iii: 694).
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If this argument does hold, it means that physical causation is only ever intelligible 
through the notion of the union, regardless of whether or not we knowingly accept 
Descartes’s dualism (or, regardless of where we are in the order of the Meditations). This 
would not be an incidental result: without physical causation, Descartes would not be 
able to account for any change in the physical world; he could have no physics, no 
mechanics, no physiology, no medicine, and so on. And, if Garber’s argument is correct, 
physical causation is always unintelligible from within his dualism. It can only ever be 
conceived through a notion that is specific to the union.
4.2.3 Summary: the notion of the union is epistemically prior to the 
notions of thought and extension
For any human knower (i.e. a union), the notion of the union is a necessary epistemic 
prerequisite for the notions of thought and extension. The latter can only be derived 
from the former. The argument from containment above shows that there is an in-
principle asymmetry of derivability between the notions: the notions of thought and 
extension can both be derived from the notion of the union, but not vice versa. The 
argument from the order of the Meditations then shows that the notions of thought and 
extension are in fact, and must be, derived from the notion of the union. Finally, the 
argument from interaction shows that this does not apply only to the initial derivation 
of  the  dualist  notions,  because  a  fundamental  aspect  of  extension  (body–body 
causation) is only conceivable through the union. All this means that the notion of the 
union has epistemic priority over the notions of thought and extension. In that sense, 
it is the ‘most’ primitive of our notions.
4.3 Different domains of conceivability 
In  the  introduction  to  this  chapter,  I  warned  that  Descartes’s  epistemology  and 
metaphysics of the union would have to be teased out of the none-too-forthcoming 
comments he makes about the nature of the union. This section is where that teasing 
out begins in earnest. The result of the previous section – that the notion of the union 
is our most primitive – is problematic in the context of the familiar dualist system. In 
this  section,  I  am going  to  propose  that  we  can  overcome  those  problems  if  we 
understand Descartes’s dualist framework and his treatment of the union as belonging 
to two distinct domains of conceivability. The term ‘domain of conceivability’ is not 
Descartes’s,  of  course,  but  the  idea  is  derived  from  the  conceptual  isolation  he 
describes between the conception of the union itself and the conception of the world 
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in terms of thought and extension. It is a reconstruction of the kind of epistemology 
that would allow him to reach the conclusions about the union that he does.
In the letter  to Elisabeth quoted at  the beginning of  §4.2,  Descartes lists  multiple 
primitive notions. Chief amongst them are extension, thought and the union. He goes 
on  to  specify  that  these  notions  are  specifically  primitive  in  that  each  can  be 
understood only through itself; a primitive notion cannot be understood through any 
other notion (AT iii: 665). And yet my claim throughout this chapter so far has been 
that the primitive notions of thought and extension both can be and, indeed, must be 
derived from the union. In some sense, then, they must be understood through the 
notion of the union. In light of Descartes’s definition of primitive notions, it seems as 
though there  is  a  serious  problem in  reconciling  my reading  here  with  Descartes’s 
explicit  statements  about  the  notions  of  thought  and  extension.  It  might  look  as 
though  I  have  to  conclude  that  Descartes  was  either  mistaken  or  misleading  in 
labelling the notions of thought and extension as ‘primitive’. That is not what I am 
going to conclude.
Instead,  I  take it  that the notions of thought and extension are both primitive,  as 
Descartes claims, and derived from the notion of the union. So all three notions are 
primitive, but the notion of the union is ‘more’ primitive. If being ‘more primitive’ 
sounds questionable, it should: another way of putting the problem here would be to 
ask how one thing can be more primitive than another. The argument in response goes 
as follows. We can reconcile the primitivity of all three notions with union-priority if 
the primitive notions of thought and extension, on the one hand, and the notion of the 
union, on the other, belong to two distinct domains of conceivability. This seems to be 
close to what Brown has in mind when she claims that ‘[w]hether we think of ourselves 
in  terms  of  the  minimal  [mind  only]  or  maximal  [union]  self  depends  on  which 
explanatory [. . .] context we are in’ (Brown 2014: 255). That is, the ontology changes 
depending on context:  in the minimal context,  the ontology includes mind but not 
union; in the maximal context, the ontology includes union.21
21 Cf. Simmons (manuscript: 31–2): ‘Since we do not have an intellectual idea of the union, but only a sensory 
one, the nature of union must stand outside the domain of Cartesian metaphysics. We have good evidence 
that it exists: the presence of sensations, appetites, and passions in tells us (that is, tells our intellects) that 
something more than aggregation is going on between our mind and body. But we cannot oﬀer a positive 
metaphysics  of  it.’  I  am arguing  here  that  the  union  does  indeed  stand  outside  the  domain  of  dualist 
Cartesian metaphysics, but that that does not mean it has no metaphysical status available to humans: there 
is another domain of Cartesian metaphysics beyond his dualism.
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Descartes equivocates between these two domains in his response to Elisabeth. In the 
first domain,  the notion of the union is  primitive,  and the notions of thought and 
extension are not. In the second, the notions of thought and extension are primitive, 
and the union is inconceivable. Since the union is inconceivable in the second domain, 
the notion has to be imported from the first in order to fill in the conceivability gaps. 
The first domain has epistemic priority over the second inasmuch as it is our ‘natural’ 
domain of conceivability. The second is produced by abstraction from the first (but, 
once produced, becomes mostly independent).
This requires some unpacking. The second domain of conceivability is what we end up 
with  after  having  been  through  the  Meditations.  It  is  what  we  standardly  take 
Descartes’s philosophy to consist in. Let’s call it DomainD for short. DomainD is the 
preserve of the familiar Cartesian dualist system. Within it, the notions of thought and 
extension are primitive (along with the notions of being, number, duration, etc.). On 
this  reading,  the  Cartesian  project  that  we  are  familiar  with  from the  Meditations, 
Discourse on the Method, World, and Principles of Philosophy is the project of establishing 
the  conceivability  of  the  world  within  DomainD.  If  Descartes  can  show that  the 
phenomena are explicable in the terms of DomainD, then the project will have been 
successful.  Crucially,  DomainD  is  only  obtained  with  eﬀort.  It  is  not  a  given,  for 
Descartes. As Brown puts it, ‘we spend most of our time in the state of being a [union], 
and while it is possible for us cognitively to transcend that state to engage in pure 
thought  or  thought  aided  only  by  the  imagination,  it  [.  .  .]  is,  in  a  way, 
unnatural’  (Brown  2014:  249).  We  need  to  go  through  a  process  of  establishing 
DomainD (a process that Descartes variously refers to as ‘philosophising’, ‘meditation’, 
and ‘metaphysics’) – this is the entire point of the Meditations.
What  is  prior  to  the  process  of  establishing  DomainD  is  our  ‘natural’  domain  of 
conceivability. This is how the Meditator conceives of things right at the beginning of 
the Meditations. For obvious reasons, let’s call this domain of conceivability DomainU. It 
is within DomainU that we have the notion of the union that we have been over already 
– that is, the notion that our nature most vividly teaches us, or what Descartes calls 
‘the  notion of  the union which everyone invariably  experiences  in  himself  without 
philosophizing’ (CSMK: 228; AT iii: 94). For all the reasons covered in the preceding 
sections of this chapter, this notion of the union is primitive in DomainU (presumably 
along with the notions of being, number, duration, etc.).
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What we do not have in DomainU  are primitive notions of thought and extension, 
although we do have non-primitive notions of them. This has to be the case because, as 
Descartes writes in the 28 June 1643 letter to Elisabeth,
[i]t does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of forming a very distinct 
conception of both the distinction between the soul and the body and their union; 
for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and at the same time 
to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd [ce qui se contrarie]
(CSMK: 227; AT iii: 693).
Descartes’s point here is that we cannot conceive of the union and  of thought and 
extension as primitive notions simultaneously. The two positions are opposed.22  The 
problems raised in §4.2.1  apply equally  here.  If  you start  with primitive notions of 
thought and extension (i.e. as really distinct, as in DomainD), you cannot coherently 
unite them (by Descartes’s definition of primitivity). By the same token, if you start 
with a primitive notion of a union of mind and body (as in DomainU), you cannot also 
hold primitive notions of  thought and extension,  just  because those notions would 
have to be conceptually isolated from the notion of the union in order to be primitive. 
Put another way, the notions of thought and extension necessarily would not be able to 
tell us anything about the notion of the union, because, if they could, they would not 
be primitive. But, if they could not tell us anything about the notion of the union, they 
would necessarily have to be notions of something other than thought and extension 
(because the union is a union of thought and extension). Consequently, the notions of 
thought and extension that we have within DomainU (i.e. the notions of the two parts 
of the union) cannot be primitive notions.
So,  within  DomainU,  we  cannot  conceive  of  thought  and  extension  as  primitive 
notions, although we can easily conceive of them as two sides of the union (i.e. as non-
primitive notions). As soon as we start thinking of thought and extension as primitive 
notions (that is, as really distinct), we can no longer maintain our natural conception of 
the union. In the terms I am using here, then, this necessarily constitutes a switch from 
DomainU to DomainD. This is what I take Descartes’s proscription against conceiving 
both the union and the thought/extension distinction at the same time to consist in. 
We cannot  conceive  both  of  the  union  and  of  primitive  notions  of  thought  and 
extension simultaneously just because we need to change domains of conceivability: on 
22 See Yandell 1997 on logical and conceptual contradiction in Descartes’s treatment of the union. See also 
(Brown 2014: 245).
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this reading, Descartes’s temporal restriction gets cashed out in domain switching.23
Both thought and extension are conceivable within DomainU. The same cannot be said 
of  the  union within  DomainD.The union cannot  be  accounted for  in  the  terms of 
DomainD. For all the reasons established in §4.2, the union is entirely inconceivable 
within DomainD: this is an epistemic gap in that domain of conceivability. In order to 
account for the union (and in order to account for, at least, body–body causation as 
well),  Descartes  has  no  choice  but  to  import  the  primitive  notion  of  the  union 
wholesale from outside DomainD. This is why the idea of mind–body causation appears 
so incoherent with our picture of Descartes’s philosophy, and why Elisabeth, Gassendi, 
and so many others since see it as a failure within his system: we take it that Descartes 
has nothing but DomainD, and so we assume that the union must be conceivable within 
DomainD, when it is instead taken from a diﬀerent domain of conceivability altogether. 
This is also why the union is usually addressed as a problem of mind–body causation – 
because  mind  and  body  are  the  only  seemingly  relevant  terms  available  within 
DomainD. But the DomainD-notions of mind and body (or thought and extension) have 
nothing to do with the notion of the union from DomainU (if they did, of course, the 
notion of the union would no longer be primitive). The notion of the union is an alien 
within DomainD; importing it from DomainU is Descartes’s only available option for 
patching the epistemic gaps (i.e. at least the union itself and, if Garber is right, body–
body causation) within DomainD.
It is no surprise that we have tended to assume that what I am calling DomainD is all 
there is to Descartes’s philosophy. Descartes himself recognises as much. In his 21 May 
1643 letter, he writes the following to Elisabeth:
I may truly say that the question [i.e. the question of mind–body causation24] which 
Your Highness poses seems to me the one which can most properly be put to me in 
view of my published writings. There are two facts [choses] about the human soul on 
which depend all the knowledge we can have of its nature. The first is that it thinks, 
the second is that, being united to the body, it can act and be acted upon along with 
it. About the second I have said hardly anything; I have tried only to make the first 
well understood. For my principal aim was to prove the distinction between the soul 
23 This parallels the ‘shift in thinking about the self ’ that Brown identifies in Descartes’s treatment of the 
union: ‘[t]he product of reflecting on my experiences of embodiment is a diﬀerent sense of self from the one 
Descartes relies on in the real distinction argument’ (Brown 2014: 244).
24 See Elisabeth to Descartes, 6 May 1643 (AT iii: 660–2; Bohemia and Descartes 2007: 61–2) and §4.2.2.3 
above.
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and the body, and to this end only the first was useful, and the second might have 
been harmful
(to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643; CSMK: 217–8; AT iii: 664–5).
Descartes notes here that his published work (which, at that point, included both the 
Meditations and the Discourse) had focused almost exclusively on the soul as a thinking 
thing. Given that he takes the conceivability that pertains to the union (DomainU) to 
be naturally, unavoidably available to us all, while getting to the conceivability of the 
dualist  system (DomainD)  requires  work,  his  focus  on  the  latter  makes  sense.  He 
needed  both  to  establish  DomainD  in  the  first  place  and  then  to  show  that  the 
phenomena of the world are conceivable within DomainD. By contrast, there is little 
need to say much about the union if we get our notion of it so naturally. He brings all 
this  up in  the  letter  to  Elisabeth in  order  to  make clear  why she  sees  mind–body 
causation as a problem for his system while he does not. His point is that it is his prior 
focus on the soul as a thinking thing that has erroneously given her the impression that 
everything must be conceivable in the terms of DomainD. That focus, he admits here, 
was pragmatic: it was needed in order to get an unwilling audience to start thinking 
within a system that was new to them. Since, as we have seen, the notions of the dualist 
system are useless for explaining the union, what Descartes had so far left unsaid about 
the union could only be expressed in the notions that pertain to the union itself. In 
other words, if Descartes wants to talk about the union, he has to do so in the terms of 
DomainU.  Because of  its  epistemic gaps,  DomainD  is  incapable of  fully  superseding 
DomainU.
It  is  immediately  after  the  passage  quoted  above  that  Descartes  introduces  the 
primitive notions of union, thought, and extension, and their conceptual isolation. We 
are now in a better position to provide a reading of his claim that ‘we go wrong if we 
try to explain one of these notions by another, for since they are primitive notions, 
each of them can be understood only through itself ’ (to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643; CSMK: 
218; AT iii: 666), when it is evident that both thought and extension not only can be 
but actually are derived from the notion of the union. It is by virtue of belonging to 
diﬀerent domains of conceivability that the notion of the union and the notions of 
thought and extension are conceptually  isolated.  The union is  inconceivable within 
DomainD, so, while the notion can be used to patch over epistemic gaps, it cannot tell 
us  about  anything  in  the  terms  of  DomainD.  And  since  the  DomainD-notions  of 
thought  and  extension  are  notions  of  independent,  incompatible  substances,  they 
cannot tell us about anything in the terms of DomainU, where thought and extension 
are fundamentally the two parts of a union that has priority over them.
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This reading makes sense of how the notions of the union, thought, and extension can 
still be properly primitive. And it is because of the epistemic priority of DomainU over 
DomainD  that  the  notion of  the  union gets  be  ‘more’  primitive.  As  we have  seen, 
DomainU is a natural given for all humans, while it takes work to produce DomainD. We 
always have to get to DomainD  "om  DomainU  just  because DomainU  is  our natural 
domain  of  conceivability.  As  established  in  §4.2.2.2,  the  notions  that  belong  to 
DomainD  are  derived  by  analysis  of  certain  notions  within  DomainU.  That  makes 
DomainD an abstraction from DomainU, in that it is a new domain of conceivability 
built on notions removed from their original context within DomainU.25 All this means 
that DomainU  necessarily  has epistemic priority over DomainD.  And this  is  what it 
means for the notion of the union to be more primitive than the notions of thought 
and extension: the notion of the union is conceptually isolated from the DomainD-
notions,  and it  will  also  always  have  epistemic  priority  over  them,  exactly  because 
DomainU has epistemic priority over DomainD.
4.4 The ontological priority of the union
So far, this chapter established that the notion of the union has epistemic priority over 
the notions of thought and extension. We still need to look at the metaphysics implied 
by Descartes’s treatment of the union to see how that epistemic priority translates into 
ontological priority for the union itself. What characterises the switch from DomainU 
to DomainD is that within DomainD we adopt an objective view of the world: DomainD 
is an attempt to conceive the world as what Williams calls ‘the absolute conception of 
reality’ (1978: 65), or what Nagel (1989) calls the ‘view from nowhere’. The notions of 
thought and extension we have within DomainD are notions of thinking and extended 
substances respectively that exist independently (or quasi-independently, subtended by 
God,  who  is  the  only  truly  independent  substance  (Principles  1/51;  AT viiiA:  24): 
thinking substance and extended substance are what they are regardless of any human 
conception.  On  the  face  of  it,  that  might  seem  to  give  thinking  and  extended 
substances ontological priority over the union. If we assume (like Elisabeth, etc.) that 
DomainD is all Descartes has, then the union is going to look like some kind of vague, 
magical  aggregate  of  mind  and  body  (because  the  union  is  inconceivable  within 
DomainD).  That  is,  it  is  going  to  look  as  though  the  union  is  dependent  on  its 
25 Cf. the discussion of intellectual abstraction in the letter to Gibieuf of 19 January 1642: ‘[t]his intellectual 
abstraction consists in my turning my thought away from one part of the contents of this richer idea the 
better to apply it to the other part with greater attention. Thus, when I consider a shape without thinking of 
the substance or the extension whose shape it is, I make a mental abstraction. I can easily recognize this 
abstraction afterwards when I look to see whether I have derived this idea of the shape on its own from 
some other, richer idea which I also have within myself ’ (CSMK: 202; AT iii: 475). See also Nolan 1997: 133.
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ontologically well-grounded components, thereby making it ontologically posterior to 
them.26
But, on the reading given in this chapter, DomainD is not all that Descartes has. And 
the  situation  looks  rather  diﬀerent  from  within  DomainU.  Whenever  Descartes 
discusses the conceivability that pertains to the union, it  is  clear that he is  talking 
about a subjective standpoint rather than an objective view.27 What our nature most 
vividly teaches us is that ‘I have a body, and that when I feel pain there is something 
wrong with the body, and that when I am hungry or thirsty the body needs food and 
drink, and so on’ (CSM ii: 56; AT vii: 80). We understand the world, within DomainU, 
‘by the surest and plainest everyday experience’ (for Arnauld, 29 July 1648; CSMK: 358; 
AT v: 222). And what characterises DomainU is sensation. Sensations, Descartes tells us 
in the Principles, ‘must not be referred either to the mind alone or to the body alone. 
These arise [. . .] from the close and intimate union of our mind with the body’ (1/48; 
CSM i: 209; AT viiiA: 23). That I have a body, the pain I feel that tells me there is 
something wrong with that body, hunger, thirst, and so on – these are all sensations 
(internal sensations, as Descartes sometimes specifies (CSM i: 316–8; see Simmons 2011: 
64)).
For Descartes, sensation is always concerned with benefit and harm to the union (AT 
vii: 83). And, he writes in the Meditations, ‘in matters regarding the well-being of the 
body, all my senses report the truth much more frequently than not’ (CSM ii: 61; AT vii: 
80). So, sensation reports truths, and the truths it reports are indexed to a particular 
union. That sounds like a good description of a subjective standpoint.28 The question, 
then, is what exists from this standpoint29 – what is the ontology of DomainU? At the 
26 Although that, of course, would make the union ‘absolutely’ an ens per accidens, which is a position Descartes 
rejects (AT iii: 461; AT iii: 493; AT iii: 508).
27 This ‘objective view’ is distinct from Cartesian/scholastic objective reality. The latter refers to the intrinsic 
reality of a thing,  or (when contrasted with formal reality)  to the represented side of a representational 
relation (AT vii: 40). The former is a framework in which ontological statuses are assigned; it is objective in 
that the ontology disregards perspective.
28 Simmons calls this subjectivity ‘narcissistic representation’, or a ‘representation of the world as mattering to 
me’ (2014: 269; emphasis in original).
29  If we are accustomed to thinking of ontology purely in terms of an objective view, then the notion of 
existence  from a  subjective  standpoint  might  sound  strange.  Chapter  Six  will  show that,  and  how,  the 
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very  least,  the  union  must  exist.  The  union  is,  after  all,  the  standpoint  itself. 
Consequently,  it  seems  that  not  only  must  the  union  exist,  but  it  also  must  have 
ontological priority over whatever else there may be in DomainU. To see why this is so, 
it is useful to look at what ontological priority is for Descartes.
In his relatively recent paper on ontological priority monism, Schaﬀer contends with 
scepticism about  ontological  priority.  He  writes,  ‘[t]he  assumption  that  there  are 
priority relations between actual concrete objects is weighty and controversial [. . .]. 
[. . .] [I]t is controversial to allow that there is such a thing as priority at all’ (2010: 36). 
We do not have that problem here: Descartes fully endorses ontological priority and 
posteriority, in terms of more or less reality. This diﬀerence in degree of reality (which 
we covered in terms of containment in §4.2.2.1) cashes out in degrees of dependency: 
the less on which a thing depends, the more reality it has (AT vii: 185), and the more 
reality,  the greater  the ontological  priority.  Within the standpoint  of  DomainU,  the 
union is the fundamental given. It depends on nothing but itself (within DomainU).30
This  is  surprising:  for  the  union to  be  something  with  no further  dependencies  is 
(literally) blasphemy on the standard interpretation of Descartes. He is explicit that 
only God is truly independent; everything else has at least one further dependency (‘we 
perceive that they can exist only with the help of God’s concurrence’ (Principles 1/51; 
CSM i: 210; AT viiiA: 24)). But that is only the case within DomainD, where we take the 
view  of  an  absolute  conception  of  reality.  On  that  conception,  it  it  is  certainly 
conceivable  that  I  might  depend  on  something  beyond  myself.  But  within  the 
metaphysics of a subjective standpoint, it is nonsensical for the standpoint itself to 
depend on something beyond itself.  That  is,  as  soon as  we start  talking about the 
dependency of the union on something else, we have already jumped out of DomainU 
and into some other domain of conceivability (in this case, DomainD).
So, the union depends on itself alone (within DomainU). And since everything within 
DomainU is indexed to the union, everything within DomainU, besides the union itself, 
existence in question is non-independent existence. In the case of the union that pertains to me, its existence 
is non-independent in that it is inextricable from me. This is not as obscure as it sounds: I am the union that 
pertains to me (or an intrinsic part of it, if I am just a mind), so of course I am inextricable from it. See 
Chapter Six, §6.2.4.
30 Descartes calls his principle of ontological priority ‘completely self-evident’ (CSM ii: 130; AT viiiA: 24), and 
since  he  takes  its  self-evidence  to  be  prior  to,  and  not  reliant  upon,  the  abstractions  in  the  switch  to 
DomainD, it seems safe to assume that the principle applies within DomainU.
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has a further dependency (i.e. the union to which it is indexed). This means that the 
union has more reality than anything else within DomainU, which means that it has 
ontological priority over everything else within DomainU. So, the union has ontological 
priority over the mind and body that compose it31 – so, within the metaphysics implied 
by DomainU, the union has ontological priority over thought and extension.
4.5 Union-priority metaphysics and the problem of mind–body 
interaction
Having  established  that,  within  DomainU,  the  notion  of  the  union  has  epistemic 
priority  over  the  notions  of  thought  and  extension,  and  that  the  union  itself  has 
ontological priority over thought and extension themselves, we are in a good position 
to see how Descartes’s union-priority metaphysics dissolves the problem of mind–body 
causation. I have noted a couple of times already (85, 103) that the union gets treated as 
a problem specifically of mind–body causation –  indeed, as a problem at all  –  only 
because  we  expect  Descartes  to  account  for  it  in  the  terms  of  a  domain  of 
conceivability in which it is inconceivable. All that is available within the dualism of 
DomainD  are mind and body, so the union appears to be an intractable problem of 
making  two  necessarily  incompatible  substances  compatible.  Within  DomainU, 
however, that problem never arises.
As  established  above,  within  DomainU,  mind  and  body  are  not  incompatible, 
independent substances with a real distinction between them; if they were, the union 
would still  be inconceivable.  Instead,  they are  the two sides  of  the union that  has 
ontological  priority  over  them  both.  Within  DomainU,  mind  and  body  are  what 
Schaﬀer calls ‘dependent fragments of an integrated whole’ (2010: 33).32 Consequently, 
what appears as interaction between incompatibles in DomainD  is  really only intra-
action33  within  the  integrated  whole  that  is  the  union.34  As  such,  there  is  no 
31  Another  way  to  look  at  this  is  through  Schaﬀer’s  argument  that  integrated  wholes  (as  opposed  to 
aggregates) intuitively have priority over their parts (Schaﬀer 2010: 47–8). Within DomainD, that would not 
hold, because analysis overrides intuition. But within DomainU, intuition (in the form of sensation) overrides 
analysis.
32  Or ‘parts as arbitrary abstractions’ (Schaﬀer 2010: 46).  Cf. Descartes’s discussion of a ‘unity in its own 
right’ (CSM ii: 156–7; AT vii: 222–3), and (Brown 2014: 244).
33  I take the term from Barad (2007: 33).  Barad’s agential realism is developed in a very diﬀerent context 
(quantum mechanics), but it has parallels with the subjective metaphysics proposed here.
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compatibility problem between mind and body within DomainU, exactly because their 
distinction (within DomainU)  is only abstracted from their fundamental union. This 
captures Descartes’s repeated insistence that there is no problem of the union, that 
mind–body interaction is something we grasp naturally and immediately, and that there 
is no need for further explanation in terms of incompatible substances. The union is 
simply something that cannot be addressed within DomainD, but it is the easiest thing 
in the world to account for within DomainU. Metaphysically, for Descartes, the union 
has to be an integrated whole, because that is what it is within DomainU, and it cannot 
be accounted for at all within DomainD. As such, mind and body are only secondary, 
dependent  abstractions  (in  the  metaphysics  implied  by  DomainU),  and  not 
independent,  incompatible substances.  Consequently,  there is  no problem of mind–
body interaction.
4.6 The union and nonreductionism
If my reading here is correct, it has at least two significant implications for Descartes’s 
reductionism.  First,  and simplest,  the union has  to be understood as  an integrated 
whole  prior  to  its  parts.  It  is  not,  fundamentally,  a  combination  of  two  more 
ontologically basic units (i.e. mind and body).  Instead, mind and body are derivable 
abstractions  from the  union.  They  are  abstractions  that  can  be  used  to  build  up 
classical Cartesian dualism, where they are hypostatised as independent substances, to 
be sure. But classical Cartesian dualism has no means of addressing the union, so, when 
we are addressing the union,  its  ontological  status within DomainU  has to be what 
counts. And, within DomainU, to reduce the union to mind and body is to be in error 
about the ontological priorities: it is to mistake less reality for more. What is ultimately 
evident  is  that  reduction  of  the  union  to  mind  and  body  makes  the  union 
demonstrably, infamously less intelligible (to the point of inconceivability). And this is 
why Descartes has to account for it nonreductively.
Second, Descartes still requires the union in his dualist metaphysics in at least a couple 
of ways: to explain humans, and to explain how body–body causation can be intelligible 
to humans. But, because classical Cartesian dualism cannot address the union, there is 
nothing in the dualist ontology for the union to be reduced to. Consequently, he has to 
34 Hence, I agree with Simmons that ‘we cannot use the primitive notion of union to develop a metaphysics 
of mind-body causation’ (), but for diﬀerent reasons. Simmons takes it that all Cartesian metaphysics requires 
the intellect, and that we have no intellectual notion of the union. I take it that what looks like mind–body 
causation from the perspective of the dualist metaphysics is instead intra-action from the perspective of the 
subjective metaphysics that pertains to the union.
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import  the  notion,  along  with  its  nonreductionist  metaphysical  baggage,  from 
DomainU. That is, Descartes’s dualism produces epistemic and ontological gaps that he 
patches only by invoking a separate nonreductionist (and non-dualist)  epistemology, 
which  implies  a  separate  nonreductionist,  non-dualist  metaphysics.  He  uses 
nonreductionism to cover up for the shortfalls in his reductionist project. That is quite 
a win for nonreductionism.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has argued, first,  that,  for humans, the notion of the union has to be 
epistemically prior to the notions of thought and extension for Descartes. It has to be 
our  ‘most  primitive’  notion.  It  has  also  argued  that  the  metaphysics  implied  by 
Descartes’s treatment of the union gives the the union ontological priority over mind 
and body, or thought and extension, themselves – at least, it has ontological priority 
within Descartes’s only metaphysical means of accounting for the union. This dissolves 
the problem of mind–body interaction by showing that, when understood within the 
metaphysical context proper to the union, there never was a problem of mind–body 
interaction. It also shows that Descartes, that archetypal reductionist, has no choice 
but to rely on nonreductionism to address what his reductionist project cannot.
Chapter 5
Knowledge acquisition and natural philosophy
5.1 Introduction
Even if Descartes does allow an irreducible (the union) into his philosophy, it is not at 
all  clear  how we  can  possibly  come to  acquire  legitimate  knowledge  of  it.  This  is 
because the epistemological project that he sets out in the Meditations seems to require 
reducibility  as  a  necessary  condition  of  knowledge  (because  the  intellect  needs  to 
reduce confused ideas down to their simple constituents in order to make existential 
and  essential  judgements  –  see  §5.4.1);  this  appears  to  rule  out  any  knowledge  of 
irreducibles.  In  the  following,  however,  I  argue  that  the  epistemic  aims  and 
methodology of the Meditations do not extend to Descartes’s natural philosophy.
The  argument  is  based  on  an  analysis  of  the  rule  of  knowledge  acquisition  that 
Descartes  asserts  in  correspondence  with  Elisabeth,  to  Burman,  and,  according  to 
Clerselier,  frequently  in  conversation.  The  rule  states  that,  in  order  to  acquire 
knowledge,  we  should  devote  the  vast  majority  of  our  study  time  to  activity  that 
integrates sensation, imagination, and intellect, and should spend almost no time at all 
on activity that engages the intellect alone. This rule seems to be entirely antithetical 
to the canonical epistemological project of the Meditations:  it seems to privilege the 
epistemic worth of the senses and imagination over that of reason, at least in terms of 
time allocation. In the following, I argue that the project of the Meditations has only a 
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very  limited  scope1:  it  is  restricted  to  knowledge  acquisition  in  first  philosophy; 
Descartes’s requirements for knowledge in natural philosophy are somewhat diﬀerent, 
relying largely on knowledge acquired through sensation.
The latter result is nothing new. Even if the textbook version of Descartes portrays him 
as requiring all knowledge to proceed deductively from clear and distinct grounds, the 
literature has diligently reiterated that that is simply not the case. Clarke goes so far as 
to claim that we should privilege Descartes’s more empirical, scientific works over his 
canonical  philosophy  texts  (Clarke  1982:  2).2  He then  provides  a  good overview of 
established positions on Descartes’s scientific method, with a view to just how a priori 
or a posteriori it is (1982: 9–10). That summary is fairly old by now, though, and a lot of 
work  has  been  done  subsequently  on  the  role  of  knowledge  acquired  through 
observation and experiment in Descartes’s science – e.g. Hatfield (1985), Wilson (1995), 
Gaukroger (1995b; 2002),  the entire second part of Gaukroger, Schuster and Sutton 
2000, Garber 2001c, Buchwald 2008, and Schuster 2012. This chapter does not stray 
far from what has already been established with respect to the more ‘empirical’ side of 
Descartes’s  natural  philosophy.  Where  it  diﬀers  is  in  its  focus  on  the  place  of 
reductionism in all of this; here, I establish what role reductionism plays in Descartes’s 
natural-philosophical knowledge acquisition in order to show, in the next chapter, what 
kind of nonreductionist knowledge is possible for Descartes.
The  chapter  is  structured  as  follows.  Descartes’s  knowledge  acquisition  rule  is 
introduced in §5.2.1. In §5.2.2, I argue that the rule is based on epistemic productivity: 
Descartes  takes the integrated activity  to be more fruitful  than the activity  of  the 
intellect  alone  (§5.2.2.1).  This  is  not  because  purely  intellectual  activity  is  entirely 
fruitless, but because the knowledge it can acquire is limited (§5.2.2.2): beyond what 
Descartes has already established in the Meditations,  there is  little left  for the pure 
intellect to do. Then §5.3 sets out exactly what the integrated activity propounded in 
Descartes’s rule does and does not involve: it does not involve first philosophy, which is 
the preserve of the pure intellect (§5.3.1); it does involve observation and experiment 
(§5.3.2).  Finally, I assess the consequences of all this for Cartesian reductionism and 
nonreductionism (§5.4). In §5.4.1, I argue that the role reductionism plays in Cartesian 
knowledge acquisition is to validate the independent existence of external things (with 
their particular essences).  I then conclude, in §5.4.2, by showing that Descartes can 
1 Cf. Simmons: ‘[. . .] the place of metaphysics itself in Cartesianism, which, I suggest, has been overplayed in 
our canonical narrative’ (manuscript: 5).
2 See p. 129 below.
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allow for nonreductionist knowledge (just how that nonreductionist knowledge works 
will be the subject of the next chapter).
5.2 Integration of intellect, imagination, and sensation
5.2.1 Descartes’s rule of knowledge acquisition
On several occasions, Descartes explicitly advocates leaving behind the approach of the 
Meditations  –  that is, the approach with which the historiography of philosophy has 
come to identify his philosophy almost entirely – in order to concentrate on the use of 
the imagination and/or the experience of the senses (more or less broadly construed). 
In the 28 June 1643 letter to Elisabeth, Descartes writes,
I  am almost  afraid  that  Your  Highness  may think that  I  am not  now speaking 
seriously; but that would go against the respect which I owe her and which I will 
never cease to show her. I can say with truth that the chief rule I have always observed 
in my studies, which I think has been the most useful to me in acquiring what knowledge I 
have, has been never to spend more than a few hours a day in the thoughts which occupy the 
imagination and a few hours a year on those which occupy the inte!ect alone. I have given all 
the rest of my time to the relaxation of the senses and the repose of the mind
(to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643; CSMK: 227; AT iii: 692–3; my emphasis).
Descartes professes fear that Elisabeth will question his seriousness because what he is 
about to say appears to deviate sharply from the philosophical methodology for which 
he was, and is, best known.3 This much is clear from the context of the letter, in which 
Descartes is attempting to assuage Elisabeth’s concerns about mind–body interaction; 
he is just about argue that the union is only confusing when you try to understand it in 
the terms of the Meditations, rather than in its own terms (see Ch. 4, §4.2.1). What he 
expects Elisabeth to find surprising is his claim that he has only ever spent a few hours 
a day on matters that occupy the imagination, and only a few hours a year on matters 
that are purely of the intellect. This is not merely a matter of his personal preferences 
in the way he spends his time: his claim is that this particular distribution of his time is 
what  has  been  ‘most  useful’  to  him ‘in  acquiring  knowledge’.  That  is,  the  rule  of 
knowledge  acquisition  he  specifies  here  recommends  largely  avoiding  activity  that 
occupies the intellect alone.
3 To an extent, the passage parallels a remark makes at the beginning of the Meditations, where Descartes 
claims that ‘it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start 
again’ (CSM ii: 12; AT vii: 17). The diﬀerence is that, in the Meditations, Descartes is asserting the need for 
this project, while, in the letter, he stresses the need to discard the methodology of the Meditations for all but 
a few hours each year.
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This purely intellectual activity is metaphysical thought of the kind involved in the 
project of the Meditations, as he specifies a few sentences earlier in the letter.4 Despite 
its being precisely this kind of thought with which Elisabeth associates his philosophy, 
Descartes suggests,  he claims to have spent very,  very little time on it  indeed.  His 
biographer,  Baillet,  seems  to  have  been  just  as  surprised  about  this  as  Descartes 
expected  Elisabeth  to  be:  Baillet  calls  it  ‘a  paradox’  (AT x:  202).  Descartes’s  self-
assessment  in  these  terms  appears  to  be  a  consistent  theme,  at  least  according  to 
Chanut, who reported that Descartes would frequently repeat the rule (AT x: 202–3).5 
The implication of  this,  and the reason for  both Elisabeth’s  potential  surprise  and 
Baillet’s paradox, appears to be that the Meditations project is not nearly as central to 
Descartes’s work as Elisabeth and Baillet take it to be.
Descartes glosses those thoughts that occupy the imagination and take up a few hours 
a  day as both ‘all  serious conversations and anything which needs to be done with 
attention’ and simply ‘study’ (CSMK: 227; AT iii: 693). The implication in this case is 
that the vast majority of his work is done through the imagination, and not through 
the pure intellect. He could be clearer about what it is that he does with the rest of his 
time, but it seems that by ‘the relaxation [relasche (i.e. relâche)] of the senses and the 
repose of the mind’ here, what he means is ‘the ordinary course of life’ (CSMK: 227; AT 
iii:  692),  given that, in the same letter, he identifies ‘the ordinary course of life and 
conversation’ with ‘abstention from meditation and from the study of the things that 
exercise the imagination’ (CSMK: 227; AT iii: 693). Most of the time, he eats and drinks 
and walks his dog and lazes around until late morning.6
It is notable that Descartes claims that dedicating the least part of his time to activity 
of the pure intellect is the rule that ‘has been the most useful to me in acquiring what 
knowledge [connoissance (i.e. connaissance)] I have’ (to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643; CSMK: 
227; AT iii: 692–3). It is notable that Descartes takes forsaking pure-intellect-activity to 
be  the  route  to  knowledge (or  part  of  that  route),  because  the  traditional  view of 
Descartes’s epistemology is that pure-intellect-activity is the only worthwhile route to 
knowledge. As this textbook account puts it,
4  ‘Metaphysical thoughts, which exercise the pure intellect, help to familiarize us with the notion of the 
soul’ (to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643; CSMK: 227; AT iii: 692–3).
5 Chanut’s remark is reported by Baillet via Clerselier; given the degrees of separation, the reliability of the 
statement might be arguable.
6 On Descartes’s everyday habits, see (Gaukroger 1995: 384).
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Descartes,  along  with  many  other  seventeenth-  and  eighteenth-century 
philosophers, took it that any knowledge worthy of the name would be based on 
cognitions the truth of which is guaranteed (infallible), that were maximally stable, 
immune from ever being shown to be mistaken (incorrigible), and concerning which 
no  reasonable  doubt  could  be  raised  (indubitable).  Hence  the  search  in  the 
Meditations for a divine guarantee of our faculty of rational intuition
(Alston 1992: 384).
Or as Descartes himself unequivocally puts it in the Rules, ‘[a]ll knowledge is certain 
and evident cognition’  (Rule 2;  CSM i:  10;  AT x:  362;  my emphasis).  If  cognition or 
rational intuition are what Descartes needs for the acquisition of knowledge ‘worthy of 
the name’, we should expect his rule of knowledge acquisition to be the opposite of 
what he tells Elisabeth and others: we should expect that he privilege study time spent 
on pure-intellect-activity over that spent on anything else. And yet, he tells us that 
what he does, and should do, is the exact opposite. That is not to say that Descartes’s 
knowledge acquisition rule is necessarily incompatible with some form of epistemic 
foundationalism;  but  the  rule  does  suggest  that  his  wider  means  of  knowledge 
acquisition  should  not  be  confused  with  his  means  for  establishing  epistemic 
foundations. And the rule does seem puzzling in the context of a purely rationalist 
reading  of  Descartes’s  philosophy –  hence,  again,  Baillet’s  paradox,  and Descartes’s 
expectation of Elisabeth’s surprise.
5.2.2 Productivity in the acquisition of knowledge
There are at least three ways to read Descartes’s  knowledge acquisition rule.  Pure-
intellect-activity is aﬀorded the least amount of time because either (a) pure-intellect-
activity is more taxing than imagination-activity in one way or another and so cannot 
be maintained for as long; or (b) pure-intellect-activity is overall less fruitful, in some 
significant way, than imagination-activity, and so deserves less time; or (c) imagination-
activity is more time-consuming than pure-intellect-activity, and so requires more time. 
I am going to argue that reading (b) holds, that reading (c) is both compatible with (b) 
and plausible, and that reading (a) is unlikely. Here are the reasons for (a) and (b); (c) 
will wait until §5.3.
5.2.2.1 Pure-intellect-activity and epistemic unproductivity
In a recent paper on Mediation Six, Brown discusses the knowledge acquisition rule 
and appears to interpret it in terms of (a):
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[i]n  these  passages  [i.e.  those  concerning  the  knowledge  acquisition  rule],  the 
implication is that the self which is identified with the pure intellect is not one we 
can inhabit for very long; that it takes a supreme mental eﬀort not to think using the 
senses; and that it takes a substantial though diminished eﬀort by comparison to 
think using the imagination
(2014: 246).
Brown takes the limited allocation of time to pure-intellect-activity to be due to the 
sheer diﬃculty of maintaining its cognitive purity. While I am more than sympathetic 
to  the  wider  point  Brown  is  making  here,  the  evidence  is  not  in  favour  of  this 
particular reading: from what Descartes tells us, pure-intellect-activity simply is not all 
that diﬃcult. He never claims that intellect-activity of this kind is especially taxing to 
maintain. And, as he puts it in Meditation Six, we ‘notice quite clearly that imagination 
requires a peculiar eﬀort of mind which is not required for understanding’ (CSM ii: 51; 
AT vii: 72–3). And experience seems to bear this out: intellectually conceiving of, say, a 
chiliagon  seems  no  more  diﬃcult  than  imagining  a  triangle.  Indeed,  it  is  arguably 
considerably easier to conceive of a chiliagon intellectually than it is to imagine shapes 
even only a little more complex than a triangle. A decagon, for instance, takes some 
imaginative  work,  while  simply  conceiving  of  a  thousand-sided  shape  is  eﬀortless. 
Descartes points out that imagining even a pentagon requires some exertion (AT vii: 
72–3).  This suggests that thinking using the pure intellect does not necessarily take 
extraordinary mental eﬀort –  certainly no more so than the use of the imagination 
does. So (a) seems an unlikely reading: it is not that Descartes has spent such little time 
on pure-intellect-activity because it is more diﬃcult than the other options.
What presumably is supremely diﬃcult (to the point of impossibility), however, is to 
think without the senses and still get anything much done in the world: conceiving of a 
polyhedron in the abstract is  highly specialised,  and,  by itself,  of  extremely limited 
application; even writing about chiliagons is going to require employing the senses (at 
the very least,  because writing is  visual7).  This brings us back to (b):  perhaps pure-
intellect-activity is simply less fruitful than imagination-activity. Descartes has more to 
say about the relative productivity of pure-intellect-activity and imagination-activity 
when he repeats his interdiction against meditation a few paragraphs further on in the 
same letter. This time, the message is both clearer and stronger:
I believe that it is very necessary to have properly understood, once in a lifetime, 
the principles of metaphysics, since they are what gives us the knowledge of God 
7 Or tactile, in the case of Braille, of course – either way, writing requires sensation.
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and of our soul.8 But I think also that it would be very harmful to occupy one’s inte!ect 
"equently in meditating upon them, since this  would impede it  "om devoting itself  to  the 
functions of the imagination and the senses. I think the best thing is to content oneself 
with keeping in one’s memory and one’s belief the conclusions which one has once 
drawn from them, and then employ the rest of one’s  study time to thoughts in 
which the intellect co-operates with the imagination and the senses
(to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643; CSMK: 228; AT iii: 695; my emphasis).
Whereas in the earlier passage Descartes merely relegated the type of activity that 
pertains to the Meditations project to the periphery of his wider knowledge-gathering, 
by dedicating the least amount of time to it, here he goes further, and explicitly paints 
it  as  ‘very  harmful’to  the  enterprise  (when  done  frequently).  Doing  too  much 
metaphysics, Descartes tells Elisabeth, actively impedes one’s study; it gets in the way 
of  what you need to do to in order to acquire knowledge.9  If  we want knowledge, 
Descartes  claims,  we  need  to  avoid  pure-intellect-activity  involved  in  doing 
metaphysics. So, after a certain point, pure-intellect-activity is a diversion – at least a 
partial diversion – from the main work of acquiring knowledge. So it does seem that 
Descartes takes pure-intellect-activity to be less fruitful, in some way, than activity ‘in 
which the intellect co-operates with the imagination and the senses’.
If what Descartes calls the ‘relaxation of the imagination and repose of the intellect’ 
CSMK: 227; AT iii: 692–3) is indeed the course of ordinary life (see p. 114 above), then 
the  intellect-imagination-sensation-activity  (hereafter,  ‘IIS-activity’)  that  Descartes 
refers to in the passage above must be the same as the imagination-activity that he 
brings up in the earlier passage, presumably just better specified. So, the imagination-
activity of the original passage is, more properly, IIS-activity. This is because, in the 
context of Descartes’s knowledge-acquisition rule, there is nothing else for this activity 
to  be.  IIS-activity  is  clearly  not  pure-intellect-activity,  both  because  it  involves 
imagination and sensation in  addition to the intellect  (and so is  not  purely  of  the 
intellect), and because Descartes is explicitly opposing it to pure-intellect-activity here. 
And it is presumably not the relaxation of the imagination and repose of the intellect, 
because it involves the imagination. So we can say that Descartes takes pure-intellect-
8 This again echoes the beginning of the Meditations. But what was presented in the Meditations as nothing 
other than an epistemically productive activity goes on to be treated here as an epistemic hinderance.
9 Simmons (2014: 268) reads Descartes’s warning about the overuse of pure-intellect-activity in this passage in 
relation to its negative eﬀect on the ordinary course of human life – the function of the senses is to preserve 
the union, and if we abandon them for the sake of the pure intellect, we will stop taking care of ourselves. 
This is certainly true as well.
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activity  to  be  less  fruitful,  in  some  significant  way,  than  imagination-activity/IIS-
activity, and therefore that (b) is a viable reading.
5.2.2.2 Pure-intellect-activity and diminishing returns
We know there is a diﬀerence in fruitfulness between pure-intellect-activity and IIS-
activity, then, but there are various forms this diﬀerence could take. It might be all-
inclusive – it might be that IIS-activity is simply better than pure-intellect activity in 
every way. But that does not seem likely, given everything that Descartes says in favour 
of pure-intellect-activity elsewhere. He certainly takes there to be epistemic value in 
pure-intellect-activity, and views of the kind typified by Alston (quoted above, p. 114) 
do  not  come  out  of  nowhere.  In  the  28  June  1643  letter,  Descartes  aﬃrms  the 
importance  of  going  through a  process  of  meditation,  although this  is  qualified as 
something that should be done ‘once in a lifetime’ and, it is implied, preferably not 
again.  Not  coincidentally,  this  is  also  exactly  how the  project  is  introduced at  the 
beginning  of  the  Meditations:  it  is  ‘necessary’,  but  only  ‘once  in  the  course  of  my 
life’  (AT vi: 17).  So Descartes clearly does take pure-intellect-activity to be valuable, 
albeit for a limited period; the diﬀerence in fruitfulness between IIS-activity and pure-
intellect-activity  is  clearly  not  all-encompassing,  but  must  be  due  to  diminishing 
returns with the latter.
What  pure-intellect-activity  does  give  us,  according  to  the  letter  to  Elisabeth,  is 
knowledge of God and our soul (AT iii: 695). Although Descartes does not say as much 
here,  presumably  pure-intellect-activity  also  gives  us  knowledge  of  (at  least)  the 
fundamental nature of substance (AT vii: 31) and the reality of the external world (AT 
vii: 80). That is valuable knowledge worth acquiring, but – and this is the point that 
Descartes is making to Elisabeth (as well as more widely in conversation, if Chanut, 
Clerselier, and Baillet are to be believed) – it pales in comparison to the breadth of 
knowledge  that  can  be  acquired  through  IIS-activity.  Descartes  brings  all  this  out 
reasonably explicitly in the Conversation with Burman:
A point to note is that one should not devote so much eﬀort to the Meditations and 
to metaphysical questions, or give them elaborate treatment in commentaries and 
the like. Still less should one do what some try to do, and dig more deeply into these 
questions than the author did; he has dealt with them quite deeply enough. It is 
suﬃcient to have grasped them once in a general way, and then to remember the 
conclusion. Otherwise, they draw the mind too far away "om physical and observable things, 
and make it unfit to study them. Yet it is just these physical studies that it is most desirable for 
people to pursue, since they would yield abundant benefits for life. The author did follow up 
metaphysical questions fairly thoroughly in the Meditations,  and established their 
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certainty against the sceptics, and so on; so everyone does not have to tackle the job 
for himself, or need to spend time and trouble meditating on these things 
(Conversation with Burman; CSMK: 346–7; AT v: 165; my emphasis).
According  to  Descartes  here,  the  fruitfulness  of  metaphysical  questions  (i.e.  pure-
intellect-activity)  is  exhausted by the contents of  the Meditations.  The metaphysical 
work has already been done, and nothing more of value is left to be obtained through 
pure-intellect-activity.10 Instead, we, along with Descartes himself (as he specifies in the 
passages addressed above), should concentrate on the study of ‘physical and observable 
things’. That is, we should engage ourselves in the kind of activity that integrates the 
intellect with the imagination (for producing and manipulating images of the observed 
things11)  and  with  the  senses  (for  observation  itself).  This  IIS-activity  provides 
‘abundant benefits’, and it is in search of these benefits that we should spend our study 
time.12 The implication is clear: the benefits that are available through pure-intellect-
activity have already been all but exhausted by the Meditations, and any further work on 
metaphysics would be fruitless. The world of physical things, on the other hand, in all 
its vastness and complexity, still contains a wealth of knowledge yet to be obtained – 
and it is through IIS-activity that this knowledge can be acquired.
5.2.2.3 Pure-intellect-activity and the spoiling of the mind
Here is a closely related, but separate, reason for the rule of knowledge acquisition. It 
feeds into reading (b). In addition to being detrimental to the acquisition of knowledge 
insofar as it takes time away from IIS-activity, according to Descartes, overuse of pure-
intellect-activity is deleterious to our ability to perform eﬀective IIS-activity the rest of 
the time. In the Conversation,  Descartes reiterates the warning about pure-intellect-
activity that he gave Elisabeth five years previously. While he told Elisabeth that the 
10 That’s assuming, as of course Descartes does, that we buy into his system.
11 Galison 1984 provides an excellent account of the role of the imagination in Descartes’s construction of 
micromechanical explanations of physical phenomena.
12 In the passage above, Descartes doesn’t make it entirely explicit whether these are benefits in the realm of 
knowledge acquisition, or in the realm of everyday life and health. But, given his focus on ‘study’ here, and 
given the strong parallels with his claims to Elisabeth and Chanut, it does seem that knowledge acquisition is 
what he has in mind.
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harm of focusing on metaphysics lies in its hindering the study of observable things13, 
he specifies to Burman that the study of metaphysics actually makes the mind ‘unfit 
[ineptum]  to  study’  observable  things.  This  seems stronger  (although the remark to 
Elisabeth could also  be  read in  this  light):  he  does  not  specify  why,  but  Descartes 
appears to be claiming that too much metaphysics will spoil the mind, in some way, for 
more productive activities.
5.2.3 Summary
Reading (b) of Descartes’s knowledge acquisition rule holds: pure-intellect-activity is 
less fruitful than IIS-activity, and he thus allocates himself only a few hours a year to it, 
while suggesting that we ought to do even less and involve ourselves in pure-intellect-
activity only once in our lives (if we too are interested in acquiring knowledge). Pure-
intellect-activity is less fruitful than IIS-activity because of diminishing returns: all the 
knowledge  it  is  capable  of  producing  is  already  available  in  the  Meditations,  and 
dedicating any more time to it would be futile. According to Descartes, in addition to 
being  a  distraction  from more  productive  study,  focusing  on  pure-intellect-activity 
diminishes  our  capacity  to  investigate  the  natural  world  productively  –  that  is,  to 
investigate it through the integration of intellect, imagination, and sensation.
5.3 IIS-integration and natural philosophy
In §5.2.1 (p. 115 above), a third possible reading of Descartes’s knowledge acquisition 
rule was mentioned, but not assessed: (c) it could be that Descartes spends so much 
more time on IIS-activity than on pure-intellect-activity simply because IIS-activity is 
significantly  more  time-consuming  than  pure-intellect-activity.  We  have  already 
established that reading (b) holds (IIS-activity is aﬀorded more study time because it is 
more fruitful than pure-intellect-activity). That reading is by no means incompatible 
with (c): IIS-activity could be both more fruitful and, for independent reasons, more 
time-consuming than pure-intellect-activity. If we look at what is involved in using IIS-
activity to investigate physical, observable things, then it will turn out that (c)  does 
indeed hold. In this section, I am going to argue that, for Descartes, IIS-activity largely 
involves experiments,  observations,  data collection and analysis,  and so on. That is, 
IIS-activity is time-consuming because it involves a wide range of laborious processes. 
In fact, as we might expect from Descartes’s knowledge acquisition rule, IIS-activity 
13 The original French (translation quoted on p. 117 above) is, ‘[. . .] il ne pourrait si bien vacquer aux fonctions 
de l’imagination & des sens’ (AT iii: 695).
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does the great majority of the work in investigating the natural world. So let’s start 
with what IIS-activity does not involve.
5.3.1 What IIS-activity does not involve
What IIS-activity does not involve – and, by contrast, what pure-intellect-activity does 
involve – is knowledge of fundamental metaphysics, or first philosophy. We can see this 
in  an exchange between Descartes  and Gassendi  in the Objections and Replies,  in 
which  Descartes  clarifies  exactly  what  he  takes  the  senses  and  imagination  to  be 
incapable  of  telling  us.  In  Meditation Six,  Descartes  lists  some experiences  ‘which 
gradually undermined all the faith [he] had in the senses’ (CSM ii: 53; AT vii: 76). The 
first experience on his list is that of deceptively shaped towers:
[s]ometimes towers which had looked round from a distance appeared square from 
close up
(CSM ii: 53; AT vii: 76).
Now, Descartes brings this up as an example of how the senses can be fooled, and 
consequently as part of the impetus for scepticism about the ultimate veracity of the 
knowledge available through sensation. It is precisely that scepticism that makes the 
project of the Meditations necessary for obtaining a guarantor of truth. On the face of 
it,  that ought to make the tower example antithetical to the use of integrated IIS-
activity  in  natural  philosophy.  But,  the  visual  deception  problem  in  the  example 
contains its own solution, and it is a solution that is within sensation: the tower might 
look round from far away, but all we need to do is move closer, and we will discover 
that  it  is  square.  The  initial  round  appearance  of  the  tower  is  still  evidence  for 
Descartes that sensation can be deceptive,  of course,  but,  at  least in this  case,  the 
correction of that deception comes from more sensations.
Gassendi brings Descartes up on just this point in the fifth set of objections, where he 
writes,
I  have no intention of  starting an argument here about the truthfulness  of  the 
senses. For although there is deception or falsity, it is not to be found in the senses; 
for the senses are quite passive and report only appearances, which must appear in 
the way they do owing to their causes. The error or falsity is in the judgement or the 
mind,  which  is  not  circumspect  enough  and  does  not  notice  that  things  at  a 
distance will for one reason or another appear smaller and more blurred than when 
they are nearby, and so on. Nevertheless, when deception occurs, we must not deny 
that it exists; the only diﬃculty is whether it occurs all the time, thus making it 
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impossible for us ever to be sure of the truth of anything which we perceive by the 
senses.
[.  .  .]  [I]t seems to be quite uncontroversial that when we look at a tower from 
nearby, and touch it, we are sure that it is square, even though when we were further 
oﬀ we had occasion to judge it to be round, or at any rate to doubt whether it was 
square or round or some other shape
(CSM ii: 230–1; AT vii: 332–3).
Gassendi’s point is that we needn’t give up faith in the senses just because a tower 
might look round from afar and square close up, and the suchlike. Sensation does not 
mislead: it merely presents us with appearances; it gives us the phenomena. And we can 
check up on those phenomena simply by acquiring more sensations: we walk up to that 
tower  and we see,  and feel,  that  it  is  square.  In his  reply,  Descartes  reasserts  that 
sensory deceptions do indeed give him cause for scepticism:
[y]ou maintain that we never suspect any falsity in situations where we have never 
detected it, and hence that when we look at a tower from nearby and touch it we 
are sure that it is square, if it appears square. You also maintain that when we are 
really awake, we cannot doubt whether we are awake or asleep, and so on.14 But you 
have no reason to think that you have previously noticed all the circumstances in 
which error can occur; moreover, it is easy to prove that you are from time to time 
mistaken in matters which you accept as certain
(CSM ii: 264; AT vii: 385–6).
Descartes’s  message  to  Gassendi  here  is  that  checking  phenomena  through  the 
acquisition of more sensations is not suﬃcient to rule out scepticism about whether 
our  senses  might  be  fundamentally  deceptive;  if  sensations  really  can’t  be  trusted, 
getting more of  them will  be no help.  Consequently,  the Meditations  project is  still 
needed. But then Descartes goes on to qualify exactly what this scepticism is about:
when you come round to saying that ‘at least we may not doubt that things appear 
as they do’, you are back on the right road: I made this very assertion in the Second 
Meditation. But the point at issue in the present context concerned the truth [veritate] about 
the things located outside us
(CSM ii: 264–5; AT vii: 386; my emphasis). 
Descartes  agrees  with  Gassendi  that  sensation  is  not  deceptive  with  respect  to 
14 Gassendi had written, ‘since during our lives we are alternately awake or dreaming, a dream may give rise to 
deception because things may appear to be present when they are not in fact present. But we do not dream 
all the time, and for as long as we are really awake we cannot doubt whether we are awake or dreaming’ (CSM 
ii: 231; AT vii: 333).
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appearances,  and he specifies  the particular  point  on which they do disagree:  they 
disagree  when  it  comes  to  the  truth  about  external  things.  This  is  not  the  most 
transparent phrasing on Descartes’s part – ‘the truth about the things located outside 
us’  is  rather  vague:  we might  well  want  to  ask him what  it  is,  in  particular,  about 
external  things  that  gets  to  count  as  the  relevant  truth  in  this  case.  Given  that 
appearances do not count as the truth, it is not immediately clear what does.
The relevant truth about any particular external thing is that it exists with its particular 
essence: the truth about the square tower is that there is something with the essence 
‘square tower’ that really does exist in front of me. We can see why by a looking at a 
passage from Meditation Six, in which Descartes uses the same construction. There, he 
distinguishes the knowledge acquired as a union through the senses with that acquired 
through pure-intellect-activity:
[m]y sole concern here [in this passage] is with what God has bestowed on me as a 
combination of mind and body. My nature, then, in this limited sense, does indeed 
teach me to avoid what induces a feeling of pain and to seek out what induces 
feelings of pleasure,  and so on.  But it  does not appear to teach us to draw any 
conclusions from these sensory perceptions about things located outside us without 
waiting until the intellect has examined the matter. For knowledge of the truth [verum 
scire] about such things seems to belong to the mind alone, not to the combination of mind and 
body
(CSM ii: 57; AT vii: 82–3; my emphasis).
So Descartes is making a distinction between what the senses can tell us and the ‘truth’ 
they can’t access – and hence, of course, the truth we should be sceptical about the 
senses’ being able to acquire. He goes on to explain what this involves:
I  misuse  [the  senses]  by  treating  them  as  reliable  touchstones  for  immediate 
judgements about the essential nature of the bodies located outside us;  yet this is an area 
where they provide only very obscure information
(CSM ii: 57–8; AT vii: 83; my emphasis).
There  are  two  things  to  note  here:  (1)  what  is  unavailable  through  the  senses  is 
knowledge  of  the  essential  nature  of  external  things,  and  (2)  the  unreliability  of 
sensation is confined to its use in judgements that are immediate. Let’s deal with (1) 
first.  In  the  previous  passage,  Descartes  linked  the  truth  about  external  things  to 
knowledge  available  to  the  mind alone and not  to  the  senses.  In  the  passage  that 
follows on from it (i.e.  the passage quoted immediately above),  he tells us that the 
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knowledge unavailable to the senses is that of the essential nature of external things. 
On that basis, the relevant truth about external things must be their essential nature.
Given  that,  the  next  question  is  what  gets  to  count  as  the  essential  nature  of  an 
external thing. We know already, from earlier in the reply to Gassendi, that Descartes 
thinks the senses have access to the appearances of things. His famous illustration of 
stripping away appearances to get to (what presumably counts as) the essential nature 
of some external thing is his treatment of wax at the end of Meditation Two. He starts 
from the sensory phenomena particular to a specific piece of wax (‘it has not yet quite 
lost the taste of the honey; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was 
gathered; its colour, shape and size are plain to see; it is hard, cold and can be handled 
without diﬃculty; if you rap it with your knuckle it makes a sound’ (CSM ii: 20; AT vii: 
30)). These he eliminates one by one, removing whatever is inessential. After having 
relieved the wax of all its contingent appearances, here is what remains:
[l]et us concentrate, take away everything which does not belong to the wax, and 
see what is left: merely something extended, flexible and changeable
(CSM ii: 20; AT vii: 30–1).
This  is  the  fundamental  essential  nature  of  the  wax:  extension,  flexibility,  and 
mutability.15 This is the truth that is not immediately available through the senses: the 
external  thing’s  basic  ontological  properties,  or  attributes,  in  respect  to which,  the 
phenomena available to sensation are, at most, accidents. So the essential nature that is 
derived here is not what is directly accessible through the senses – that is, the taste, 
smell, hardness, etc. particular to that piece of wax in that particular context. Those are 
accidental  and inessential.  And it  is  not  a  truth available  through the imagination, 
either,  since  the  wax  could  undergo  an  indefinite  number  of  mutations  while  still 
remaining the same wax, and ‘I am unable to run through this immeasurable number of 
changes in my imagination’. Hence,
I  would  not  be  making  a  correct  judgement  about  the  nature  of  wax  unless  I 
believed it capable of being extended in many more diﬀerent ways than I will ever 
encompass in my imagination. I must therefore admit that the nature of this piece 
of wax is in no way revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind alone
(CSM ii: 21; AT vii: 30–1).
15 Note that there are accidental properties that are essential, at some higher level, to the particular piece of 
wax in front. I might, for instance, want to distinguish the red wax from the white. Descartes makes it clear 
that these are not the kinds of things that concern pure-intellect-activity.
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So,  this  is  the  kind  of  truth  about  a  thing  located  outside  us  that  requires  pure 
intellection. Knowledge of basic ontological properties is the preserve of the intellect, 
and not of  sensation or imagination.  As Descartes puts it,  far  more bluntly,  in the 
Principles: ‘sensory perceptions [. . .] do not, except occasionally and accidentally, show 
us what external bodies are like in themselves’ (2/3; CSM i: 224; AT viiiA: 41–2).
Descartes concludes the wax example in the Meditations by noting the deceptiveness of 
ordinary speech with respect to external things. Ordinary speech, in this context, deals 
in sensory knowledge.16 And its deception consists in implicit judgements of the actual 
existence of some external thing with such-and-such an essential nature, independent 
of our sensations:
[w]e say that we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be 
there from its colour or shape; and this might lead me to conclude without more 
ado that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the 
scrutiny of the mind alone.  But then if  I  look out of the window and see men 
crossing the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men 
themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and 
coats which could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something 
which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of 
judgement which is in my mind
(CSM ii: 21; AT vii: 32).
In ordinary conversation, we say we see the wax. We do not say we see a particular 
colour in a particular shape and size (or taste a honey-flavour, or smell a flower-like 
scent). And, in doing so, we imply that what we see is the wax itself, in its essential 
nature  –  just  as  we  would  say  that  we  see  men  outside,  when  the  phenomena  by 
themselves would be equally consistent with suitably attired automata.17 So, this is the 
other aspect of the wax that is only available through intellection, and not through 
sensation or imagination: knowledge of its independent existence as an external thing 
with its essential nature.
16 Cf. the reference to ordinary conversation in Descartes’s discussion of the union, and the sensory grasp 
thereof, with Elisabeth (28 June 1643; CSMK: 692). See also §5.2.1, p. 114 above.
17 Wagner (1995: 170) points out that the Latin, ‘judico homines esse’, which CSM renders as ‘I judge that they 
are men’, could just as well be translated as ‘I judge that there are men there’. The latter version emphasises 
the existential attribution in the judgement, which CSM obscures by adding an already existent ‘they’ of 
which an essential nature (‘men’) is predicated.
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This, then, is what sensation and imagination cannot do. They cannot tell us about the 
essential natures of external things, where ‘essential nature’ is understood in terms of 
basic ontological  properties.  And they cannot tell  us whether those external  things 
actually  exist,  independent  of  our  sensations.  In  other  words,  what  sensation  and 
imagination cannot do is first philosophy.18 They cannot do metaphysics (at least, not 
metaphysics of the kind espoused in the Meditations).19
5.3.2 What IIS-activity does involve
When Descartes discusses the misuse of the senses in Meditation Six, he specifies that 
they are unreliable for ‘immediate judgements about the essential nature of the bodies 
located outside us’ (CSM ii: 57–8; AT vii: 83). In the previous section, we looked at the 
‘essential  nature’  side of Descartes’s  claim. Let’s  move to the immediacy restriction 
here. Sensations are fundamentally fallible, according to Descartes, when used to judge 
essential  natures  of  external  things,  but  only  when  used  by  themselves,  with  no 
mediation.20  For  Descartes,  knowledge  of  essential  natures  requires  intellection,  so 
whatever mediation is involved here would have to come from the intellect. Knowledge 
of essential natures is not available to sensation and/or imagination taken alone, then – 
but IIS-activity is the integration of sensation and imagination with the intellect. In 
other words, IIS-activity is all about mediation. So can sensation (and imagination) be 
involved in acquiring knowledge about external things? The answer to that is assuredly 
yes, as long as they are integrated, to some degree, with intellection. That is, sensation 
and imagination are involved in knowledge of external things as long as the intellect is 
able  to  make  judgements  as  to  the  independent  existence  of  the  things  presented 
through sensation and imagination.
In  Descartes’s  coats-and-hats  example,  the  sensations  involve  nothing  but  the 
appearances.  Within  sensation  itself,  there  is  no  judgement  as  to  the  nature  or 
existence of the external things: it falls to the mind to judge that there exist things with 
18 In the First Replies, Descartes writes, ‘we must never ask about the existence of anything [an sit] until we 
first understand its essence [quid sit]’ (CSM ii: 78; AT vii: 107–8). The context there is the proof of God’s 
existence, and Descartes’s point is that first philosophy involves establishing first the essence of a thing and 
then whether a thing of that essence actually exists. See also (Wagner 1995).
19 This is the other side of what Newman calls Descartes’s ‘Intellection Reliability Thesis’ (‘The intellect is a 
reliable basis for judgments about the nature of reality’ (2005: 192)).
20 The Latin is immediate, i.e. ‘without mediation’, rather than ‘instant’.
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the essential  nature  of  men outside,  crossing the square.  And since the judgement 
involved is purely intellectual, it makes a good deal of sense to read the passage as an 
aﬃrmation of the complete absence of sensation (and imagination) in matters of the 
essence and existence of external things. To a certain extent, that must be the case: the 
final  arbiter  of  essential  and  existential  truths  must  always  be  the  intellect  for 
Descartes. But that certainly does not mean that sensation and imagination play no 
part in acquiring knowledge about external things.
Sensation and imagination in themselves might not be reliable guides to the essential 
natures  of  external  bodies,  but,  for  humans,  they  are  nevertheless  indispensable  in 
acquiring knowledge about almost everything (on the reading I give in this dissertation, 
knowledge of God would be the only true exception21).  In the case of the hats and 
coats,  although  it  was  the  mind  that  judged  there  to  be  men  in  the  square,  that 
judgement was not pulled out of thin (mental)  air. It was neither arbitrary nor self-
caused:  the  judgement  is  prompted  by,  and  based  on,  the  sensations  involved  in 
observing the square (or prompted by and based on images from the imagination, if 
Descartes is being disingenuous about his framing of the example). Indeed, in the Sixth 
Replies, Descartes calls this kind of judgement the ‘third grade of sensory response’, 
while noting that the judgement itself is intellectual (AT vii: 437–9).
That is to say, we would not think there were men outside if we did not see the coats 
and hats. Similarly, we would not judge that a piece of wax, with its essential nature 
(extension,  flexibility,  and mutability),  was  in  front  of  us  in  the  absence of  certain 
sensations. In a way, this is rather trivial: of course we, and Descartes, cannot acquire 
any knowledge about external things without some – at least initial – input from the 
senses.  What  is  not  trivial  is  its  demonstration  of  just  how limited  pure-intellect-
activity is. When almost all the knowledge we can acquire will need at least partial 
integration of the senses and/or the imagination along with the intellect, Descartes’s 
knowledge acquisition rule starts to make a lot of sense.
Of course,  this  does  not  mean that  everything,  aside from theology,  in  Descartes’s 
philosophy  always  requires  only  IIS-activity.  Once  we  have  had  some  relevant 
sensations, there is a fair amount of pure-intellect-activity work that can be done to 
establish the essence and existence of external things in general. And once we have 
derived a notion of mind from the union, pure-intellect-activity can prove its existence 
21 Knowledge of thought and extension would not be entirely sensation-free, on my reading, given Ch. 4’s 
argument that, for humans, notions of thought and extension must be derived through analysis from the 
notion of the union.
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and tell us about its essential nature. Hence the Meditations’ treatment of extension and 
thought respectively. In those cases, some initial prompting might be required from 
the senses, but the integration of sensation and/or imagination is not needed for the 
subsequent work, which can be done by pure-intellect-activity alone. The issue is just 
that, as the knowledge acquisition rule suggests, there is not a great deal more for pure-
intellect-activity to do beyond this.
Where IIS-activity really comes into its own is in dealing with the particularities of 
natural phenomena, rather than with the generalities of first philosophy. IIS-activity 
might have only a tiny, initial role to play in telling us about, say, the divisibility of 
extended substance in general,  but it  is  very useful  –  throughout the process –  for 
finding  out  how hearts  or  eyes  or  rainbows  work.  Indeed,  this  is  how Buchwald 
characterises Descartes’s method in his study of his investigation of the rainbow in the 
eighth  discourse  of  the  Dioptrics:  ‘we  begin  with  an  observation  and  then  try  to 
manipulate the experimental conditions in order to pin down the factors that will alter 
the  eﬀect  we  are  interested  in’  (2008:  5).  What  IIS-activity  involves,  then,  is 
observational and experimental investigation of the world of physical things.22 This is 
on a continuum with, if generally more sophisticated than, walking up to the tower to 
find out  that  it  is  really  square rather  than round.  This  kind of  work requires  the 
senses, for both observation and manual intervention in the world, but it also requires 
the imagination (for at least the initial representation of the physical situation) and the 
intellect (to judge the essential natures involved).
In a letter sent the year before he wrote the Meditations, Descartes tells Mersenne that
the nature of heaviness is a purely factual question, that is to say, a question that can 
be decisively answered [determinée] by human beings only in so far as they are able to 
perform some experiment [experience]
(to Mersenne, 13 July 1638; CSMK: 112; AT ii: 224).
What is in question here is the nature of heaviness. Knowledge of natures is supposed 
to be available only to the intellect, but Descartes describes the nature of heaviness as 
purely  factual  –  as  something,  he  explains,  that  can  only  be  determined  through 
experiment. In the letter, he then goes on to describe a suitable experiment and various 
observations.  Determining  the  nature  of  heaviness,  according  to  this  methodology, 
involves a process much like getting closer to the tower to check its shape. This fits 
22  IIS-activity might also be useful in the investigation of thinking substance, I suspect, albeit to a more 
limited extent – Ch. 4 of this dissertation might well be summed up thus: for humans, Cartesian meditation 
will always find its starting point in IIS-activity.
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perfectly with the knowledge acquisition rule, and with what we have seen so far about 
IIS-activity.  Performing  those  experiments  and  making  those  observations  is  time-
consuming,  because  it  involves  the  intricate  and messy  work of  intervening  in  the 
physical  world,  of gathering information,  and of waiting for observations.  It  is  also 
productive (because it is this kind of activity that is supposed to let us find out about 
heaviness, and a tremendous number of other things). It also involves no shade of pure-
intellect-activity.
That Descartes makes use of experiment is nothing new. While it might once have 
been the case that he was read as propounding a purely deductive, a priori method in 
science, recognition of his experimentalism has been a commonplace for a long time 
now.23 What might be slightly more controversial is to align this with his knowledge 
acquisition  rule,  in  that  doing  so  ascribes  the  vast  majority  of  his  study  time  to 
experimentation  and  similar  or  related  activities.  Even  this  is  not  unprecedented, 
though. In the introduction to his Descartes’ Philosophy of Science, Clarke claims that his 
approach, in the book, is to understand Descartes as, primarily, a practicing scientist, 
who ‘wrote a few short and relatively unimportant philosophical essays’ (Clarke 1982: 
2). In support of this (apparently at least partially polemical) position, Clarke cites a 
couple of the passages that mention the knowledge acquisition rule, alongside other 
evidence that Descartes considered his achievements in what we would think of as 
science above those in first philosophy (1982: 3–4).
The reading of the knowledge acquisition rule that I have been giving in this chapter 
does not support Clarke’s claim about the unimportance of Descartes’s work on first 
philosophy.  Pure-intellect-activity  is  allocated,  and consumes,  far  less  of  Descartes’s 
study time than IIS-activity because it is a far less fruitful use of it (and, secondarily, 
because it  is  less time consuming).  But that lack of productivity is  not absolute;  it 
comes  in  the  form  of  diminishing  returns.  Pure-intellect-activity  was  immensely 
productive within a relatively restricted area of knowledge: it gave Descartes certainty 
about  the  essential  natures  of  various  fundamental  things  –  his  own  mind,  God, 
extended things, and so on. After having established that much, however, there is little 
left for pure-intellect-activity to do. As Simmons puts it (although with an eye towards 
everyday life rather than acquiring knowledge in natural philosophy),
[i]t may behoove us to meditate our way into the posture of a disembodied angel 
once  in  a  lifetime  to  discover  important  truths  about  God,  the  soul,  and  the 
fundamental nature of body. The Meditations is written to be our guide in that quest. 
23 See p. 112 above.
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But when our meditating is done, we must return to our embodied lives and trust 
the senses to be our guide
(2014: 275).
If Descartes wants to gain knowledge about the world beyond first philosophy, he has 
to bring in sensation and imagination. What his rule of knowledge acquisition tells us 
is that IIS-activity is the most productive use of his time. If he wants to know about 
the world, he needs to do experiments, make observations, perform dissections. This, 
then, is what IIS-activity does involve. And this is what it does for Descartes’s project 
of knowledge acquisition in natural philosophy – that is, just about everything.
5.4 IIS-activity, reductionism, and nonreductionism
5.4.1 Reductionism and the role of the intellect
A curious thing about sensation, in the Cartesian world, is that it deals in composites 
(or wholes). Descartes tells us that sensations are usually confused, rather than distinct 
–  ‘quite  literally  con-fused  with something else’,  as  Nelson neatly  characterises  it  by 
highlighting the Latin etymology (1997: 167). That is, they tend to be joined together; 
they tend not to come divided up into their most basic constituents. It is the role of 
the intellect to do that division, to reduce the confused unity down to distinct ideas. In 
the  Sixth  Replies  (in  response  to  the  comment  that  neither  the  real  distinction 
between mind and body nor the existence of God seem as self-evident as do basic 
mathematical truths, and as such might be prejudices of his own), Descartes writes,
[i]t  is  true that,  before freeing myself  from the preconceived opinions acquired 
from the senses, I did perceive correctly that two and three make five, and that if 
equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal, and many things of this kind; 
and yet I did not think that the soul of man is distinct from his body. But I do not 
find this surprising. For I can easily see why it happened that, when still an infant, I 
never made any false judgements about propositions of this sort, which everyone 
accepts; the reason was that I had no occasion to employ these propositions, since 
children do not  learn to  count  two and three  until  they  are  capable  of  judging 
whether they make five. But, by contrast, I had from my earliest years conceived of 
my mind and body as a unity of some sort (for I had a confused awareness that I was 
composed of mind and body). It happens in almost every case of imperfect knowledge 
that  many  things  are  apprehended  together  as  a  unity,  though  they  will  later  have  to  be 
distinguished by a more careful examination
(CSM i: 299–300; AT vii: 445; my emphasis).
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Prior to the passage above,  Descartes spends several  pages on examples of how he 
reached  various  conclusions  through  this  careful  examination.  He  discusses  the 
sensation of seeing a stick thus:
suppose that, as a result of being aﬀected by this sensation of colour, I judge that a 
stick,  located  outside  me,  is  coloured;  and  suppose  that  on  the  basis  of  the 
extension of the colour and its boundaries together with its position in relation to 
the  parts  of  the  brain,  I  make  a  rational  calculation  about  the  size,  shape  and 
distance of the stick
(CSM i: 295; AT vii: 437).
The unity of the sensation gets broken down into judgements and rational calculations 
about low-level properties of the extended substance involved. Judgement, we know, is 
mental  (see  §5.3.1);  the  reasoning  involved,  of  course,  ‘depends  solely  on  the 
intellect’ (CSM i: 295; AT vii: 438). And so we end up with separate judgements about 
the  existence  of  an  external  stick  and  of  a  colour,  alongside  calculations  (and 
presumably judgements based on those calculations) about the size and shape of the 
stick,  and  about  its  position  relative  to  the  viewer.24  In  this  way,  through  ‘careful 
examination’,  con-fused  ideas  are  separated,  and  the  unity  that  was  the  original 
sensation gets reduced to simple component ideas.
The  intellect  has  other  roles  to  play  in  IIS-activity,  besides  the  reduction  itself. 
Notably, it has to choose how to weigh up diﬀering sensations. The initial case of IIS-
activity considered in this chapter was that of the square tower that appeared round in 
the absence of further sensory investigation (see p. 121 above). It was the acquisition of 
more  sensations  (getting  closer  to  the  tower  to  look  again,  and  touching  it  in 
Gassendi’s  example)  that  revealed  the  tower’s  true  shape.  In  the  Sixth  Replies 
examples, Descartes gives us a concrete demonstration of how the intellect chooses 
between various such sensations to make a judgement on the fact of the matter. He 
brings up the familiar example of a straight stick that, visually, appears to be bent when 
partially submerged in water. This is an error that can be corrected with addition of 
another  sensation:  ‘[a]s  a  result  of  touching  it,  we  may  judge  that  the  stick  is 
straight’ (CSM i: 296; AT vii: 439). But, it is not immediately apparent why the second 
sensation should correct the first. Why not say instead that touching the stick gave us 
cause to erroneously judge it to be straight, when we can plainly see that it is bent? On 
24 These are not the only components of the sensation. Descartes also decomposes the intervening physical 
systems  between  the  stick  and  the  viewer:  ‘rays  of  light  are  reflected  off  the  stick  and  set  up  certain 
movements in the optic nerve and, via the optic nerve, in the brain’ (CSM i: 295; AT vii: 437).
132 CHAPTER FIVE
the  level  of  the  sensations  themselves,  there  seems  to  be  no  means  of  choosing 
between them. This is where the intellect comes in:
the sense alone does not suﬃce to correct the visual error: in addition we need to 
have some degree of reason which tells us that in this case we should believe the 
judgement based on touch rather than that elicited by vision
(CSM i: 296; AT vii: 439).
On this account, the intellect is what ultimately integrates all those sensations gained 
through  experiment,  observation,  and  so  on.25  The  intellect  is  what  decides  the 
epistemic weight of each. Exactly how it does that, Descartes does not specify here. 
But at least one instance has already been covered in this chapter: the investigation of 
the  piece  of  wax  (see  p.  124  above).  There,  Descartes  starts  from  the  con-fused 
sensations he has of the piece of wax he tells us is in front him: it tastes of honey, it 
smells  of  flowers,  it  is  cold  and  hard,  and  so  on  (AT vii:  30).  The  question  he  is 
interested in this particular case is that of the fundamental essential nature of the piece 
of wax. His approach is to reduce his sensations to their constituents and to test them 
for expendability, in order to decide whether they belong to the wax’s essential nature. 
In the example, part of this testing involves an empirical component:
I put the wax by the fire, and look: the residual taste is eliminated, the smell goes 
away, the colour changes, the shape is lost, the size increases; it becomes liquid and 
hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you strike it, it no longer makes a sound
(CSM ii: 20; AT vii: 30).
That these sensory phenomena can be eradicated while the wax still remains the wax is 
evidence for Descartes’s judgement that they are inessential to it. That judgement is 
itself, of course, something that belongs to the intellect. Another part of the testing is 
framed more straightforwardly as intellectual (although it presumably leads on from 
the sensory testing): ‘[l]et us concentrate [attendamus], take away everything which does 
not belong to the wax, and see what is left’ (CSM ii: 20; AT vii: 30–1). What is left is, 
again,  just  extension:  that  is  the  lowest-level  essential  nature  of  the  piece  of  wax. 
Descartes arrives at this conclusion – that is, he makes the judgement that extension is 
what counts when it comes to the fundamental essential nature of the wax – through a 
process of reduction in which everything eliminable is eliminated, until we reach the 
lowest  level  (which  we  recognise  as  the  lowest  level  exactly  because  it  cannot  be 
eliminated). This in itself does not individuate the particular piece of wax; what it does 
25 See Garber (2001a), who, working from the Discourse, emphasises deduction: ‘experiment is [. . .] part of the 
step preliminary to making a deduction’ (2001a: 102; emphasis removed).
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is  tell  us  about  the  truth  of  the  nature  of  the  wax  that  we experience  confusedly 
through the senses.
We see  another  instance  of  how the  intellect  chooses  in  Descartes’s  rejection  of 
psychistic accounts of various biological phenomena (more on this in Chs 2, 3, and 6). 
In the Treatise on the Passions of the Soul, Descartes writes,
[i]n this way we shall avoid a very serious error which many have fallen into [. . .]. 
The  error  consists  in  supposing  that  since  dead  bodies  are  devoid  of  heat  and 
movement, it is the absence of the soul which causes this cessation of movement 
and heat. Thus it has been believed, without justification, that our natural heat and 
all the movements of our bodies depend on the soul; whereas we ought to hold, on 
the contrary, that the soul takes its leave when we die only because this heat ceases 
and the organs which bring about bodily movement decay
(a. 5; CSM i: 329; AT xi: 330).
While  psychistic  principles  of  movement  and  heat  are  not  themselves  present  in 
sensations,  Descartes  is  choosing  a  mechanistic  account  of  the  phenomena  in 
preference to an account in terms of souls. The phenomena we get through sensation 
are, for instance, experiences of animals whose behaviour bears a strong resemblance to 
our  own.  Descartes  brings  this  up  most  explicitly  in  the  context  of  his  denial  of 
thought in animals26:
I see no argument for animals having thoughts except this one: since they have eyes, 
ears,  tongues  and  other  sense-organs  like  ours,  it  seems  likely  that  they  have 
sensation like us; and since thought is included in our mode of sensation, similar 
thought seems to be attributable to them. This argument, which is very obvious, has 
taken possession of the minds of all men from their earliest age. But there are other 
arguments, stronger and more numerous, but not so obvious to everyone, which 
strongly urge the opposite
(5 February 1649; CSMK: 365–6; AT v: 277).
Descartes  opposes  the  ‘obvious’  interpretation  of  animal  behaviour  with  other, 
‘stronger  and  more  numerous’  arguments.  The  first  he  appeals  to  is  that  animal 
behaviour  is  reducible  to  mechanical  activity  (AT v:  277).  Similarly,  he  rejects  a 
psychistic account of animal locomotion because there is no psychistic motive power 
available  in  his  ontology  for  animal  movement to  reduce down to (see  Ch.  4).  He 
26  On the then-standard scholastic conception of life in terms of vegetative, sensitive and rational souls, 
animal thought and animal locomotion are closely related issues –  so much so that, later in the letter to 
More, Descartes feels the need to specify, ‘Please note that I am speaking of thought, and not of life or 
sensation. I do not deny life to animals’ (5 February 1649; CSMK: 366; AT v: 278).
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adopts  a  mechanistic  account  instead,  exactly  because  animal  movement  can  be 
reduced down to mechanisms that are available in his ontology. This is, broadly, the 
argument of the Treatise on Man and the Description of the Human Body (as well as the 
summary of Man  in the Discourse,  and the opening of The Passions).  In this way, the 
intellect is responsible for account selection in IIS-activity, via reducibility (at least in 
part). As McMullin puts it, ‘[t]he explanations [Descartes] oﬀers rely in the first place 
on the epistemic priority of clear and distinct ideas to certify the explanatory apparatus 
employed: bodies reduced to extensions and all the rest’ (2008: 98).
In all these cases, the judgement is made on the basis of reducibility; that is, it is made 
on the basis of the decomposability of con-fused ideas into lowest-level constituents 
that  are  congruous  with  Descartes’s  dualist  ontology.  When  it  comes  to  animal 
locomotion  or  thought,  this  is  because  each  of  the  choices  involved  is  between  a 
reducible account, on the one hand, and an irreducible account, on the other. That will 
not  always  be  so.  Descartes  needs  to  choose  between  multiple  equally  reducible 
options to account for the colour of light in the rainbow.27 Similarly, judging the half-
submerged stick  not  to  be  bent  is  not  necessarily  a  choice  between reducible  and 
irreducible.28 But where the choice is between reducible and irreducible, reducibility is 
Descartes’s  benchmark  for  the  intellect’s  choice  between  competing  sensations,  or 
between competing information derived or partially derived from sensations.
So, the role of the intellect in IIS-activity involves (at least) the reduction of confused 
ideas  down to their  distinct  lowest-level  components.  It  also involves  assessing the 
relative merits of acquired sensations, where possible in terms of reducibility.29 In this 
27 See Buchwald 2008, which argues that experiment is integrated into Descartes’s methodology to an even 
greater extent (2008: 5).
28 Although, conceivably, it could be: Descartes has a well developed reductionist account of optical illusion 
through refraction that can explain the error in the visual sensation; he has no equivalent account that could 
explain a tactile illusion in which a bent stick would feel straight.
29 This is not an exhaustive list, of course. There are other things that the intellect can and will do in the 
context of IIS-activity, such as generating hypotheses or similar, which it can then decide between on the 
basis of information from the senses and imagination: ‘I notice hardly any particular eﬀect of which I do not 
know at once that it can be deduced from the principles in many diﬀerent ways; and my greatest diﬃculty is 
usually to discover in which of those ways it depends on them. I know of no other means to discover this 
than by seeking further observations whose outcomes vary according to which of these ways provides the 
correct explanation [. . .] so the advances I make in the knowledge of nature will depend henceforth on the 
opportunities I get to make more or fewer of these observations’ (CSM i: 144; AT vi: 64–5 ). See also Clarke 
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way, the intellect is supposed to get existential and essential truths out of obscure and 
confused sensations: there is a stick out there, and it has a certain size, shape, and so 
on; there is a stick in the water, and it’s not bent.
5.4.2 Nonreductionism and knowledge acquisition
If  the  intellect  is  supposed  to  reduce  the  confused  ideas  gained  via  sensation  and 
imagination down to  their  lowest-level  components,  and if  it  is  supposed to  judge 
existential and essential truths about external phenomena on the basis of reducibility, 
what  happens  when our  senses  present  us  with  something  irreducible?  We already 
know that this is more than a hypothetical. The union is known through the senses 
(Ch. 4, §4.2), and our notion of it is not reducible to anything in the dualist ontology 
(Ch. 4, §4.2.1). But Descartes does unequivocally and explicitly aﬃrm that we have a 
notion of the union. This ought not to be the case. As we saw in the previous section, 
the intellect aﬃrms knowledge of existence on the basis of reducibility, so it should 
reject  irreducibles.  This  works  when  Descartes  has  a  choice  between  a  psychistic 
account of bodily locomotion and a mechanical account: the mechanical account wins 
out thanks to its reducibility, and the psychistic account gets rejected. The trouble with 
the union is that Descartes has no reductive account of it to choose.
When faced with a phenomenon that is not reducible in the terms of your ontology, 
the obvious responses are either eliminativism about that phenomenon or, perhaps, to 
alter your ontology. Descartes himself does not opt for the radical latter, of course.30 
Eliminativism would seem to be the clear choice. Purely in the terms of the ontology 
Descartes has already established, the union is an impossible thing (because it is the 
combination and interaction of  two incompatibles);  eliminativism about  impossible 
things  seems  a  sensible  course  of  action.31  But,  again,  this  is  not  the  course  that 
Descartes  takes.  He  simply  aﬃrms  the  existence  of  the  union  and  treats  it  as 
unproblematic. So, given that Descartes rejects nonreductive accounts in cases such as 
bodily locomotion (and fire,  and vision,  and so on)  –  that is,  cases where he has a 
reductive alternative – we might well expect him to reject nonreductive accounts just as 
1982 in particular, and, to an extent, Garber 2001a.
30 Using trialism to ‘fix’ Descartes’s union problem would be a version of this. See Ch. 4, p. 87 above.
31 In Chapter Three, I argue that Descartes takes just this sort of eliminativist approach with respect to life; 
in Chapter Six (§6.4), I argue that this eliminativism is compatible with a weak metaphysical commitment to 
the existence of life as an irreducible.
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readily even when he has no reductive alternative. But, in the case of the union at least, 
he does the exact opposite: he adopts a nonreductive account of the union with no 
apparent reluctance, and with no hint of concern.
What this shows, then, is that Descartes takes himself to be under no compulsion to 
reject all irreducibles. But this chapter is about knowledge acquisition: can we say he 
has  knowledge  of  irreducibles?  Does  he  have  actual  knowledge  of  the  union?  If  by 
‘knowledge’, we mean what Descartes called scientia or science of the sort characterised 
by CSMK as ‘systematic knowledge based on indubitable foundations’ (CSMK: 13, n. 1), 
it would seem rather quixotic to claim that he has knowledge of irreducibles. Whatever 
he might ‘know’ of irreducibles cannot be systematic, if reducibility is what confers 
systematicity in this case (to be irreducible in the terms of a system of knowledge is 
presumably to be outside that system; to be a member of a system of knowledge is 
presumably  to  be  reducible  in  the  terms  of  that  system).  By  the  same  token, 
‘knowledge’  of  irreducibles  cannot  be  based  on  indubitable  foundations,  exactly 
because it is not reducible to them. So Descartes cannot have this kind of knowledge 
of irreducibles.
On the other hand, it would be fairly perverse to claim that Descartes really has no 
knowledge, in our sense of the term, of irreducibles. He knows that there is such a 
thing as the union of mind and body. He knows that our sensations pertain to the 
union, and that it is self-preserving. And this is operational knowledge, too: he uses 
knowledge of the union to account for the passions (Principles 1/48), for instance.32 So 
Descartes  has  some  kind  of  knowledge  of  and  about  an  irreducible.  Descartes 
(necessarily)  might not be able  to have systematic  knowledge based on indubitable 
foundations when it comes to irreducibles, but (if we take his account of the union 
seriously) he must be able to have some kind knowledge of them).
So,  irreducibles do have a part  to play in knowledge acquisition for Descartes.  We 
know that there is at least one irreducible in the world that Descartes aﬃrms, of which 
he claims knowledge, and that he thinks warrants at least minimal investigation. So 
that  door  is  open:  irreducibles  are  not  excluded  from  Descartes’s  knowledge 
acquisition project.  Determining exactly  what that  knowledge consists  in,  and how 
Descartes can legitimately have access to it, is the task of the next chapter.
32  Is this just practical  knowledge, then? It doesn’t appear to be, given that knowledge of the union has 
metaphysical import. Cf. Simmons manuscript.
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5.6 Conclusion
Standard  readings  of  the  Meditations  take  it  that  Cartesian  knowledge  acquisition 
consists  in  certainty  gained  through  pure-intellect-activity,  and  that  all  else  is 
knowledge not ‘worthy of the name’.  The certainty this  involves is  supposed to be 
conferred by reducibility to the elements of Descartes’s dualist system. But analysis of 
the  rule  of  knowledge  acquisition  that  he  describes  more  than  once  to  Princess 
Elisabeth,  as  well  to Burman,  and,  allegedly,  frequently  in conversation,  shows that 
Descartes takes the major work of knowledge acquisition to be done elsewhere: most 
knowledge,  for  Descartes,  comes  about  through  the  integration  of  sensation, 
imagination, and intellect (IIS-activity), with the former two bearing most of the heavy 
lifting, in the form of experimentation and observation. The knowledge acquisition 
programme of the Meditations is extremely limited by contrast, and Descartes concerns 
himself with it rarely and instructs those who would follow him to address it precisely 
once and then turn their attention over entirely to IIS-activity.

Chapter 6
Real irreducibles and knowledge acquisition: the union, 
teleology, and life
6.1 Introduction
As we have seen, Descartes requires the intellect to make the judgement on the reality, 
or existence, of any given external thing (§5.3.1), and the intellect makes that judgement 
on the basis of reducibility to the elements of Descartes’s ontology (§5.4.1). Given this, 
it  would  be  easy  to  conclude  that  thinking  and  extended  substances  and  their 
modifications (and God)  are all  that  is  real  for  Descartes.  If  that  is  the case,  then 
knowledge of the reality of any particular thing given through sensation is determined 
by its reducibility to a modification of extended substance – colour itself, for instance, 
is not real for Descartes, but the phenomenon is reducible to certain modifications of 
matter.1  So,  in  the  case  of  colour,  there  is  something  real  that  subtends  the 
phenomenon, and its reality is established by its reducibility.
But, Descartes does commit himself to the reality of some things that are not reducible 
to his established substances and their modifications. Or, at the very least, he appears 
to commit himself to the reality of certain irreducibles. This chapter makes the case 
that this is more than just an apparent commitment – that it is a coherent position for 
1  Those modifications  consist  in  the rotational  movement of  pieces  of  matter  of  the first  element that 
propagate light, along with spin-inducing arrangements of corpuscles on the surfaces of bodies that reflect 
light. See Descartes’s Optics, Discourse Eight.
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Descartes  to  uphold  the  reality  of  some  irreducibles.  The  argument  relies  on  the 
conclusions  of  the  previous  chapter  (see  especially  Ch.  5,  §5.3.1)  to  show that  the 
requirement for Cartesian knowledge to be reductionist applies only to knowledge of 
the  independent  existence  of  external  things,  with  their  particular  essences. 
Consequently, knowledge need not be reductionist just so long as it is knowledge of the 
non-independent  existence of a thing.2  What this means concretely is  that we cannot 
know anything about irreducibles in themselves; we can only know them in connection 
with  ourselves,  from  a  subjective  standpoint.  In  Descartes’s  terms,  our  ideas  of 
irreducibles  can be perfectly  clear,  but  they are  always  ‘con-fused’  (combined)  with 
ourselves. This is the kind of knowledge that Descartes can use to patch the epistemic 
gaps in his dualism.
There  are  parallels  between  my  approach  here  and  Lennon’s  (2007)  treatment  of 
motion and bodily individuation in Descartes. Lennon takes Cartesian motion to be 
‘phenomenal’, which he defines, for the purposes of his paper, as ‘mind-dependent’, and 
which he associates with ‘what (merely) appears to be (the case)’, rather than with ‘what 
is  (the case)’  (2007: 29).  He opposes the phenomenal to the real,  on the basis that 
‘Descartes, I venture to say, never used the term “real” to mean anything but mind-
independent’ (2007: 30). That might well be so3, but my concern is less with Descartes’s 
use of the term than it is with how he treats irreducibles – my reading deviates from 
Lennon’s in that it upholds the reality of non-independent existence: epistemic gaps in 
Descartes’s dualism, I will argue here, do not necessarily confer unreality; and, ‘what is 
the case’ can be known subjectively as well as objectively. Descartes never indicates 
that he takes the union to be any less real than minds or bodies. Indeed, if the analysis 
in Chapter Four (§4.4) is right, then the union is more real than mind or body, within 
DomainU. And, if the union can be both non-independent and real, then so might other 
irreducibles. I also diﬀer from Lennon in taking the dependency in question to involve 
2 It might be objected that this is not knowledge for Descartes – that true knowledge requires clarity and 
distinctness.  It  is  precisely  my  point,  in  both  this  and  the  previous  chapter,  to  show that  clarity  and 
distinctness  is  required  only  for  knowledge  of  the  independent  existence  of  external  things  with  their 
particular essences. We can still have nonreductionist knowledge of the non-independent existence of things. 
And, after all, Descartes tells Elisabeth that we ‘know’ the union (AT iii: 692).
3 Apparently, neither Lennon nor I have checked exhaustively.
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the union rather than the mind: nonreductive knowledge of non-independent existence 
is acquired sensorily rather than intellectually.4
The chapter  first  makes its  argument through an analysis  of  our knowledge of  the 
union (§6.2). It is fairly easy to see how knowledge of the non-independent existence of 
something works in the case of the union: since I am the union that pertains to me5, its 
existence independent of  me is  simply inconceivable.  The rest  of  the chapter then 
extends  this  reading  to  two other  potential  irreducibles.  First,  I  consider  how the 
problem of Cartesian natural teleology can be understood as a problem of reducibility, 
and what that would mean for Cartesian knowledge of teleology in the physical world 
(§6.3).  Descartes  explicitly  rejects  any  role  for  teleology  in  our  knowledge  of  the 
physical  world,  and his  extended substance  lacks  the  resources  for  any  compatible 
reduction of teleology proper.6 But, as has often been noted, Descartes seems to rely on 
teleology fairly frequently, especially when it comes to issues connected to biology.
If  we  take  his  prohibition  against  natural  teleology  seriously,  this  seems  to  be  a 
significant  problem for  him –  but  if  we  treat  natural  teleology  as  an  irreducible, 
Descartes can still have knowledge of it. That knowledge will have to be of its non-
independent  existence;  in  practice,  that  means  that  our  knowledge  of  teleology  in 
nature will always be tied up with our own human ends (§6.3.4). It means that we can 
ascribe function to a body-part, for instance, but cannot know anything about what it 
would  be  for  that  part  to  have  a  function  in  our  absence.  Perhaps  more 
counterintuitively, it means that we can ascribe health to animals, but can say nothing 
about what its health would be to the animal in itself.
Finally, the chapter comes back to the question of life itself. In Chapter Three, I made 
a case for Descartes’s being an eliminativist about life. Here, I argue that the account 
of Cartesian nonreductive knowledge set out in this chapter can make better sense of 
Descartes’s talk of life (§6.4). This does not override the conclusions of Chapter Three, 
4 This is why I specify non-independence rather than mind-dependence.
5  As a human, I  am the union that pertains to me (see Simmons 2011).  If  I  am, as  Descartes argues in 
Meditation Two, just a mind, then I am a necessary part of the union that pertains to me: independent of 
me-as-a-mind, that union would cease to exist. Either way, then, the independent existence of the union that 
pertains to me is both unknowable and nonsensical. See p. 145 below.
6 There have been some attempts, in the literature, to allow him reductionist quasi-teleologies; on this, see 
§3.
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however. It turns out that Descartes can eliminate life itself from his biology, while still 
maintaining a weak metaphysical commitment to life as an irreducible (§6.4.4).
6.2 The union
6.2.1 Knowledge of the union
In this section, I argue that Descartes treats the union of mind and body as a real 
irreducible. Given Descartes’s criteria for knowledge acquisition, the irreducibility of 
the union ought to pose a considerable problem for our ability to have any knowledge 
of the reality of the union. That’s because knowledge of the independent existence of 
any  external  thing  with  its  particular  essence  can  only  be  established  by  a  purely 
intellectual reduction into the established terms of the ontology (Ch. 5, §5.3.1).  The 
argument  I  make  here  is  that  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the  union  that 
Descartes can allow is knowledge of the non-independent existence of the union. That is, 
I can have knowledge of the existence of the union that pertains to me only insofar as 
it is not independent of me; I can have no knowledge of the essence or existence of 
that union in itself, outside my experience of it.
6.2.2 The legitimacy of knowledge of the union
If the reading given in Chapter Five holds, the union of mind and body is both (a) 
irreducible to thinking or extended substances and their modifications and (b) real. We 
know that we acquire knowledge of the union purely through the senses (see Ch. 4, 
§4.2  and  the  extensive  treatment  in  Simmons  (manuscript)).  Given  the  analysis  of 
Descartes’s rule of knowledge acquisition given in the previous chapter, knowledge of 
the  reality  of  the  union  thus  ought  to  be  illegitimate.  That’s  because  there  is  no 
reduction (in the terms of Descartes’s dualist ontology) available on the basis of which 
the intellect can make an existential judgement.7 That, indeed, is the entire problem of 
7  At  times,  Descartes  flirts  with  according  the  union  the  status  of  a  substance  (chiefly,  by  calling  it  a 
‘substantial union’ (AT vii: 228; AT iii: 508)). Others in the literature have attempted to use this to reconcile 
the reality of the union with reductionist criteria for knowledge, by rendering the union the third substance 
of Cartesian trialism. If the union is a substance itself, then it is (of course) reducible to a substance, and so 
Descartes’s means of knowledge acquisition remain consistent. But, I have argued that the application of 
substance metaphysics to the union involves the illegitimate extension of his dualism outside its domain of 
conceivability (Ch. 4, p. 87 above).  In addition, we might well say that trialism is simply not Descartes’s 
system. At the end of this section, I conclude that its inability to provide knowledge of the independent 
existence of the union is a limitation of Descartes’s dualist system. A diﬀerent system – a trialist system – 
presumably would not share that limitation.
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the union. And yet Descartes proceeds to assert the existence of the union. Not only 
does he assert the existence of the union, but he does so in explicit recognition that 
the terms of his dualism are incapable of supporting any account of it.
We see this when he establishes the notion of the union as a primitive notion (Ch. 4, 
§4.2.1), and when he tells Elisabeth that her consternation over mind–body interaction 
is  entirely  due  to  having  spent  too  much  time  thinking  only  within  the  dualist 
ontology8, which has
made Your Highness find obscurity in the notion we have of the union of the mind 
and the body. It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of forming a 
very distinct conception of both the distinction between the soul and the body and 
their union; for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and at 
the same time to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd
(to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643; CSMK: 227; AT iii: 693).
As  discussed  in  Chapter  Five  (§4.2.1),  Descartes’s  point  here  is  that  we  cannot 
understand the union while thinking in terms of thought and extension. The union, on 
the one hand, and dualism, on the other, can only be addressed through their own, 
mutually  exclusive,  domains  of  conceivability.  The  union,  then,  is  necessarily 
irreducible in the terms of the dualist ontology. And yet it ‘is known very clearly’ (to 
Elisabeth, 28 June 1643; CSMK: 227; AT iii: 692). What’s more, the union is known very 
clearly  ‘by  the  senses’  (Ibid.;  my  emphasis).  This  kind  of  knowledge,  available  only 
through  the  senses,  ought  not  to  be  possible.  From Descartes’s  wax  example,  we 
concluded that what the senses and imagination could not provide was knowledge of 
the independent existence of an external thing with its essential nature. But what we 
seem to have here is precisely knowledge acquired exclusively through the senses of the 
existence of an external thing (the union) with its essential nature (it is a union of mind 
and body).
If  Descartes  does  indeed allow sensory knowledge of  an irreducible,  then it  seems 
there are two options for making sense of the situation. Either he abandons his criteria 
for knowledge acquisition when it comes to the union, or there is some way in which 
he can reconcile those criteria with our knowledge of the union. In the former case, 
there is little more to say: Descartes’s dualism allows the intellect no reductive access 
to  the  union,  but  we  have  knowledge  of  it  nevertheless.  On  this  interpretation, 
Descartes has no means of bridging the dualism’s epistemic gap with respect to the 
8 Or, in this case, that she has spent too much time engaged in pure-intellect-activity, to the exclusion of the 
senses.
144 CHAPTER SIX
union; it is something we know, but he can say nothing about how we know it. That 
would mean that we can have knowledge of irreducibles even in the absence of any 
criteria  whatsoever  for  that  knowledge:  irreducibles  are  things  we  just  know.  This 
would be somewhat problematic, especially given Descartes’s concern with the grounds 
for epistemology. It would be problematic because it allows for an unregulated means 
of knowledge acquisition, in which there are no clear criteria by means of which to 
distinguish a real irreducible from simple error. This need not be an insurmountable 
problem9, but it would be better if we had a reading that allowed Descartes to maintain 
his knowledge acquisition rules and also apply them to our knowledge of the union. 
This is the second option.
6.2.3 Externality and independence
Te problem at stake in allowing Descartes legitimate knowledge of the union is that of 
how  he  can  reconcile  our  sensory  knowledge  of  the  union  with  his  criteria  for 
knowledge acquisition. One possibility would be to focus on the externality criterion. 
In both Meditation Six (CSM ii: 57–8) and his response to Gassendi in the Fifth Replies 
(CSM ii: 264–5), Descartes specifies that the senses cannot tell us about the existence 
and nature  of  things  located ‘outside  ourselves’  (see  pp.  122–123  above).  The union 
might seem to be non-external – humans are, after all, unions. If it were the case that 
the  union  is  not  external,  then  its  non-externality  could  allow us  to  have  sensory 
knowledge of it without contravening Descartes’s criteria for knowledge acquisition. 
That is not the case, however: when Descartes brings up the externality criterion, he 
does so within the domain of conceivability of his dualism, in which humans are not 
fundamentally unions but minds. In his response to Gassendi, Descartes is concerned 
with doubt about the veracity of the senses; throughout the Meditations and Replies, 
that doubt is just as applicable to my own body, and to my union with it, as it is to the 
world beyond my body. Similarly, when he raises the externality criterion in Meditation 
Six, he specifies that ‘knowledge of the truth about such things seems to belong to the 
mind alone,  not  to the combination of  mind and body’  (CSM ii:  57;  AT vii:  82–3). 
Within this domain of conceivability, then, the only non-external thing is the mind: 
Descartes means the union to be subject to the externality criterion.
So,  the senses  alone cannot give us  knowledge of  the independent existence of  an 
external  thing with its  essential  nature.  And,  when it  comes to our  purely  sensory 
knowledge of the union, the externality criterion still applies, and we have no leeway 
9 For instance, as we saw with the round-seeming tower, a certain amount of error-checking can be done 
within the senses themselves.
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with its  existence or its  essence (according to Descartes,  it  exists  and we know its 
nature  very  clearly).  If  we  are  to  reconcile  Descartes’s  prohibition  against  sensory 
knowledge  with  our  knowledge  of  the  union,  all  that’s  left  is  the  independence 
criterion.  And,  unlike  the  externality  criterion,  the  independence  criterion  is  not 
contravened by knowledge of the union: whether I take myself to be a union or just a 
mind,  the  union  that  I  know  (i.e.  the  one  that  pertains  to  me)  does  not  exist 
independently of me. If I am a union, that union is me; if I am a mind, that mind is 
part of the union, making the union at least mereologically dependent on the mind. So, 
either way, when I have sensory knowledge of the union, what I have is knowledge of 
the existence of something external to my mind with its essential nature, where that 
existence is not independent of me.
This makes sense:  as  Descartes claims,  I  know the union that pertains to me very 
clearly; but, I can say nothing at all about what that union would be without me – that 
would be inconceivable. This is also consistent with something established in Chapter 
Four (§4.4): the domain of conceivability through which we understand the union is 
subjective,  or  egocentric,  rather  than  an  objective  view  from nowhere.10  And  it  is 
subjective precisely because what the senses present us with are con-fused ideas in 
which we (in the form of the union of the mind with the body) are partially fused to 
our ideas of external things. In exactly this way, then, whatever my sensory knowledge 
is,  it  cannot  be  knowledge  of  external  things  with  their  essential  natures  existing 
independently of myself.
So it seems that there is a way to reconcile our sensory knowledge of the union with 
Descartes’s  commitment  to  the  inapplicability  of  the  senses  to  knowledge  of  the 
independent  existence  of  external  things  with  their  essential  natures:  we  can  have 
sensory  knowledge  of  the  non-independent  existence  of  external  things  with  their 
essential natures. This might sound surprising, given that it runs so contrary to the 
characteristics of the kind of knowledge that Descartes is so careful to establish in the 
Meditations – knowledge that is well-grounded, reductive, and objective. But, in fact, it 
fits perfectly well with what Descartes writes to Gassendi about appearances (discussed 
on p. 122 above):
when you come round to saying that ‘at least we may not doubt that things appear 
as they do’, you are back on the right road
(CSM ii: 264–5; AT vii: 386).
10 For clarity, the objective view is distinct from objective reality. See Ch. 4, n. 27, p. 106 above.
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Descartes’s  claim  at  this  point  in  the  Reply  is  that  we  are  not  deceived  about 
appearances just so long as we take them to be appearances and nothing else. It’s when 
we start attributing independent existence to appearances (with their particular essences) 
that we run into trouble (Ibid.). In other words, we can have sensory knowledge of con-
fused things just so long as we do take them to be con-fused. With an appearance such 
as colour, the situation is relatively simple: the appearance of, say, redness is indeed the 
appearance of redness, but Descartes also has the resources to give a reductive analysis 
of the con-fused idea of redness. That reductive analysis allows him to rule out the 
independent existence of some thing with the essence ‘red’ – and it provides knowledge 
of  the  independent  existence of  pieces  of  matter  arranged in  such a  way  as  to  be 
produce our con-fused idea of redness.
The redness scenario is not, of course, the scenario we get with the union. We know 
that the resources for a reductive analysis of the union are precisely what Descartes 
lacks. This does not mean that Descartes denies the existence of the union (absolutely 
not: he aﬃrms its existence). It just means that our only knowledge of the union is at 
the level of con-fusion, specifically, its con-fusion with ourselves. This means that we 
know the union to be real and also irreducible within Descartes’s system. Another way 
to put the same point is in terms of essence. For colour, we know (and have the means 
to know) that the essence of the appearance (red) is very diﬀerent from the essence of 
the independently existing thing (certain arrangements of pieces of matter).  In that 
case, we can talk both of the essence of the con-fused thing and of the essence of the 
independently existing thing. For the union, however, we know the essence of the con-
fused thing very clearly, but we can say nothing about the essence of some union-thing 
independent of ourselves; the very notion is nonsensical.
6.2.4 Knowledge of the non-independent existence of the union
As we have seen, we can have purely sensory knowledge of the existence of the union 
with its particular essence. The union, then, is an irreducible that we can know to be 
real, albeit with our knowledge of it con-fused with ourselves. What we cannot have is 
knowledge of the existence or essence of any union-thing independent of ourselves. 
This  is  not  a  problem for  Descartes.  The  inability  to  provide  the  latter  kind  of 
knowledge  is  simply  a  limitation  of  his  dualist  system (this  is  the  ‘epistemic  gap’ 
referred to in Chapters Four and Five). But in no way does that rule out all knowledge 
of the union. We can still know the union, and know it to be real. There are at least two 
outcomes of all this for Cartesian knowledge acquisition. First, it shows that Descartes 
does not rule out knowledge of things that are irreducible to the elements of his dualist 
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system (because the union is  irreducible and we have knowledge of it).  Second, on 
Descartes’s account, it is possible to have such knowledge as long as it is knowledge of 
something con-fused, rather than an illegitimate judgement of the existence of some 
thing independent of ourselves. That is, the idea we have of the union is not clear and 
distinct; it is undoubtedly clear (we ‘know it very clearly’), and it is con-fused.11 This 
means that we can indeed have knowledge of the union, and that what that knowledge 
involves must be knowledge of the non-independent existence of something with the 
particular essence of a union of mind and body.
6.3 Teleology
6.3.1 Knowledge of natural teleology
Much like the union, teleology ought to be a significant problem for Descartes. He 
rejects knowledge of ends in the material world, and yet he makes repeated use of them 
in his  natural  philosophy.  Descartes’s  apparently  contradictory treatment of  natural 
teleology has been a enduring problem in the scholarship.12 In this section, I propose 
that we might understand teleology, for Descartes, as a real irreducible. That is, we can 
have  knowledge  of  ends  in  the  natural  world  in  the  same  way  that  we  can  have 
knowledge of the union. That means that,  while we cannot have knowledge of the 
independent  existence  of  such  ends,  with  their  particular  essences,  we  can  have 
knowledge of ends insofar as those ends are not independent of ourselves. In other 
words, we can say nothing about, for instance, what the health of an animal is for the 
animal itself, but we can know about the health of an animal in some connection to 
human  health.  This  means  that  Descartes’s  prohibition  against  knowing  God’s 
purposes still stands: if God has any such purposes, they exist independently of us; and, 
we have no knowledge of the independent existence of ends in the natural world.
11 This might seem to undermine Nelson’s interpretation of clarity, given that he takes obscurity (i.e. non-
clarity) and confusion to be co-extensive (Nelson 1997: 169). But here we have a case of something that is, by 
definition,  con-fused,  but that Descartes also describes as  being ‘very clear’.  We can reconcile this  with 
Nelson’s reading if we take the two terms to allow equivocation between domains of conceivability: within 
DomainU, which is the domain Descartes is thinking within when he tells Elisabeth that we know the union 
very clearly, our notion of the union is clear (it does, after all, ‘jump out at us’ in the way that clear ideas are 
supposed). But, in the terms of DomainD, our notion of the union can only be con-fused.
12 See, e.g., La Porte 1928; Des Chene 2000a; Simmons 2001; Shapiro 2003; Gaukroger 2000; Hatfield 2008; 
Brown 2012; Detlefsen 2013; Manning 2013; Distelzweig 2015.
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To say  that  the  ends  we see  in  nature  exist  non-independently  of  us  might  sound 
somewhat obscure. All it means is that we can know, say, the function of the lungs 
perfectly well,  but we cannot legitimately know anything about the function of the 
lungs in a world devoid of humans. That is not to say, however, that the function of the 
lungs is illusory: lungs might well have a function in themselves, existing independent 
of us; Descartes’s dualist system simply lacks the resources to tell us anything about the 
independent existence of such a function. If the reading of Cartesian knowledge of the 
union given above is correct, there should be no such problem with having knowledge 
of the non-independent existence of the function of the lungs. Consequently, treating 
teleology as  a  real  irreducible,  whose non-independent existence with its  particular 
essence we can have knowledge of, provides epistemological grounds for projectionist 
readings of Cartesian natural  teleology (as proposed in,  e.g.,  Des Chene 2000a and 
Manning  2015).  Because  Descartes’s  reductionist  account  of  knowledge  acquisition 
confers  knowledge  of  the  reality  of  things  on  the  basis  of  their  reducibility,  the 
apparent risk with projectionist readings of Cartesian natural  teleology is  that they 
deny the reality of natural teleology; if reductionist knowledge is all we can have, then 
teleology must be ‘just’  a  projection.  But if  natural  ends are real  irreducibles,  their 
reality remains intact. The irreducibility of such ends does not entail that natural ends 
are illusory: it implies only an epistemic gap in the dualist system. And this is a gap that 
Descartes  has  the  resources  to  patch,  through  the  same  means  of  knowledge 
acquisition he employs for knowledge of the union.
6.3.2 The problem of natural teleology
Descartes’s  most  well  known  rejection  of  teleology  comes  at  the  beginning  of 
Meditation Four:
since I now know that my own nature is very weak and limited, whereas the nature 
of God is immense, incomprehensible and infinite, I also know without more ado 
that he is capable of countless things whose causes are beyond my knowledge. And 
for this reason alone I consider the customary search for final causes to be tota!y useless in 
physics; there is considerable rashness in thinking myself capable of investigating the purposes of 
God
(CSM ii: 39; AT vii: 55; my emphasis).
Similarly, in the Fifth Replies, he specifies further,
[t]he function of the various parts of plants and animals etc. makes it appropriate to 
admire God as their eﬃcient cause – to recognize and glorify the craftsman through 
examining his works; but we cannot guess "om this what purpose God had in creating any 
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given thing. In ethics, then, where we may often legitimately employ conjectures, it 
may admittedly be pious on occasion to try to guess what purpose God may have 
had in mind in his direction of the universe; but in physics, where everything must be 
backed up by the strongest arguments, such conjectures are futile. We cannot pretend that 
some of God’s  purposes  are more out in the open than others;  a!  are equa!y hidden in the 
inscrutable abyss of his wisdom
(CSM i: 258; AT vii: 374–5; my emphases).
His  argument  is  that  our  finite  intellects  cannot  hope  to  grasp  God’s  purposes; 
consequently, any attempt to explain natural phenomena through final causes would be 
a  hopeless  endeavour.  We cannot,  Descartes  tells  us,  predicate our explanations on 
something that can only ever be a mystery to us. We might well wonder why Descartes 
jumps straight from teleology to God –  it  seems plausible that we could have final 
causes without making them the products of God’s purposes. The problem with that is 
that, for Descartes, only minds can provide ends; extended substance does not have the 
resources to produce final causes itself. The final causes of artificial things are thus to 
be found in the purposes of their human designers; and, if natural things have final 
causes,  they can only be found in the purposes of God (within the confines of the 
dualist system).  In the Sixth Replies,  Descartes tells us that, prior to distinguishing 
properly between body and mind, he
thought that gravity carried bodies towards the centre of the earth as if it had some 
knowledge of the centre within itself.  For this  surely could not happen without 
knowledge, and there can be no knowledge except in a mind
(CSM ii: 298; AT vii: 442).
In other words, Descartes takes it that a final-cause explanation (of the kind used by 
Aristotelians)  of  why bodies  fall  downwards  involves  the  illegitimate  attribution of 
mind-specific capacities to bodies: if they fall in order to reach the centre of the earth, 
they must know where they are going (otherwise, they wouldn’t be falling in order to 
reach the centre of the earth). On Descartes’s account, final causation requires some 
kind of knowledge of the end involved, and bodies cannot have knowledge of any kind. 
So extended substances lacks the capacities that make final causation possible: it is 
incapable of having the requisite knowledge.
Indeed, if Descartes does reject secondary causation13, then, strictly speaking, extended 
substance  in  itself  lacks  the  capacities  to  produce  any  sort  of  causation at  all:  for 
Descartes, all body–body causation is really God–body causation (see Ch. 4, §4.2.2.3). 
And since we cannot know God’s purposes, it would be futile to attempt to account for 
13 See n. 18, p. 96 above.
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natural, physical phenomena through final causation. Descartes makes this explicit in 
the Principles. Article 28 of Part One is titled ‘[i]t is not the final but the eﬃcient causes 
of created things that we must inquire into’, and this, he explains again, is because,
[w]hen dealing with natural things we will, then, never derive any explanations from 
the purposes which God or nature may have had in view when creating them <and 
we shall entirely banish from our philosophy the search for final causes>. For we 
should  not  be  so  arrogant  as  to  suppose  that  we can share  in  God's  plans.  We 
should, instead, consider him as the eﬃcient cause of all things
(1/28; CSM i: 202; AT viii: 15–6).
Since we have no access to God’s plans, we can say nothing about the ends for which 
things in the natural world might take place, if indeed there are any such ends. If we 
want to explain natural phenomena within the dualist system, our only option is to 
look at the eﬃcient causes. When faced with some phenomenon, we can only ask what 
God changes directly in making it happen; we can’t ask why.
And  yet,  Descartes  does  make  considerable  use  of  teleology  in  explaining  natural 
phenomena,  biological  phenomena  in  particular.  Or,  at  the  very  least,  he  certainly 
appears to make use of teleology in doing so. His accounts of physiology and medicine 
frequently  rely  on  what  looks  like  highly  teleological  language,  largely  through  his 
attributions of usus/usage or oﬃcia/oﬃces to parts of the body: the ‘true function [usage] of 
respiration is to bring enough fresh air into the lungs to cause the blood entering there 
[. . .] to thicken’ (CSM i: 138; AT vi: 53; my emphasis); the ‘upper part of the heart of an 
eel [. . .] performs the same function [oﬃcio fungebatur] in the eel as the right auricle does in 
the heart of a land animal’ (CSMK: 96; AT ii: 68; my emphasis); when the body takes 
on the configuration of  hatred,  ‘the stomach ceases  to perform  its  function  [faire  son 
oﬃce], being inclined to regurgitate and reject the food we have eaten’ (CSM i: 363; AT 
xi: 402; my emphasis); the muscles ‘serve [servir] to move the body’ (CSM i: 335; AT xi: 
341; my emphasis); and so on.
The apparent teleology goes beyond lexical choice, too. Descartes is eager to claim that 
the ultimate goal of his physiology – indeed, of all his work – is medicine, specifically 
the  preservation  of  health  (AT iv:  329).  Health,  however,  is  an  end;  as  such,  it  it 
something that Cartesian bodies ought to lack the capacity to have. And, as Simmons 
(2001) has shown, health is not just a problem of teleology in its own right: the notion 
of health is also central to Descartes’s physiological account of sensation; and the same 
goes  for  his  similarly  physiological  treatment  of  the  passions  in  the  Treatise  on  the 
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Passions of the Soul.  In none of these cases does Descartes attempt to justify, explain 
away, or otherwise account for his use of teleology.
So Descartes both excludes teleology from our knowledge of the natural world and 
unapologetically  puts  it  to  work in  his  explanations  of  biological  phenomena.  This 
bears more than a passing resemblance to his treatment of the union: in each case, 
something ruled out by his wider philosophy gets aﬃrmed without explanation. There 
are two diﬀerences worth noting here.  First,  Descartes aﬃrms the existence of the 
union explicitly, while his aﬃrmation of teleology in the natural world is tacit at best. 
Second, while Descartes’s dualism entirely lacks the resources to provide a reductionist 
account of the union, that’s not the case for teleology. Descartes does have reductionist 
accounts  of  both  anthropogenic  and  non-anthropogenic  teleology.  The  former,  as 
discussed above,  comes down to activity  towards  ends  known by minds;  the  latter 
comes down to God’s purposes. Anthropogenic teleology is no problem, because the 
ends of minds are accessible to us.  But God’s purposes are inscrutable, and, hence, 
whatever non-anthropogenic teleology there may be in the natural world could only 
ever be mysterious.14  So, Descartes’s system certainly has the resources to provide a 
reductionist  account  of  anthropogenic  teleology.  And,  in  a  sense,  it  also  has  the 
resources to provide a reductionist account of non-anthropogenic teleology. It’s just 
that the results of that account will always be beyond our grasp – and, consequently, it 
is entirely useless for the acquisition of knowledge.
The result of that inaccessibility is that the reduction of non-anthropogenic teleology 
that is possible in principle ends up being impossible in practice, within Descartes’s 
system: final  causes  might rest  in God’s  purposes,  but we humans will  never know 
them.  And given  that  God’s  purposes  are  inscrutable,  whatever  non-anthropogenic 
teleology Descartes identifies in the natural world must either be an error on his part, 
or it must be something else. It could, perhaps, be that he is simply being careless with 
his use of teleological language, and with his identification of health. But, if  so, he 
would be allowing a lot to rest on such carelessness, given the importance he places on 
medicine and the role he allows health in everyday life and in sensation. In addition, it 
is diﬃcult to see how his account of physiology could possibly work in the absence of 
all ascription of function. So simple error seems an unlikely solution, which suggests 
that whatever is involved when Descartes invokes health, functions, or similar, it is not 
God’s  unknowable purposes.  In that case,  the in-principle reduction of teleology is 
14 Even the very existence of non-anthropogenic teleology would, presumably, be equally mysterious (because 
to presume that God has a specific purpose for any given thing is to pretend to share in his plans).
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beside the point; something else must account for the (apparent) non-anthropogenic 
teleology in the Cartesian natural world.
6.3.3 Reductions of natural teleology
Recent scholarship has made several proposals for reductionist accounts of particular 
forms  of  teleology  that  Descartes  appears  to  invoke.  Such  reductionist  accounts 
address what Gaukroger (2000: 387)  calls ‘intrinsic goal-directedness’,  as opposed to 
the ‘extrinsic goal-directedness’ of God’s purposes (or of anthropogenic teleology in the 
case  of  artefacts).  These reductionist  accounts  tend to be eliminativist  accounts  as 
well15, in that they aim to reduce the problematic apparent teleology to processes that 
are purely mechanical and that thus operate only through eﬃcient causation. If they 
can show that all the causation involved is eﬃcient, then there is no final causation 
involved;  the  assumption  underlying  this  move  seems  to  be  that,  without  final 
causation, there is no true teleology. Thus, Shapiro (2003) argues both that health is 
reducible to the structural integrity of the body and that structural integrity is non-
teleological (2003: 426). Similarly, Brown proposes a reduction of function to reciprocal 
dependencies  between  parts  of  the  body,  and  argues  that  this  allows  for  ‘a  non-
normative, non-teleological form of functional explanation’ (2012: 75). Hatfield (2008) 
suggests the possibility of a Lucretian selectionist account of function, but then rejects 
it for various reasons (not least because Descartes never so much as hints at holding 
such a position).
My intention here is  not to prove that teleology is  incontrovertibly  irreducible for 
Descartes.  If  the reductionist  interpretations do hold,  then the particular  forms of 
teleology  they  address  are  simply  amongst  the  things  Descartes  treats  reductively. 
What I want to show, instead, is that a reading in which Descartes takes teleology to be 
a  real  irreducible  is  coherent  and has  some advantages  (notably,  it  makes  sense  of 
Descartes’s  casual  treatment  of  teleology,  and  it  provides  grounds  for  projectionist 
accounts of biological teleology). All that said, of the reductionist accounts, it is not 
clear  that  Shapiro’s,  at  least,  does  hold.  She  notes  (2003:  433)  the  ‘boundary 
problem’  (Des Chene 2001:  132)  that  Des  Chene identifies:  extended substance,  in 
itself,  lacks  the  resources  to  ground  a  principled  individuation  of  any  particular 
15 That is not to say that all eliminativism is reductionist – §6.4.4 argues that eliminativism can be compatible 
with nonreductionism.
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machine.16 Shapiro (rightly) thinks that finding a way to define bodily boundaries purely 
within extended substance would provide Descartes with a means of defining health. 
Such a definition would allow health and ill-health to be determined in terms of the 
maintenance of that boundary. She proposes that a machine’s ‘stable intrinsic structure’ 
will  do exactly that job –  without ‘appeal to any extrinsic purpose’  (2003: 435).  For 
Shapiro, this stable intrinsic structure is what ‘allows the thing to be put to some kind 
of work, of whatever kind that might be’ (2003: 435). She stresses that the work it is put 
to need not be the work for which it was designed; as such, the account does not fall 
back on extrinsic ends.
On Shapiro’s reading, a machine stops being the kind of machine it is if it loses, or 
changes,  its  ‘stable  intrinsic  structure’.  A machine’s  structure  is  both  ‘stable’  and 
‘intrinsic’ if it is the particular structure that determines that particular machine: for as 
long as that structure is maintained, it remains that machine. Hence, presumably, some 
alien entirely ignorant of the simple machines that anglophone humans call ‘springs’ 
could  pick  one  up and use  it  to  absorb impact,  to  transmit  vibrations,  or  to  help 
construct some kind of time-keeping machine (see 2003: 434). Shapiro’s insight is that 
it is something about the intrinsic structure of the spring that lets it be put to those 
uses; if it were straightened out (thereby losing that structure), it would cease to be 
able  to  be  put  to  work  in  just  those  kinds  of  ways.  This  structure  is  describable 
reductively, purely in material terms (in the way that we can describe the composition 
of the mechanism of a clock in terms of the arrangement of its cogs, springs, etc.17). 
The idea is that the apparent teleology of health can be reduced to the maintenance of 
this reductively describable structure.
The trouble is that this doesn’t solve the boundary problem. The individuation here is 
still  dependent  on  extrinsic  ends,  in  that  it  depends  on  the  uses  to  which  some 
intentional creature wants to put it. What Shapiro shows is that those uses are not 
indiﬀerent to certain features of material substance, in that there are some things we 
can do with a spring and some we cannot. But individuation does not need to be purely 
dependent on extrinsic ends in order for us to run into the boundary problem; it just 
requires  extended  substance  in  itself  to  be  incapable  of  fully  determining  the 
boundaries of the body. It is true that there is something intrinsic to a spring that 
16 It is worth noting that the boundary problem might well also be an irreducible in its own right – and not 
just  for  biological  bodies,  but  for  any physical  body.  As  Des Chene points  out,  it  is  not  clear  what,  in 
extension itself, could do the job of defining the boundary of a body. Cf. Lennon 2007.
17 For more on the composition of a mechanism –and the irreducibles that involves – see Ch. 1.
154 CHAPTER SIX
makes it suitable for some uses and unsuitable for others, but those uses do not exist 
within matter itself: they are the ends of intentional beings and, as such, are necessarily 
extrinsic to Cartesian extended substance. So while the structure itself is intrinsic to 
extended substance,  the  uses  for  which that  structure  is  suitable  or  unsuitable  are 
extrinsic.
Given that the particular structure that determines the particular machine is relative to 
the  uses  to  which  it  can  be  put,  Shapiro’s  solution  to  the  boundary  problem still 
requires extrinsic ends. Whether the spring is coiled up or straightened out makes no 
diﬀerence to extended substance in itself, which persists regardless; the structure only 
becomes salient if some intentional being comes along looking to absorb some impact, 
transmit some vibration, or build a clock. Consequently, on Shapiro’s reading, extended 
substance in itself is still not capable of fully determining the boundaries of a machine, 
and the reduction fails. In the terms we’ve been using in this chapter, Shapiro’s attempt 
to establish a reductionist account of health is an attempt to establish knowledge of 
the independent existence of bodily health. What she ends up showing, though, is the 
non-independent existence of bodily health: we understand health in connection with 
our own ends, via the boundary problem. This, of course, is entirely consistent with the 
kind of knowledge described in this chapter: knowledge of bodily health is the kind of 
knowledge we can acquire of irreducibles.
6.3.4 The projectionist reading of natural teleology
6.3.4.1 Projectionism
Of the  rest  of  the  literature,  some draws  out  the  teleology  of  Descartes’s  biology 
without looking for solutions to the problem (e.g. Distelzweig 2015, while some opts 
for some form of ‘projectionist’ reading. Under projectionist readings, Descartes can 
attribute teleology to material bodies by the projection of, or by comparison to, the 
human  case.  As  Des  Chene  has  pointed  out,  we  humans  get  to  be  legitimately 
teleological, for Descartes, by virtue of our being unions.18 Since minds are intentional, 
they can have ends; and since our minds are joined to our bodies, they can assign these 
ends, such as health or function, to those bodies, for the sake of the union. Thus, a 
human body is healthy insofar as it is able to play its part in maintaining the union.
18 ‘The union is a proper subject of teleological properties, and thus of normative predicates defined in terms 
of  them. For the body-machine,  health and sickness  are external  valuations,  but for  the union they are 
genuine properties’ (Des Chene 2000a: 723).
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This much is  not problematic for Descartes.  Animals,  however,  (and human bodies 
considered purely in themselves) still seem to be at least describable in terms of health; 
and Descartes still addresses animal and human body-parts in terms of function. But 
animals (and human bodies in themselves)  do not have unions. Their teleology thus 
cannot come from their being joined to intentional minds. But what animal bodies do 
have is a distinct resemblance to the bodies of ensouled human bodies. (And human 
bodies in themselves look exactly  like ensouled human bodies.)  On the projectionist 
reading, we see teleology in the natural world because we project ensouled teleology 
onto bodies that have no intrinsic teleology of their own. In this way, we can say, for 
example, that an animal is healthy insofar as its state is analogous to that of a healthy 
ensouled human.
Des Chene outlines the projectionist reading thus:
[t]he functional language that, like his opponents, Descartes uses to describe living 
things can be explicated only as a projection of human intentions onto a nature devoid of 
them, or of divine intentions that we are in no position to fathom
(Des Chene 2001: 11; my emphasis).
And since we have no access to divine intentions, the only recourse for identifying 
teleology in the natural  world (in this  case,  functions)  is  through the projection of 
human intentions.  Similarly,  in a paper on Cartesian health,  Manning summarises a 
version of the reading as follows:
[f]or the physicians who worried that the health of a machine could not apply to the 
health of the human being, Descartes could remind them that they were getting 
things  backwards.  The  health  of  the  machine  is  parasitic  on  the  health  of  the 
human being, not the other way around
(Manning 2013: 261).
This is both the problem and a solution to it in a nutshell. The health of a machine 
cannot apply to the health of a human being precisely because, as established above, 
extended substance  in  itself  lacks  the  resources  to  ground teleology.  But,  Manning 
claims, this is the wrong way around: human health is not modelled on machine health; 
machine health is modelled on human health. That is, reductionist accounts such as 
Shapiro’s attempt to account for human health in terms of machine health, and they 
fail  because  machine  health  can  only  be  accounted  for  in  terms  of  human health. 
Manning goes on to explain:
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[f]or animals and other living things, the intrinsic denomination of nature to which 
their extrinsically denominated ‘nature’ relates is the human being’s body when in 
union with the mind. In their case, however, it is through the intermediary of the 
human  machine  that  they  relate  to  the  appropriate  intrinsic  denomination  of 
‘nature’
(Manning 2013: 262).
Here, Manning refers to Descartes’s use of ‘natures’ in Meditation Six’s discussion of 
teleology, where Descartes writes,
when I consider the purpose of the clock, I may say that it is departing from its 
nature  when it  does  not  tell  the  right  time;  and  similarly  when I  consider  the 
mechanism of the human body, I may think that,  in relation to the movements 
which normally occur in it, it too is deviating from its nature if the throat is dry at a 
time when drinking is not beneficial to its continued health. But I am well aware 
that ‘nature’ as I have just used it has a very diﬀerent significance from ‘nature’ in 
the other sense. As I have just used it, ‘nature’ is simply a label which depends on 
my thought; it is quite extraneous to the things to which it is applied, and depends 
simply on my comparison between the idea of a sick man and a badly-made clock, 
and the idea of a healthy man and a well-made clock. But by ‘nature’ in the other 
sense I understand something which is really to be found in the things themselves; 
in this sense, therefore, the term contains something of the truth.
When we say, then, with respect to the body suﬀering from dropsy, that it has a 
disordered nature because it has a dry throat and yet does not need drink, the term 
‘nature’ is here used merely as an extraneous label. However, with respect to the 
composite, that is, the mind united with this body, what is involved is not a mere 
label, but a true error of nature, namely that it is thirsty at a time when drink is 
going to cause it harm
(CSM i: 58–9; AT vii: 85).
If I deviate from my nature by drinking when drinking is unhealthy, I deviate from an 
intrinsic norm. If a clock deviates from its nature by failing to keep time, however, the 
norm it deviates from is extrinsic: it is in the ‘nature’ of a clock to keep time only in 
relation  to  the  ends  of  intentional  creatures  that  use  clocks  to  tell  time.  The 
mechanisms of extended substance themselves, Descartes says, cannot be treated as 
having intrinsic norms; whether or not it keeps time makes no diﬀerence at all to the 
clock in itself – that norm does not inhere in the mechanisms themselves but is an 
‘extraneous  label’  applied by minds.  The union,  however,  can have intrinsic  norms: 
edema causes a ‘true error of nature’ – it is ‘true’ in that the nature is not, in this case, 
an extraneous label but inheres in the union in question (it is ‘really to be found in the 
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[thing itself]’); unlike a clock, a union in itself is capable of having (and does have) ends, 
health chief amongst them (Passions 2/52; AT xi: 372).
Manning’s point is  that health in non-human living creatures is  an extraneous label 
applied by virtue of comparison to the human body, which gets its ‘health’ by virtue of 
the inherent nature of the union of which it is a part. In the same way that the human 
body considered in itself can be described as healthy by reference to the union, so can 
the animal – just at one further remove: the animal is healthy by comparison to the 
human body which is healthy with reference to its union. Manning expands on this 
reading in a recent paper19:
the  abstraction  that  sets  up  the  comparison  between  us  and  animals  is  an 
abstraction from the person’s body to the human body [. . .]. Yet Descartes’s point 
of departure remains the person’s body. Fundamentally, Descartes’s biology involves 
(1)  using what we know about the person’s body and then (2)  abstracting to the 
human body (that it has certain sense organs, behaves and moves in certain ways, 
etc.) (3) to identify analogs in the world (those things with a similar shape, sense 
organs, behavior, and movements) and then (4) to attribute causes to those analogs 
given what we know about the human body [. . .].
My  proposal  is  that  the  person’s  body  sets  the  agenda  for  Descartes’s  biology  and  that 
Descartes’s practice commits him to the view that the living bodies in the world have a nature 
similar to the person’s body. In other words, Descartes’s ontology of natures is not an ontology 
of de facto physical natures [. . .] but, rather, an ontology of projected natures. The human 
body and animal bodies have natures that cannot be reduced to the nature of body, 
given that they are identified through an abstraction from the person’s body. Just as 
the  person’s  body  can  be  corrupted  and  ‘true  errors  of  nature’  can  occur,  by 
projecting our nature onto other living things we enable ourselves to find analogs to 
the ‘true errors of nature’ we initially identified in ourselves
(Manning 2015: 232; my emphases).
Here, Manning adopts the terms ‘human body’ to refer to the human body in itself and 
‘person’s body’ to refer to the human body as involved in a union with a mind (2015: 
228), but his position remains consistent. He concludes that we do identify normative 
natures in addressing living things, but they are ‘projected natures’ rather than ‘de facto 
physical natures’ inherent in extended substance. And the projection works, ultimately, 
by analogy with the person’s body – that is, the body in the union.
19 In which he uses it to ground the disciplinary identity of Cartesian biology. Cf. Ch. 3, §3.3.3 here, which 
argues against the need for any such disciplinary identity.
158 CHAPTER SIX
6.3.4.2 Projectionism, antirealism, and real irreducibles
There might seem to be a problem with the projectionist reading: it might appear to be 
antirealist about teleology. If teleology is nothing but a projection of human ends onto 
a world intrinsically devoid of ends, then natural teleology is, presumably, not real. At 
first glance, antirealism about teleology in the physical world ought to be a distinct 
strength of the projectionist reading: if no teleology inheres within animals or plants, 
then Descartes has not contravened his ontology of extended substance. However, this 
seems to put Descartes in the position of claiming that the sheep that flees the wolf 
(AT vii: 230) has nothing of its own to preserve in doing so20; its action is comparable to 
what a human would do out of a self preservation that the sheep itself lacks. Such an 
interpretation is by no means out of the question – the sheep is, after all, an automaton 
that  seems  to  have  been  designed  to  produce  certain  behaviours  under  certain 
conditions. But, at the very least, it seems counterintuitive to claim that actions that 
do in fact preserve an animal’s health (in that they keep it operating) have nothing real 
to preserve.
This is indeed a problem if we maintain that only reducibles are real for Descartes: in 
that case, projectionism can be nothing but projection; in that case, projectionism is 
the imposition of human ends on a world to which they are purely extrinsic. But, as 
this  chapter  and  the  previous  have  shown,  Cartesian  knowledge  need  not  be 
reductionist, and, as Chapter Four showed, Descartes can allow irreducibles into his 
ontology. On that understanding, the irreducibility of natural teleology does not imply 
its unreality. Natural teleology is simply another epistemic gap in Descartes’s dualist 
system: it cannot be accounted for within that system, but the epistemology of the 
dualism  does  not  exhaust  Descartes’s  means  of  knowledge  acquisition.  The 
irreducibility  of  natural  teleology does mean that we cannot have knowledge of  its 
independent  existence.  But  we can still  know of  the existence of  natural  teleology 
insofar as it is not independent of us.
What this means concretely is that the teleology we see in the material world is always 
going  to  be  combined  with  our  own,  human  teleology  in  some  way,  whether  by 
identifying in animals the same health that we maintain, or by analogy with our own 
bodies, or by some other means. Whatever natural teleology we can know can only be 
20 In a letter to More, Descartes suggests that health, specifically, pertains only to humans (5 February 1649; 
AT v: 270). This, in turn, suggests that it is meaningless in relation to animals. It is not entirely clear how 
serious Descartes is in that passage, but, even if we do understand him to deny animal health, he nevertheless 
takes the sheep to run from the wolf. There does seem to be something in the sheep itself that causes that 
behaviour – it seems to be more than simply a projection simpliciter. See Des Chene (2001: 150).
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known in connection with our own ends. This is why Cartesian natural teleology needs 
to be projectionist: we cannot know it except insofar as it is inextricably wrapped up 
with human teleology.  This  is  also why Shapiro’s  attempt to provide a  reductionist 
account  of  bodily  health  ends  up  relying  on  a  conception  of  boundary  relative  to 
human ends. In no way does this undermine the reality of natural teleology: real natural 
teleology is simply something that cannot be known independently. If natural teleology 
is a real irreducible, then the antirealism problem ceases to be an issue: Descartes’s 
system lacks the resources to provide a reductionist grounding for it, but there really is 
identifiable teleology in the physical world.
6.3.5 The risk of arbitrary knowledge
The  obvious  objection  to  the  real  irreducible  reading  is  that  it  seems  to  risk 
arbitrariness.  Given  Descartes’s  extensive  use  of  teleology,  interpreting  natural 
teleology as real but irreducible appears to allow an awful lot into his biology that is not 
subject to the constraints and checks of his wider system. If we allow him this much, if 
irreducible teleology can legitimately permeate Descartes’s biology, what prevents him 
from importing  sundry  other  things  ruled  out  in  his  ontology?  In  other  words,  if 
teleology,  why  not  powers  and  forms?  Part  of  the  answer  is  that  Descartes  quite 
eﬀectively makes powers and forms redundant within his system: he puts considerable 
work into showing that everything they explain is (at least) equally explicable using the 
elements of his ontology. As we have seen, teleology and the union cannot be similarly 
reduced  away.  Nor,  it  seems,  can  they  be  simply  eliminated  or  avoided:  Descartes 
cannot deny our sensory knowledge of  our being unions,  and,  evidently,  he cannot 
explain a whole range of biological phenomena without involving teleology. Thus, there 
are two conditions for Descartes to treat a phenomenon as a real irreducible: it must 
(of course) be irreducible, and it must be ineliminable. Consequently, powers and forms 
are  not  a  concern  because  of  their  reducibility,  while,  say,  magic  is  not  a  concern 
because Descartes can, and does, avoid it entirely. Knowledge of real irreducibles, then, 
is not arbitrary and not without conditions: it is only what Descartes cannot avoid and 
cannot reduce that needs to be treated in this way.
Simmons’ treatment of Cartesian natural philosophy shows how this approach works 
concretely.  On Simmons’  account,  Descartes’s  objection  to  the  use  of  teleology  in 
natural philosophical explanations is an objection to ‘the ways in which the attribution 
of ends has interfered with the pursuit of eﬃcient causes’  (2001: 69).  The problem 
Descartes has with occult  powers is  that they allow explanations to bottom out at 
higher levels, when there are lower-level, micro-mechanical explanations still to be had 
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(2001 :  70–2 ) . 21  But  a spect s  o f  te leo logy  can  work  per fect l y  we l l  a s 
‘placeholders’ (Simmons 2001: 71), such that ‘the sort of functional analysis in which 
Descartes engages amounts to the first step toward (what he views to be)  a proper 
investigation of some of the underlying mechanical causes’ (Simmons 2001: 75). Thus, 
Descartes allows teleology into natural philosophy in order to reduce it away where 
possible. Whatever cannot be reduced away, and cannot be eliminated (because, e.g., 
the blood-pumping, as opposed to sound-making, function of the heart subtends the 
mechanical explanation), remains as a real irreducible.
6.4 Life
6.4.1 Life beyond eliminativism
Within the confines  of  his  dualist  ontology,  Descartes  can only  be an eliminativist 
about  life.  This  much  was  established  in  Chapter  Three.  There  is  nothing  either 
material or mental (or accessibly theological)  for a concept of life to be reduced to. 
This, I’ve argued, is fine: Descartes can do everything he needs to in biology in the 
total absence of any well-defined, principled concept of life. It is in this sense that he is 
an eliminativist, rather than a reductionist, about life. If Descartes cannot reduce life 
to anything in his ontology, one conclusion to draw is that, for him, life is nothing at all, 
as Chapter Three claimed. In this section, I am going to draw a second conclusion: that 
life is still a meaningful category for Descartes, despite his eliminativism. This means 
that Descartes both gets to be a strict eliminativist about life and gets to be what 
amounts to a kind of vitalist. The claim is that he is a vitalist in the, admittedly broad, 
sense  that  he  has  a  weak  metaphysical  commitment  to  the  existence  of  life.  His 
‘vitalism’, however, is entirely nonfunctional, in that it plays no role whatsoever in his 
natural philosophy.
For any kind of vitalism to be compatible with eliminativism about life seems more 
than a little counterintuitive. Even in its broadest sense, vitalism must involve taking 
life  to  be  something  or  other,  while  eliminativism is  precisely  the  claim that  it  is 
nothing.  The  resolution  of  that  tension  comes  from  taking  Descartes  to  be  an 
eliminativist  with respect to the ontology of  his  dualist  system, and a quasi-vitalist 
outside that ontology. My argument here will be that life is eliminated exactly because 
the dualist ontology lacks the resources to account for life, just as it lacks the resources 
to account for the union and teleology. By itself, though, that does not necessarily mean 
that there is no such thing as life for Descartes. All it means is that the dualist system 
21 Ch. 1 here deals extensively with levels and mechanical explanations.
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cannot tell us what life is. That could still be because there is nothing real there to 
define (and so eliminativism holds regardless).  But it  could instead be because of a 
simple epistemic gap in the dualism, as we have seen above for the union and teleology. 
The position I am advocating here is that, despite its indefinability in the terms of the 
dualist ontology, a nonreductionist notion of life is indeed available to Descartes.
6.4.2 Life and indefinability
6.4.2.1 Everyone knows what life is
In a paper on the definition of life, the biochemist Daniel Koshland Jr recounts an 
anecdote from a conference dedicated to the subject:
After many hours of launching promising balloons that defined life in a sentence, 
followed by equally conclusive punctures of these balloons, a solution seemed at 
hand: “The ability to reproduce—that is the essential characteristic of life,” said one 
statesman of science. Everyone nodded in agreement that the essential of a life was 
the ability to reproduce, until one small voice was heard. “Then one rabbit is dead. 
Two rabbits—a male and female—are alive but either one alone is dead.” At that 
point, we all became convinced that although everyone knows what life is there is 
no simple definition of life
(Koshland 2002: 2215).
Koshland takes the lesson here to be that we need a non-simple definition of life. Since 
we all  know what life  is,  there must be some definition available,  he assumes.  But 
simple definitions  –  by  which he seems to mean those that  reduce life  to a  single 
characteristic, such as the ability to reproduce – are not going to be able to do the job. 
What he proposes instead is the reduction of life to multiple basic principles, which 
can be instantiated in various ways. This bears more than a passing resemblance to 
LifeMK,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Three  (p.  66  above).  (And,  like  LifeMK,  Koshland’s 
definition suﬀers from some degree of arbitrariness, amongst other issues.22)
There is a diﬀerent lesson to be drawn from Koshland’s anecdote. And that is that the 
story  shows,  succinctly,  that  being  unable  to  define  life  is  not  inconsistent  with 
knowing what life is. We can all know what life is and and still not be able to say, in any 
principled way, what it is that life consists in. We can consistently distinguish living 
from non-living even if we can’t definitively point to specific features on which that 
22 Ruiz-Mirazo et al. claim that it ‘lacks [. . .] explanatory power’ and is ‘clearly redundant’ (2004: 326); it also 
fails  to  account  for  various  counter-examples  (Cleland  and  Chyba  2002:  388),  such  as  primordial  life 
(Zhuravlev and Avetisov 2006: 282).
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distinction depends – that is, even if we can’t find a reductive analysis of life or turn it 
into  a  natural  kind  (at  least,  not  under  a  reductionist  conception  of  nature).  Put 
otherwise,  this  is  a  rejection of  Koshland’s  assumption that  our  recognition of  life 
implies that there is still a definition to be found: Descartes knows what life is even 
though he makes life entirely indefinable.
6.4.2.2 Descartes and superfluous terms
In Chapter Three, I argued that Descartes’s frequent references to life, and his explicit 
use  of  it  as  a  category,  are  not  incompatible  with eliminativism about  life  for  two 
reason. First,  because he uses ‘life’  as a folk term, where doing otherwise would be 
ineﬃcient. And second, because he uses it as an Aristotelian term, with the intention of 
showing that he can explain everything the Aristotelians take to be encompassed by 
life, without requiring the addition of souls. Both these reasons stand. But the problem 
with this approach to Descartes’s use of the term and category is that he never acts as 
if he takes the term itself to be meaningless, as we might well expect him to, if what 
he’s  doing is  making the point that what others call  ‘life’  fails  to refer to anything 
within his ontology. He never claims that ‘life’ itself is fictitious (while he, of course, 
can nevertheless account for all  the phenomena others have associated with it);  he 
simply talks of life just as anyone who takes the category to be real would. And while 
Descartes  does  have  a  habit  of  appropriating  established  terms  for  his  own,  very 
diﬀerent, purposes, he is not one to suﬀer false concepts silently. Take, for instance, his 
rejection of forms and qualities in The World:
[o]thers may, if they wish, imagine the form of fire, the quality of heat, and the 
process of burning to be completely diﬀerent things in the wood. For my part, I am 
afraid of mistakenly supposing there is anything more in the wood than what I see 
must necessarily be in it, and so I am content to limit my conception to the motion 
of its parts. For you may posit ‘fire’ and ‘heat’ in the wood, and make it burn as 
much as you please: but if you do not suppose in addition that some of its parts 
move  about  and  detach  themselves  from their  neighbours,  I  cannot  imagine  it 
undergoing any alteration or change. On the other hand, if you take away the ‘fire’, 
take away the ‘heat’, and keep the wood from ‘burning’; then, provided only that 
you grant me there is some power which puts its finer parts into violent motion and 
separates them from the coarser parts, I consider that this power alone will be able 
to bring about all the same changes that we observe in the wood when it burns
(CSM i: 83; AT xi: 7).
Fire  and heat,  as  things  in  their  own right,  distinct  from the material,  mechanical 
activity of corpuscles, are excised from the account as superfluous. Descartes tells us, 
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with some condescension, that we can talk about fire and heat if we want, but we’d be 
wasting our time in doing so: there’s no fire as such, and there’s no heat as such; there’s 
only corpuscle activity. Similarly (and not unironically, given the present context), his 
rejection of the soul as the principle of life is both vociferous and explicit. As we have 
seen before, Descartes considers vegetative souls to be redundant (e.g. AT i: 523; AT iii: 
371) and the psychistic account of life to be a ‘very serious error’ (CSM i: 329; AT xi: 
330).
So why is the attribution of life to humans, animals, and plants not also an error? If 
Descartes expressly rejects forms, qualities, and vegetative souls (amongst other things) 
for their superfluity, it seems as though he should do the same with life. We might 
expect him to note the bankruptcy of the term and flag his own use of it as purely 
pragmatic, as with his occasional use of, e.g., ‘form’.23 As established in Chapter Three, 
he has good reason to distance himself from his use of the term – but he doesn’t. This 
is, perhaps, only a small puzzle, but it is one without an entirely satisfactory resolution 
as long as we stay purely within Descartes’s reductionist project: Descartes might be an 
eliminativist about life, but he does not seem to treat it as a false category.24
6.4.3 Indefinability and irreducibility
That Descartes does not attempt to distance himself from his own use of ‘life’ could 
just be an oversight on his part. To an extent, it is plausible that he could make use of 
the term without fully thinking through the consequences. But Descartes is rarely, if 
ever,  careless  with  his  language;  and  he  certainly  put  a  great  deal  of  thought  into 
matters  of  biology.  With that in mind,  simple negligence doesn’t  seem a promising 
answer to the puzzle at hand. So, let’s take him seriously when he claims not to deny 
life to animals (AT v: 278). Let’s assume that, when he talks about ‘life’, he knows what 
it is. But let’s also assume that he knows what life is while still maintaining that he is an 
eliminativist about life.
23 For instance, in the Description of the Human Body, Descartes describes the yeast-acting blood particles in 
the heart as separating particles of new blood ‘from one another, and in separating thus they acquire the 
form of fire’ (DHB: 203; AT xi: 282).
24  The  situation  is  diﬀerent  from that  of  teleology  in  one  significant  way:  Descartes  helps  himself  to 
teleological terms while also denying teleology in the material world, or at least our access to knowledge of it. 
By contrast, he is committed to eliminativism about life, but he never explicitly tells us that there is no such 
thing.
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Under  a  single-domain  model  of  conceivability,  that  would  presumably  be  a 
contradictory  proposition.  But  we  know  that  Descartes’s  major  domain  of 
conceivability, his dualism, can have epistemic gaps about things that we nevertheless 
know: everyone knows what the union is (they know it in the course of their ordinary 
lives), but the union is nevertheless indefinable in the terms of Descartes’s dualism. In 
§6.3,  I argued that the various forms of teleology Descartes includes in his biology 
might be appropriately addressed as ‘real’ features of the world that also happen to be 
irreducible to anything within his dualist ontology. There are good reason to think that 
the same goes for life: life constitutes an epistemic gap in Descartes’s dualism, but it is 
no less real for that. However, the case for life as a real irreducible is distinct from that 
of  teleology  in  a  way  that  makes  it  somewhat  stronger.  That’s  because,  although 
Descartes does reject teleology while still making implicit use of it, he never explicitly 
aﬃrms its presence in the material world. But he does explicitly aﬃrm the presence of 
life.
Descartes provides a relatively strong statement that there is indeed such a thing as life 
in the letter to Regius quoted at the beginning of Chapter Three, where Descartes 
writes,
[s]ince “self-moving” is a category with respect to all machines that move of their 
own accord, which excludes others that are not self-moving, so “life” can be taken as 
the category [vita sumi potest pro genere] which includes the forms of all living things
(to Regius, June 1642; CSMK: 214; AT iii: 566; translation adjusted). 
Descartes is equating the existence of ‘life’ as a category with that of ‘self-moving’ as a 
category: the former encompasses all living things just as the latter encompasses all 
self-moving  things.  But  ‘self-moving’  is  reducible  and  therefore  definable  within 
Descartes’s ontology. A self-moving thing is a thing that contains its own principle of 
movement,  rather than being moved by external  causes.  And since Descartes takes 
movement to be a mode of extended substance, ‘self-moving’ can be reduced in the 
terms of his ontology.25 The category requires no additional metaphysical commitments 
from Descartes;  his  commitment  to  extended  substance  already  covers  everything 
needed. It makes good sense, then, for ‘self-moving’ to be an existent category: it is 
both a category we recognise and one for which we can access well defined conditions 
for  membership.  We know that  to  belong  to  the  category  is  to  have  an  internal 
25 That said, the boundary problem (see Des Chene (2001: 132) and p. 152 above) undoubtedly applies to the 
‘self ’ part of ‘self-moving’. It might turn out that, instead of ‘life’ operating on the model of ‘self-moving’, 
‘self-moving’ operates on the model of ‘life’. That is, it might be that the category of ‘self-moving’ is also a 
real irreducible that constitutes an epistemic gap in Descartes’s dualism.
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principle of self movement. For life, on the other hand, we do recognise the category, 
but the conditions of membership are indefinable: to belong to the category ‘life’ is just 
to be alive, but we can say nothing definitive about what it is for a category-member to 
be alive.
According to Descartes, then, ‘life’ is an existent category with indefinable membership 
conditions. This is entirely consistent with the situation for the union, which we know 
to exist but is nevertheless indefinable. Given that, a notion of life is indeed available 
to Descartes, as a real irreducible, on the model of the union. And if we allow him that 
notion, we can make sense of his unapologetic endorsement of the category and use of 
the  term.  On this  reading,  even  though life  is  irreducible  within  his  ontology,  the 
category is  just  as  real  as  the category of  ‘self-moving’.  By the same token,  he can 
meaningfully and legitimately describe animals, people and plants as ‘living’, distinguish 
between living and dead eels (AT ii: 66), or even claim that life ends when any of the 
principle parts of the body stops working (AT xi: 330; see Ch. 2, §2.4.3) – all without 
being able to say what it is to be alive, in what the distinction between living and dead 
eels consists, or what it is that ends when the body breaks down. In all these cases, 
Descartes can do no more than appeal to life itself.
In her paper on Descartes’s conception of life, MacKenzie asks for a definition in terms 
of ‘what is asserted by the whole sentence “x is alive”’ (1975: 2). Given all the above, 
alongside the conclusions of Chapter Three, this is the only definition Descartes can 
provide:
LifeD := x is alive if and only if x is alive.
Clearly, this is not what MacKenzie had in mind; a tautologous definition is not an 
informative one. But that does not prevent Descartes from having a meaningful notion 
of life, just as he has a meaningful notion of the union. The issue is that we can’t say 
anything more about it, at least not in the terms of his dualist ontology. But that is a 
secondary issue. What is crucial is that this is a definition that Descartes does get to 
employ. It turns out that appealing to life itself is, against expectations, a real option 
for Descartes.
6.4.4 Eliminativism, nonreductionism, and vitalism
6.4.4.1 Eliminativism and nonreductionism about life
In Chapter Three, I argued that Descartes is not a reductionist about life itself because 
there is nothing in his ontology to which life can be reduced (and, not incidentally, also 
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because he makes no attempt to provide a reductionist account). Within the confines 
of his dualism, he is an eliminativist about life. And in the present chapter so far, I have 
argued that Descartes nevertheless  does have a  meaningful  notion of  life,  as  a  real 
irreducible.  That  means  that  Descartes  is  both  an  eliminativist  about  life  and  a 
nonreductionist about life. That is an odd conclusion to reach if eliminativism is, as it 
is  generally  taken  to  be,  a  particularly  thoroughgoing  form  of  reductionism. 
Eliminativism  and  nonreductionism  about  the  same  thing  ought  to  be  mutually 
incompatible, and that ought to be a problem.
There is a way to resolve this without accusing Descartes of gross inconsistency. And 
that, as suggested above, is to understand Descartes as an eliminativist about life in one 
domain  of  conceivability  and  a  nonreductionist  in  another.  The  point  need  not 
necessarily be couched in terms of separate domains, but that is a usefully revealing 
way of analysing what’s going on in Descartes’s disparate treatments of life. Within the 
domain proper to his dualism, Descartes can only be an eliminativist about life – and 
within that domain he is, as Chapter Three showed, fully eliminativist. But outside that 
domain, he is free to recognise the category of ‘life’ and to be nonreductionist about it. 
And we do know that there is an outside to that domain for Descartes, because that’s 
where the notion of the union resides.
In this way, there is no problem of incompatibility:  eliminativism about life is fully 
compatible with nonreductionism about life as long as the two positions are particular 
to diﬀerent domains. This is presumably the de facto present-day situation with certain 
strands of neuroscience and traditional psychology (or even folk psychology). The one 
is eliminativist about certain things that are treated nonreductively by the other. But 
they belong to  diﬀerent  domains,  with diﬀerent  ontologies  and diﬀerent  epistemic 
aims,  so there is  no necessary problem of  compatibility  between them. That is,  of 
course, there is no problem of compatibility unless we try to collapse the one into the 
other.
For  his  part,  however,  Descartes  shows  no  interest  in  trying  to  collapse  the  two 
domains. We saw this in the case of the union (Ch. 4 and §6.2 above). And we see the 
same thing in this section and Chapter Three, in the way Descartes addresses life. He 
never attempts to reduce life itself to the elements of his dualist ontology, nor does he 
ever  express  the  desire  to.  He  undoubtedly  is  interested  in  attempting  to  reduce 
various phenomena associated with life, but not to reduce life itself. We would say he 
had no interest at all in life itself, if it weren’t for his aﬃrmation of the category in the 
letter to Regius, along with various non-trivial uses of the term. That he does all this 
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with  absolutely  no  handwringing,  with  no  attempt  to  explain  the  apparent 
contradiction, gives us good reason to think that he was not interested in trying to 
overcome  the  incompatibility  through  domain  collapse.  Given  this,  and  given  his 
willingness  to  maintain  a  separate  domain  with  respect  to  the  union,  it  seems 
reasonable to conclude that Descartes is an eliminativist about life in one domain and a 
nonreductionist about life in another.
6.4.4.2 Descartes’s eliminativism and vitalism
Vitalism has a long history of the being the bogeyman of the life sciences. Painted as 
the baseless supposition of some magical life force, it gets taken to be the disreputable 
counterpart of serious biological research. Perhaps the only area in which Descartes’s 
programme in biology has retained some mainstream respectability is its apparent use 
of hard-nosed reductionist mechanism as a repudiation of the Aristotelian, Galenic, 
and  Paracelsian  supposed  vitalisms  that  preceded  it.  And  now I  am claiming  that 
Descartes thinks there is such a thing as life in itself, and that it is irreducible into 
ontologically acceptable terms. That might seem like a cause for concern over whether 
this reading ruins the one aspect of Descartes’s biology that is well regarded. Does it, in 
other words, turn him into some kind of vitalist?
If vitalism is understood in its bogeyman form, then that concern is easily dismissed. 
Nowhere does  Descartes  posit,  or  sanction,  any non-natural  life  force.  Indeed,  the 
arguments of Chapter Three stand: what Descartes does is to methodically, repeatedly, 
and explicitly  reject  any cause of  vital  phenomena that  falls  outside the properties 
intrinsic to his extended substance. While, on my reading, he does also have a notion 
of life as an irreducible, it is kept entirely separate from his treatment of biology, and is 
accorded no explanatory power or role. This is a long way from the kind of vitalist 
approach that is supposed to rely on some vital force to make its biology work. Even on 
my reading, Descartes still excises mysterious forces from the science of biology. His 
sober  materialist  position  abides  (even  if,  if  I  am  right  in  this  dissertation,  his 
reductionism is looking ragged at the edges), and the reputation of his biology stays 
intact.
However, vitalism rarely took its bogeyman form. Wolfe (2014; 2015; Wolfe and Terada 
2008)  distinguishes  between  what  he  calls  ‘substantive’  and  ‘functional’  vitalisms. 
Substantive vitalism is the metaphysical commitment to the living thing as a distinct 
metaphysical substance of some kind. This is the kind of vitalism found in the work of 
Stahl or Driesch, which, with their talk of anima and entelechies, most resemble the 
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form  of  vitalism  reviled  by  twentieth-century  biologists.  But,  as  Wolfe  shows, 
substantive vitalism is a poor description of the work of, for example, the Montpellier 
Vitalists (‘the ones for whom the term “vitalist” was coined!’ (Wolfe 2015: 926)). Barthez, 
he  argues,  came  closest  to  adopting  a  substantive  approach,  but  then  explicitly 
abandoned all interest in metaphysical significance:
Paul-Joseph  Barthez,  the  Dean  of  the  School  [.  .  .]  had  initially  asserted  the 
existence of an independent vital force, but withdrew this and added a chapter to 
the second edition of his book entitled “Skeptical considerations on the nature of 
the vital principle” (Barthez [1858], III, p. 96f.). He warned that one should follow 
an  “invincible  skepticism”  (p.  32)  or  a  “reasonable  Pyrrhonism”  (p.  274)  when it 
comes to the vital principle. He only “personified” the vital principle, he explains, 
for ease of argument (p. 126). In a wonderful phrase, he says: “I am as indiﬀerent as 
could be regarding Ontology considered as the science of entities” (Barthez 1806, p. 
96, n. 17)
(Wolfe 2015: 6).
Barthez’s work is concerned with the investigation of vital phenomena, but, thanks to 
his ‘scepticism’ and ‘indiﬀerence’, he remains agnostic about the metaphysical status of 
the vital principle itself. Elsewhere, Wolfe identifies this approach, in both Barthez and 
the rest of the Montpellier School, amongst others, with a Newtonian positing of an 
unknown as an object of research – what he calls, in a neat phrase derived from Hall, a 
‘provisionally  inexplicable  explicative  device’  (Wolfe  2014:  255).  This  is  a  functional 
vitalism: vitality itself is not at stake, but it does serve to drive the research.
On the face of it, at least, this functional vitalism looks a lot like Descartes’s treatment 
of life. He accounts for vital phenomena piecemeal, while maintaining an indiﬀerence 
towards  the  status  of  life  itself.  And  Chapter  Three’s  characterisation  of  ‘life’,  in 
Descartes’s  use,  as  either  a  folk  term or  an Aristotelian  term (Ch.  3,  §3.3.2),  could 
certainly  be  read  as  ‘personifications’  of  life  purely  for  the  ease  of  argument,  per 
Barthez.  There  is  a  significant  diﬀerence  between  this  and  functional  vitalism, 
however: for Descartes, life is entirely non-functional.
Life  is  non-functional  for  Descartes  because  it  does  not  serve  at  all  to  drive  his 
research. This is precisely what the conclusion of Chapter Three amounts to: Descartes 
is  careful  to address all  the phenomena of  the body without reference to life.  The 
questions he deals with are never about how such-and-such a process contributes to 
life, but how such-and-such a process contributes to locomotion, or sensation, or the 
26 Quotations, and pagination, from Wolfe 2015 are taken from Wolfe’s original English text.
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continuation of the heartbeat individually, and so on. When Descartes does refer to 
living and non-living (such as in articles five and six of The Passions), it is to point out 
how very banal a distinction that really is, and how death is entirely due to the purely 
material  breakdown of certain parts  of  the body.  The diﬀerence between dead and 
living, after all, comes down to the diﬀerence between a broken watch and an intact 
and wound watch (a. 6). Even if Descartes does have an additional notion of life as an 
irreducible, it has no role in his accounts of the operation of the body. Whatever that 
notion might be, it is undoubtedly non-functional; there is nothing explicative about it.
So,  Descartes’s  notion of  life  is  non-functional.  On the  other  hand,  if  we  do take 
seriously his aﬃrmation of the existence of the category of ‘life’ and use of the term, it 
does imply some metaphysical commitment. Unlike with ‘self-moving’, the category of 
‘life’ is not covered by pre-existing commitments (if it were, it would be reducible). And 
unlike Barthez, Descartes is not entirely indiﬀerent: he tells us that ‘life’ is an existent 
category.  This  looks  more  like  substantive  vitalism.  We would  not  want  to  call  it 
‘substantive’ of course (just because the exact ontological status of whatever is outside 
Cartesian dualism is necessarily obscure, making it a metaphysical jump too far to refer 
to life as a ‘substance’). But it is closer to being substantive than functional: it is the 
claim  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  life  (whatever  it  may  be)  that  is  specific  to 
Descartes’s notion of life. With this in mind, Descartes’s position on life seems to be 
something less than Montpellier Vitalism in the pragmatic, functional sense, because of 
its non-functionality, but something more in the metaphysical sense. At the same time, 
it  appears  to  be  straightforwardly  something  less  than  substantive  vitalism,  both 
because  of  its  metaphysical  obscurity  and,  and,  because  life  itself  has  no  role  in 
Descartes’s biology (Driesch’s vitalism, for example, is substantive but still functional, 
in that entelechies play a central part in his biology).
Descartes is clearly not a vitalist in the bogeyman sense of the term. Given Wolfe’s 
distinctions, however, we would be hard-pressed not to see Descartes as some sort of 
vitalist. He does have a metaphysical commitment to ‘life’ as a category (assuming we 
take  him  seriously  on  that  count).  That  commitment  is  only  implicit,  and  is, 
presumably,  only  a  weak  commitment  to  an  obscure  notion  of  life.  It  is  also  a 
commitment  to  an  entirely  non-functional  notion.  But,  it  is  a  commitment 
nonetheless. Descartes does seem to subscribe to a weak form of vitalism, even if only 
implicitly. Following Wolfe, we might call Descartes’s position ‘non-functional quasi-
substantive vitalism’.
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6.4.5 Why a non-functional notion of life still matters
The previous section and Chapter Three both emphasised just how non-functional life 
itself is for Descartes. This might well look like something of an objection against the 
argument here. If life is useless for Descartes’s biology, it is not clear that there is a 
mandate for pressing the point about a nonreductionist notion of life, or for arguing in 
favour of a Cartesian vitalism. My response is this: the very uselessness of life is part of 
what makes Cartesian vitalism a compelling reading. In contrast to the cases of the 
union and teleology, life is a low-stakes commitment for Descartes. Nothing depends 
on its existence or on its precise nature. His inability to analyse life in the terms of his 
dualism poses no problem at all, because, if he happened to be mistaken about life, it 
would have no eﬀect on anything else in his system. This allows him the luxury of 
making the unapologetic,  if  casual,  metaphysical  commitment  to  life  that  he  does. 
Thanks to its non-functionality, the claim that ‘life’ is an existent category is a claim 
Descartes  can aﬀord to make.  This  means that  the option of  reflecting Koshland’s 
observation that everyone knows what life is is open to him, with no need for concern 
over not being able to provide any kind of definition.
6.4.6 Knowledge of the non-independent existence of life
As established above, in order for knowledge of real irreducibles not to contravene 
Descartes’s criteria for knowledge acquisition, their existence can only be known non-
independently. The non-independent existence of the union was straightforward: I am 
the union that  pertains  to me,  and I  can nothing about its  (nonsensical)  existence 
independent of me. With natural teleology, our knowledge turned out to be tied up 
with  our  own ends.  The  situation  is  not  so  clear  for  life.  It  is  not  obvious  what, 
specifically,  knowledge  of  life  is  combined  with.  However,  our  original  example  of 
Cartesian  non-independent  knowledge  was  knowledge  of  appearances,  acquired 
through the senses (p. 145 above). We do not need further specification to know that 
knowledge acquired through the senses is combined with ourselves. In the case of the 
appearance of the colour red, we can reduce the sensation and know what red consists 
in  independent  of  our  seeing  it  (as  discussed  above,  it  consists  in  the  particular 
rotational motion of the minute particles propagating light).  In the case of life,  no 
reduction is available within Descartes’s dualism, so we can know nothing about what 
life would be in our absence. We cannot specify what life would be for a rabbit or 
(perhaps more understandably) for a tree. We can only experience rabbits and trees as 
living and clocks as non-living: we cannot point to anything independent of us that 
constitutes their life. We can know what life is without being able to define it. If this 
sounds insuﬃcient and disappointing, it needn’t: all it means is that Descartes’s dualist 
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system does not provide the resources to explain life in itself, independent of us, but 
that he can nevertheless uphold a commitment to the existence of life (whatever it 
might be).
6.4.7 Knowledge of life: vitalism and eliminativism
When Koshland notes that ‘although everyone knows what life is there is no simple 
definition of life’ (2002: 2215), he assumes that there is a (non-simple) definition of life 
available for the taking somewhere out there in the world, and that this definition will 
be accessible in terms established in the science. Descartes,  by contrast,  makes life 
utterly indefinable in the terms he’s established. And yet he tells Regius that ‘life’ is the 
category  that  covers  all  livings  things,  and  is  distinct  from but  just  as  real  as  the 
category of ‘self-moving’.  He repeatedly and seemingly meaningfully talks of life,  in 
various  contexts.  He  simultaneously  eliminates  life  from his  biology  and  commits 
himself  to  the  existence  of  life  as  a  real  irreducible.  All  this  ought  to  make  for  a 
significant contradiction.
It needn’t end up in contradiction, however, if all Descartes is doing is eliminating life 
from one domain of  conceivability  while  asserting  its  existence in  another.  This  is 
analogous with the case of  the union.  Moreover,  this  reading makes sense of  what 
might initially be the most puzzling aspect of Descartes’s treatment of life: that his use 
of  the  term  and  category  is  entirely  unapologetic;  he  talks  of  life,  but  never 
provisionally or with qualification. This is not, I have suggested, mere negligence on his 
part. On the reading given here, he can legitimately refer to life because he really does 
take it to exist, in spite of its indefinability and irreducibility. In this way, Descartes 
gets access to a notion of life, while still being an eliminativist about life within the 
confines of his dualism. Without endangering the strict materialism of his biology, he 
even gets to be a vitalist (of some sort).
6.5 Conclusion
If  Cartesian  knowledge  is  purely  reductionist,  if  we  can  have  knowledge  of  the 
existence  of  only  those  things  that  can  be  reduced to  the  elements  of  Descartes’s 
ontology,  then  Cartesian  knowledge  of  irreducibles  is  a  problem.  Indeed,  it’s 
oxymoronic. But Cartesian knowledge needn’t be purely reductionist. The reducibility 
criterion applies only to knowledge of the independent existence of external things 
with  their  particular  essences.  What  we  can  have  in  the  absence  of  reducibility, 
however, is knowledge of the non-independent existence of external things with their 
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particular essences. What this means is that we cannot have objective knowledge of 
irreducibles, but we can know them perfectly well from a subjective standpoint. For 
the union, this is relatively straightforward: I either am the union that pertains to me 
or, if I am just a mind, I am an intrinsic part of that union; consequently, I can know 
nothing about what the union that pertains to me would be without me (that concept is 
nonsensical), but I nevertheless know it ‘very clearly’ through my own involvement in 
it.
If natural teleology is interpreted in terms of the account of Cartesian nonreductive 
knowledge developed here, it ceases to be a problem for Descartes. That we cannot 
provide a reductionist account of teleology in the physical world means only that we 
can say nothing about what natural teleology would be in itself – that is, we cannot 
know it objectively. But we certainly can know it in combination with out own, human 
ends. This provides an epistemological basis for the projectionist readings of natural 
teleology given in the literature: we can only know natural teleology as a projection, or 
as a confused idea, but this does not imply antirealism about teleology in the physical 
world. Our inability to produce objective knowledge of it indicates not that natural 
teleology is not real, but simply that there is an epistemic gap in Descartes’s dualist 
system. We can know natural teleology to be real while not being able to extricate our 
own ends from that knowledge.
Similarly,  Descartes’s treatment of life can be understood as a case of nonreductive 
knowledge. We established in Chapter Three that Descartes eliminates life itself from 
his natural philosophy. Here, I argued that this eliminativism is compatible with a weak 
metaphysical commitment to the existence of life itself as a real irreducible. Descartes 
can know what life is, and distinguish living from non-living, even without being able to 
give a reductionist account of what life consists in.
Conclusion
There are two main conclusions I want to draw from this dissertation. First, despite his 
apparent  deep  and  systematic  commitments  to  reductionism  (in  ontological, 
epistemological, and more broadly methodological forms), Descartes needs to rely on 
nonreductionism in order to account for biology. That is,  I suspect,  because of the 
complexity  both  of  biological  bodies  themselves  and  of  the  practices  needed  to 
investigate them: while certain phenomena in, say, physics or meteorology appear to 
lend themselves fairly well to idealisation, to physical modelling, or to experimental 
isolation, biology complicates the matter considerably, especially given the techniques 
available in Descartes’s time. Vivisection allowed for only poor isolation of phenomena, 
while isolating an anatomical  structure would tend to destroy the active process at 
stake (i.e. the operation of the biological body). Descartes, then, had little choice but 
to address bodies as dynamic systems full of intradependencies and intra-actions. He 
could not eﬀectively decompose them to the extent required for a strict reductionist 
account. We still can’t.
Thus, as Chapter One showed, the mechanisms that Descartes relies on in accounting 
for  biology  are,  for  the  most  part,  not  the  billiard-ball  mechanisms of  corpuscular 
mechanics  but  whole,  dynamic  systems.  In  order  to  be  explanatory,  those  systems 
require  non-lowest-level  properties,  such  as  activities,  inter-level  dependencies,  and 
interdependencies.  This  reliance  on  interdependence  carries  over  into  Descartes’s 
treatment of the ‘principle of life’, as discussed in Chapter Two. It turns out that, on 
Descartes’s account, there is no single underlying principle that provides the motive 
force  of  the  body;  equally,  and  not  coincidentally,  there  is  no  single  foundational 
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epistemic  principle  of  the  science  of  physiology  either  (that  is,  there  is  no  single 
principle  that  grounds  Cartesian  knowledge  of  the  operation  of  the  body).  There 
cannot  be  such  a  principle,  because  the  body’s  major  systems  are  interdependent: 
provision of  the body’s  motive force is  a  circular  process that involves a  variety of 
systems; and any knowledge of physiological operations depends on knowledge of all 
those systems and their interactions. Consequently, despite Descartes’s appeals to the 
notion of a ‘principle of life’, the operation of the body can never be fully reduced to 
any one thing.
The  second  conclusion  is  that  Descartes’s  philosophy  includes,  and  relies  on, 
nonreductionism even at the core of its epistemology and metaphysics. Or, at least, 
that there is the inclusion of, and reliance on, nonreductionism implicit in Descartes’s 
epistemology and metaphysics.  This was the argument of Chapter Four. His dualist 
system cannot account for the union of mind and body, because the union is irreducible 
to  anything  in  his  dualist  ontology.  That  makes  the  union an  epistemic  gap in  his 
dualism. Nevertheless, Descartes claims, we do have knowledge of the union. He never 
suggests that our knowledge of it is inadequate in any way, or that our knowledge is 
delegitimised by its irreducibility. I have argued that all that, along with Descartes’s 
assertion  that  we  have  a  primitive  notion  of  the  union,  implies  that  there  is  an 
epistemology of the union separate from the epistemology of the dualist system. In 
addition, since the dualist metaphysics does not cover the union, if Descartes want to 
maintain that  the union exists,  he must be relying on an equally  separate,  implicit 
metaphysics to do so.
As argued in Chapters Four and Six respectively, the metaphysics and the epistemology 
of  the  union  are  subjective,  as  apposed  to  the  objective  view  from nowhere  that 
pertains to the dualist metaphysics and epistemology. They are subjective in that they 
are  concerned  entirely  with  the  non-independent  existence  of  things,  or  with  our 
knowledge thereof. Epistemologically, our knowledge of the non-independent existence 
of  a  thing  consists  in  our  having  knowledge  of  it  in  combination  with  ourselves. 
Ontologically, its existence is inextricable from our own. Consequently, as set out in 
Chapter Six, I can say nothing about what the union that pertains to me would be in 
my absence (because, of course, I am an inextricable part of that union1); similarly, I can 
say nothing about what natural teleology or life would be in themselves. If the union, 
natural teleology, or life could be reduced to the entities available within Descartes’s 
dualist ontology, they would have objective ontological status. They cannot, so they 
have  no  objective  ontological  status.  That  does  not  mean  that  Descartes  is  an 
1 This is so whether I take myself to be a union or to be just a mind. See the discussion on p. 145 above.
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antirealist about irreducibles such as the union, natural teleology, and life; it just means 
that, within his philosophy, these irreducibles are the kinds of things that exist non-
independently.
All this means that Descartes’s ontology is not as austere as he makes it out to be. 
There is more in Descartes’s world than thought, extension, and God. There are, of 
course, unions too – unions, that is, that do not reduce to thought, extension, or God. 
And there are various forms of natural teleology, and there is life. If my analysis here is 
right, then there may well be more Cartesian irreducibles than I have addressed in this 
dissertation. I have already noted that the unity of a biological body2, and perhaps the 
unity of any physical body3, might be treated as a real irreducible. The argument from 
interaction in Chapter Four suggests that physical causation might be too (in that, if 
Descartes  allows  no  secondary  causes,  physical  causation  can  only  be  understood 
through a notion of mind–body interaction that is irreducible to thought or extension). 
Indeed,  the account of  irreducibles  and nonreductionist  knowledge developed here 
might  be  expanded  to  address  Cartesian  secondary  causes  and  non-lowest-level 
properties  (such  as  those  discussed  in  Part  One)  in  general:  they  are,  after  all, 
irreducible (or apparently irreducible) to anything in extended substance.
My position  in  this  dissertation  is  not  that  Descartes  should  be  read  purely  as  a 
nonreductionist. Evidently, he should not. Nor is my position that nonreductionism is 
unconditionally ‘better than’ reductionism. Descartes makes great, and successful, use 
of reductionism. The majority of the Meditations attests to that, as do large swaths of 
his physics. Even the biology identified in Part One as nonreductionist still involves 
reduction to matter  (just  not to the lowest-level  properties  of  that  matter).  I  have 
focussed  on  the  nonreductionism  here  because  Descartes’s  reductionism  is  well-
established  and  by  no  means  short  of  recognition.  But  my  ultimate  point  is  that 
Descartes requires both: reductionism gets him a long way, but it has its failures, and it 
has  its  gaps.  Where  reductionism fails  him,  Descartes  turns  to  nonreductionism. 
Where  his  dualist  system cannot  account  for  a  feature  of  the  world,  he  turns  to 
irreducibles. And where distinctness becomes epistemically bankrupt, he relies on the 
epistemic productivity of confusion.
2 See Ch. 6, p. 153, n. 16 above.
3 See Ch. 1, p. 19, n. 13 above.
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Summary
Descartes is usually taken to be a strict reductionist, and he frequently describes his 
work in reductionist terms. This dissertation, however,  makes the case that he is  a 
nonreductionist in certain areas of his philosophy and natural philosophy (biology and 
the mind–body union in particular).  This might seem like simple inconsistency, or a 
mismatch between Descartes’s ambitions and his achievements. I argue here that it is 
more  than  that:  nonreductionism  is  compatible  with  his  wider  commitments; 
moreover,  allowing  for  irreducibles  increases  the  explanatory  power  of  Descartes’s 
system. The dissertation begins by showing where, in Descartes’s biology, reductionism 
fails him and he turns to nonreductionism (chapters one to three).  It then looks at 
Descartes’s  epistemology and metaphysics,  to establish the consistency of Cartesian 
nonreductionism (chapters four to six).
The first chapter assesses the basis for interpreting Descartes’s natural philosophy as 
reductionist:  his  corpuscular  mechanics.  Reductionism  does  seem  immediately 
apparent  in  Descartes’s  use  of  mechanism to  explain  the  natural  world.  After  all, 
natural  phenomena are  supposed to  reduce  down to  the  size,  shape,  position,  and 
motion of tiny pieces of matter. Chapter one argues that Cartesian mechanism is not 
always so reductionist. It looks at a range of mechanisms in Descartes’s treatment of 
physiology,  including  the  heartbeat,  respiration,  and  nutrition,  amongst  others.  It 
concludes that the mechanisms Descartes uses to account for these phenomena are 
systems,  and  that  they  rely  on  non-lowest-level  properties  of  those  systems  (e.g. 
organisation,  interdependence,  inter-level  dependence)  to  do  the  explanatory  heavy 
lifting.  That  is,  those  features  are  both  necessary  and  irreducible.  This  contrasts 
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strongly with the standard picture of Cartesian mechanism as consisting in reduction 
to billiard-ball-like particle collisions.
The ‘principle of life’ to which Descartes frequently refers is usually identified with the 
‘fire without light’ in the heart as the underlying principle of the operation of the body. 
Chapter two argues that Descartes has no such single underlying principle. It shows 
that his account of physiology explains the operation of the body through multiple 
interdependent systems,  with no one system more fundamental  than any other.  As 
such, Cartesian physiology is incompatible with a hierarchical conception of a body 
whose operations are driven by a single underlying principle. That is, the operation of 
the body is not reducible to any one thing.
If the principle of life turns out to be irreducible, then what exactly does Descartes 
take life itself to be? Chapter three makes the case for his being an eliminativist, rather 
than a reductionist about life. The scholarship has made various attempts to attribute a 
principled, reductionist conception of life to Descartes, from cardiac heat to sets of life 
functions subtended by arrangements of bodily parts, to an ontologically distinct kind 
of complexity, and so on. The chapter shows that these attempts all either result in 
arbitrariness  or  break  the  coherence  between  biology  and  the  rest  of  Descartes’s 
system.  I  argue  that  Descartes’s  dualist  ontology  does  not  have  the  resources  to 
produce a reductionist concept of life, and that his biology has no need for any such 
concept.  What  he  does  is  to  account  mechanistically  for  individual  physiological 
phenomena,  rather  than  addressing  life  as  such:  he  eliminates  life  itself  from his 
account of physiology.
Chapter four argues that the union of mind and body is irreducible,  for Descartes, 
when considered in terms of what he calls its ‘primitive notion’. First, I argue that the 
union makes for an epistemic gap in Descartes’s dualism: the reason he won’t, and can’t, 
explain it in the way he explains various properties of mind and body separately is that 
the union is indefinable in the terms of his dualism. What this tells us is that Descartes 
does not expect his dualist system to account for every single feature of the world: the 
union is  one exception (chapter  six  argues  that  there  are  others).  This  means  that 
Descartes  allows  for  knowledge  of  things  that  are  inaccessible  for  his  standard 
epistemology: he needs a separate epistemology to address the union. The chapter then 
extends  this  analysis  to  metaphysics.  This  is  more  contentious.  The  idea  is  that, 
because the dualist metaphysics does not cover the union, Descartes’s account of the 
union contains an implicit metaphysics that does.
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Chapter five argues that the epistemological strategies of the Meditations should not be 
read into Descartes’s  natural  philosophy.  It  argues that  the role  of  reductionism in 
Descartes’s  project  of  knowledge  acquisition  in  natural  philosophy  is  to  allow the 
intellect to make a judgement as to the independent existence of external things with 
their  particular  essences.  This  allows  us  to  say,  e.g.,  that  colour  does  not  exist 
independent  of  our  perception  of  it,  but  that  the  rotation  of  tiny  corpuscles 
propagating light does. The chapter makes that case through an analysis of a rule of 
knowledge acquisition that Descartes cites in several places: that almost no study time 
should be spent on matters that occupy the intellect alone, while almost all study time 
should  be  dedicated  to  matters  that  integrate  sensation  and  imagination  with  the 
intellect.
Given that Descartes is willing to allow an irreducible, the union, into his system, the 
final chapter argues that he has means for integrating other irreducibles into his natural 
philosophy.  It  builds  on  the  results  of  chapter  five  to  argue  that  nonreductionist 
knowledge is perfectly consistent with Descartes’s wider commitments, just so long as 
what it involves is knowledge of the specifically non-independent existence of external 
things with their  particular essences.  In other words,  while we can’t  have objective 
knowledge of irreducibles, we can have subjective knowledge of them. I then use this 
reading  to  account  for  Cartesian  knowledge  of  both  natural  teleology  and  life  as 
irreducibles. The analysis of life extends the conclusions of chapter three by arguing 
that, while Descartes is an eliminativist about life in his treatment of physiology, he 
still has an ontological commitment to life as an irreducible, which I characterise here 
as a (weak) form of vitalism.

Samenvatting
Descartes wordt gewoonlijk aanzien voor een strikte reductionist, en hij beschrijft zijn 
werk zelf vaak in reductionistische termen. Deze verhandeling bepleit echter dat hij 
een nonreductionist is in bepaalde gebieden van zijn filosofie en natuurfilosofie (in het 
bijzonder  wat  biologie  en  de  eenheid  van  lichaam  en  geest  betreft).  Dit  lijkt 
aanvankelijk  ofwel  een  loutere  inconsistentie,  ofwel  een  wanverhouding  tussen 
Descartes’ ambities en zijn verwezenlijkingen. Ik argumenteer dat er meer aan de hand 
is:  nonreductionisme  is  verenigbaar  met  zijn  bredere  overtuigingen;  bovendien 
versterkt  het  toelaten  van  onherleidbaarheden  de  verklaringskracht  van  Descartes’ 
systeem.  De  verhandeling  begint  met  aan  te  tonen  waar,  in  Descartes’  biologie, 
reductionisme  hem  in  de  steek  laat  en  hij  zich  tot  nonreductionisme  wendt 
(hoofdstukken een tot drie). Daarna behandelt het Descartes’ kennisleer en metafysica, 
met  het  doel  de  consistentie  van  Cartesiaans  nonreductionisme  te  bepalen 
(hoofdstukken vier tot zes).
Het  eerste  hoofdstuk  beoordeelt  de  basis  van  waaruit  Descartes’  natuurfilosofie 
geïnterpreteerd  kan  worden  als  reductionistisch:  zijn  corpusculaire  mechanica. 
Reductionisme  lijkt  inderdaad  onmiddellijk  duidelijk  in  Descartes’  gebruik  van 
mechanisme om de wereld te verklaren.  Tenslotte worden natuurlijke verschijnselen 
verondersteld herleidbaar te zijn tot grootte, vorm, positie en beweging van minuscule 
materiedeeltjes. Hoofdstuk 1 beargumenteert dat Cartesiaans mechanisme niet steeds 
zo  reductionistisch  is.  Het  kijkt  naar  een  brede  verzameling  mechanismen  in 
Descartes’ fysiologie, waaronder hartslag, ademhaling en voeding. Het besluit dat de 
mechanismen  waarvan  Descartes  gebruik  maakt  om deze  fenomenen  te  verklaren 
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systemen zijn, en dat ze a/angen van eigenschappen van deze systemen die niet tot het 
laagste  niveau  behoren  (o.a.  organisatie  en  wederzijdse  a/ankelijkheid  tussen 
componenten en niveaus)  voor  hun verklarende kracht.  Met  andere  woorden,  deze 
eigenschappen zijn zowel noodzakelijk als onherleidbaar. Dit contrasteert scherp met 
het  standaardbeeld  van  Cartesiaans  mechanisme  als  reductie  tot  botsingen  tussen 
biljardbalachtige deeltjes.
Het  ‘principe  van  leven’  waarnaar  Descartes  regelmatig  verwijst  wordt  gewoonlijk 
geïdentificeerd met het “vuur zonder licht” in het hart als het onderliggend principe 
van de werking van het lichaam. Hoofdstuk 2 beargumenteert dat Descartes niet een 
enkel  dergelijk  principe  heeft.  Het  toont  aan  dat  zijn  opvatting  over  fysiologie  de 
werking van het lichaam verklaart aan de hand van verscheidene onderling a/ankelijke 
systemen,  waarbij  geen enkel  systeem meer fundamenteel  is  dan om het even welk 
ander. Om die reden is Cartesiaanse fysiologie onverenigbaar met een hiërarchische 
conceptie van een lichaam waarvan de werkingen voortgestuwd worden door een enkel 
onderliggend  principe.  Met  andere  woorden:  de  werking  van  het  lichaam  is  niet 
herleidbaar tot een enkele zaak.
Indien het principe van het leven echter onherleidbaar blijkt, wat verstaat Descartes 
dan precies onder het leven zelf? Hoofdstuk 3 bepleit dat hij een eliminativist eerder 
dan een reductionist is wat het leven betreft. Binnen de literatuur over Descartes kan 
men  verscheidene  pogingen  aantreﬀen  om  een  principiële  en  reductionistische 
conceptie van het leven toe te schrijven aan Descartes, van harthitte tot klassen van 
levensfuncties  onderspannen  door  schikkingen  van  lichamelijke  delen,  tot  een 
ontologisch onderscheiden vorm van complexiteit, enz. Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat 
deze  pogingen  allemaal  ofwel  uitlopen  op  arbitrariteit  ofwel  de  coherentie  tussen 
biologie en de rest van Descartes’ systeem opbreken. Ik beargumenteer dat Descartes’ 
dualistische ontologie de middelen mist  om een reductionistisch concept van leven 
voort  te  brengen.  Wat  Descartes  wel  doet  is  individuele  fysiologische  fenomenen, 
eerder dan het leven als zodanig, mechanistisch uitleggen: hij elimineert het leven als 
zodanig uit zijn fysiologische opvatting.
Hoofdstuk 4 beargumenteert dat de eenheid van geest en lichaam volgens Descartes 
onherleidbaar is  wanneer het opgevat wordt in termen van wat hij  haar ‘primitieve 
notie’  noemt.  Eerst  beargumenteer  ik  dat  de  eenheid  een  epistemische  kloof  in 
Descartes’ dualisme vormt: de reden waarom hij het niet wil en niet kan verklaren op 
de manier waarop hij de verschillende eigenschappen van geest en lichaam afzonderlijk 
verklaart is dat de eenheid ondefinieerbaar is in termen van zijn dualisme. Dit leert ons 
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dat Descartes niet van zijn dualistisch systeem verwacht dat het van elke eigenschap 
van  de  wereld  te  verklaren:  de  eenheid  is  een  uitzondering  (hoofdstuk  6 
beargumenteert dat er nog andere zijn).  Dit betekent dat Descartes kennis toestaat 
over  dingen die  ontoegankelijk  zijn voor zijn gebruikelijke kennisleer:  hij  heeft  een 
afzonderlijke epistemologie nodig om de eenheid te benaderen. Het hoofdstuk breidt 
deze analyse dan uit naar metafysica, wat meer omstreden is. De idee is dat, omdat de 
dualistische  metafysica  niet  instaat  voor  de  eenheid,  Descartes’  opvatting  over  de 
eenheid een impliciete metafysica die er wel voor instaat bevat.
Hoofdstuk 5 beargumenteert dat de epistemologische strategieën van de Meditaties niet 
gelezen mogen worden in Descartes’ natuurfilosofie. Het beargumenteert dat de rol van 
reductionisme  in  Descartes’  project  van  kennisverwerving  in  natuurfilosofie  moet 
toestaan  dat  het  intellect  een  oordeel  kan  vormen  met  betrekking  tot  het 
ona/ankelijke bestaan van externe zaken met hun bijzondere essenties. Dit laat ons 
toe om bijvoorbeeld te stellen dat kleur niet ona/ankelijk van onze perceptie ervan 
bestaat, maar dat dit wel geldt voor de rotatie van minuscule deeltjes waardoor licht 
voortgeplant wordt. Het hoofdstuk pleit voor deze stelling aan de hand van een analyse 
van een regel voor kennisverwerving die Descartes meermaals aanhaalt: dat zo goed als 
geen studietijd  gespendeerd zou mogen worden aan aangelegenheden die  enkel  het 
intellect bezighouden, terwijl zo goed als alle studietijd gewijd zou moeten worden aan 
aangelegenheden die gewaarwording en verbeelding integreren met het intellect. 
Aangezien Descartes bereid is een onherleidbaarheid, met name de eenheid, in zijn 
systeem toe te laten, beargumenteert het laatste hoofdstuk dat hij de middelen heeft 
om andere onherleidbaarheden in zijn natuurfilosofie toe te laten. Het bouwt voort op 
hoofdstuk 5 om te beargumenteren dat niet-reductionistische kennis perfect consistent 
is  met  Descartes’  bredere  overtuigingen,  maar  enkel  zolang  dit  kennis  over  het 
specifiek niet-ona/ankelijk bestaan van externe zaken met hun bijzondere essenties 
betreft .  Met  andere  woorden,  hoewel  wi j  geen  objectieve  kennis  over 
onherleidbaarheden kunnen hebben, kunnen wij er wel subjectieve kennis over hebben. 
Ik gebruik deze interpretatie om Cartesiaanse kennis van zowel natuurlijke teleologie 
en leven als onherleidbaarheden te verklaren. De analyse van leven breidt de conclusies 
van hoofdstuk 3 uit door te beargumenteren dat, hoewel Descartes in zijn benadering 
tot de fysiologie een eliminativist is wat leven betreft, hij niettemin een ‘ontological 
commitment’ heeft aan leven als een onherleidbaarheid die ik hier als een (zwakke) 
vorm van vitalisme karakteriseer.
Translation to Dutch by Boris Demarest
